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# *CURRENT DISCUSSION.*

*TO BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY*

*VOL. II.*

## *QUESTIONS OF BELIEF.*

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Containing papers by Frederic Harrison, Dr. Ward, Professor Huxley, Richard Hutton, Fitzjames Stephen, Lord Selborne, James Martineau, The Dean of St. Pauls', The Duke of Argyll, Professor Clifford, Lord Blatchford, Roden Noel, The Rev. Canon Barry, W. R. Greg, Professor Calderwood, G. H. Lewis, Thomas Hughes, and W. H. Mallock.

# *CURRENT DISCUSSION*

*A COLLECTION*

*FROM THE CHIEF ENGLISH ESSAYS ON  
QUESTIONS OF THE TIME.*

*EDITED BY*

*EDWARD L. BURLINGAME*

*VOL. I.*

*INTERNATIONAL POLITICS*

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1878.*

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1878.

## INTRODUCTION.

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THE aim of this Series is so fairly indicated by its title as to need but little further explanation. It is designed to bring together the most valuable expressions of English thought upon the foremost questions of the day ; to preserve them in a form in which they may be more readily reached than in the scattered places of their first publication ; and to enable the reader to gain a fair, though of necessity an incomplete view of the discussions in which they form a part. If the papers here collected are so chosen as properly to carry out this plan,—if they are truly representative of the best argument in these great debates,—the volumes of the series should have a worth beyond their present convenience ; for the thought of our time is writing its own best history in the reviews and magazines, to an extent that is greatly changing the importance of periodical literature.

There is no branch of speculation or investigation that has not, within the last ten years, ceased to be a matter for the closet or the study of the special student, and become the concern of a great body of intelligent observers. A multitude of readers demand immediate account of every step

taken in any direction of intellectual progress, and immediate discussion of its value. Constantly challenged, every leader of thought has to defend himself before a public which the times have trained to no mean capacity for judgment. It is this continual challenge and defence, this "active warfare of opinion," that has made the modern English review a very different matter from its predecessors. When the *Nineteenth Century*, the *Fortnightly*, and the *Contemporary* were recently called "the three new iron monitors," the change was defined in a single phrase. The old slow-moving and majestic line-of-battle-ships, like the *Edinburgh* of Macaulay's time, would avail little in the warfare of to-day.

The new conditions have resulted in making the modern magazine paper a more valuable contribution to real thought and knowledge than its forerunners, while it is perhaps less of a purely literary work, in the ordinary sense, than they were. The labor spent upon it is spent to increase its force—not to ornament it. Its strength lies first of all in what it has to say ; next, in the directness with which it says it ; less than ever before in other traits of style. It differs from old models as modern parliamentary oratory does, which does not raise its voice or saw the air, but reads from its blue-book rows of figures that are more convincing than eloquence. There are exceptions, and they have, of course, a double strength ; but the general rule holds good. What fills the reviews to-day is not the old essay from the quiet point of view of the looker-on, but the earnest word of the man who is actually thinking and working at living questions. Whatever effect this kind of writing may have upon other branches

of literature—and its effect is clear enough—it is giving us such a history of current thought as no period ever had before. Its very earnestness is one chief element of its value ; and every phase of opinion is finding expression in it. One of the English weeklies said truly at the beginning of this year—"the amount of force which is put into our serious periodical literature is indeed a continually increasing quantity ;" and certainly the catholicity of recent discussion is as noteworthy as its force. Any collection such as is here begun, must aim, of course, to reflect the many-sidedness as well as the earnestness of the debate.

In selecting the papers which make up these volumes I do not hope to escape adverse criticism ; their choice is a matter upon which there may certainly be wide and just differences of opinion. But I have sought in general, where the subject is one of speculation only, to include such as are most truly representative of the great divisions of opinion, rather than expressions, however able, of individual views on minor points ; and where the question involves arguments supportable by proof, to choose those papers which give the most comprehensive view of the facts concerned, rather than those which deal with some single link of the chain.

In selecting a few papers which simply contribute new information to the discussion of their subjects, without being in themselves arguments upon one side or the other, I have been guided, of course, by the freshness of the facts, and the trustworthiness of their sources. Nothing has been excluded merely because it might soon cease to be "timely," in the narrow sense. Mr. Gladstone's "Montenegro" would not be

a less perfect monograph if the Montenegrins should go back at once into the obscurity from which the present war called them ; or Mr. Forbes's study of the Russians, Turks and Bulgarians a less valuable piece of history if the status of the three races should change to-morrow.

I have, of course, been compelled to give up, because of their length, some essays which I should gladly have included ; and some others, which I should have chosen, have been shut out by their publication in volumes of their author's works.

E. L. B.

NEW YORK, March, 1878.



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## PREFACE TO THE FIRST VOLUME.

FEW of the writers represented in this volume need an introduction to American readers ; yet it may be of use to recall very briefly, in connection with their most recent work, the circumstances that have made them authorities upon their several subjects.

Mr. Archibald Forbes is undoubtedly at this moment what a brother journalist recently called him—" the most famous newspaper correspondent in the world." For some years a member of the staff of the London *Daily News*, he represented that newspaper with the German armies in 1870-71 ; but he has had even greater opportunity in the Russo-Turkish war, and has so used it as to make his name known throughout Europe, his letters accepted as a more trustworthy narrative of operations than the official reports, and his promptness, accuracy and personal endurance in the field the wonder of his rivals. His correspondence has very recently been published in a volume. He himself supplies, in the introduction to the article here given, his authority and his reasons for writing one of the most

valuable and unprejudiced contributions yet made to the literature of the Eastern Question.

The Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (until 1852 Sir Stratford Canning) is perhaps the oldest of English diplomatists. He was born in 1788. His acquaintance with Turkish affairs dates from 1809, when he was made secretary to the Embassy at Constantinople, and covers a longer period than that of any other student of the East. He was ambassador to Turkey from 1825 to 1827, and from 1841 to 1858—the last period, of course, covering the whole time of the Crimean war. He labored earnestly to liberalize the policy of the Porte, and was successful in bringing about some of the very reforms to which he refers in the article here reproduced—probably his last published word upon the subject of his life-long study.

Mr. Gladstone certainly stands in need of no introduction to any circle of readers; and the most recent feature of his political career—his persistent opposition to any English intervention for the benefit of the Turk—will be recalled by his Montenegro sketch, in itself one of the most eloquent of the arguments he has brought forward.

Professor Goldwin Smith has been as well known to an American as to an English public, since in 1866 he gave up the chair of modern history at Oxford to make his home in the United States, and to become, two years

later, the professor of English History in Cornell. He still holds an honorary professorship there, although in 1871 he removed to Canada, and three years later returned to England for a long visit. He has been one of the closest English students of American politics ; and his essay "The Slaveowner and the Turk" gives an echo of his staunch support of the North during the Civil War. His "Political Destiny of Canada" is one of the best examples of the candor he has displayed in the discussion of questions in which this country and England are concerned.

Professor John Stuart Blackie, now a man of nearly seventy, has been since 1852 professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. He has published several works in the direction of his special study, and others in philosophy and ethics ; but besides has devoted much of his attention to German history—his best known book in this department having been an excellent collection of "War Songs of the Germans," with full historical notes (1870). His paper on Prussia marks a new return to this favorite field.

Mr. Edward Dicey, in 1870 editor of the London *Daily News* and since editor of the *Observer*, is a prominent writer on political subjects. He has written "A Memoir of Cavour," "Rome in 1860," "the Battle-Fields of 1866," and several other works of considerable reputation. In 1870 he published an account of travel in the

East. Most of his work, however, still remains in the form of uncollected contributions to the leading English reviews. The present and another essay on the same subject have recently called attention to him as a special student of the attitude of Egypt in the Eastern Question; and this, the more comprehensive of these two papers, is perhaps the most valuable summary yet published of the views of an important party in England. A similar student of a special question among England's political interests is Professor Owen, sometime connected with the educational department of Indian administration, and a prominent authority upon all Indian subjects.

The name of Dr. Edward Augustus Freeman, the author of the "History of the Norman Conquest," is as well-known to American as to English readers. During the recent course of the Eastern Question, on which his latest work "The Ottoman Power in Europe" has made him an authority, he has been one of the strongest and most outspoken opponents of a war for the benefit of Turkey. "The Relation of the English People to the War" is only one of several vigorous papers which he has contributed to leading periodicals in support of his position.

*THE RUSSIANS, THE TURKS, AND  
THE BULGARIANS AT THE  
THEATRE OF WAR.<sup>1</sup>*

BY ARCHIBALD FORBES.

---

I REGRET that for a few lines at the outset I must be egotistical, in order to explain what claims I have to speak on the subject of which this article treats. During the last five months I have been with Russian soldiers on the march or in the field ; during the last three months I have been with them in Bulgaria north of the Balkans. I have been a close spectator of much hard fighting ; I have been repeatedly with Cossacks or other cavalry acting as the extreme advance ; I have traversed Bulgarian territory and entered Bulgarian villages in advance of any Russian troops. I have lived with, talked with, and dealt with the Bulgarian population, and taken great and persistent pains to ascertain their real condition and true character. I cannot profess to have had much close acquaintance with Turks, although I have taken every opportunity of talking (of course, through an interpreter) with prisoners, and

<sup>1</sup> THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, November, 1877.

with those who remained behind in the villages and towns, or who returned to their homes subsequently to the Russian occupation. But I have striven to note what they had done and what they had left undone. I have seen their conduct in battle, and their handiwork on the battle-field after the battle was over ; I have striven from the aspect and surroundings of their deserted habitations to realize the habit of their lives in the times when as yet no enemy was within their gates. In fine, I may aver that my opportunities for observation have been exceptional, if not indeed unique, and I can further aver, in no spirit of boasting, that I have striven very hard to make the most of my opportunities.

Yet another short paragraph of egotism. I believe that I came to the work as completely a *tabula rasa* in the matter of prejudices, or indeed previous familiarity with the subject, as it is well possible to conceive. My work has always been the work of action ; of politics either home or foreign I know shamefully little, and for them I ought to blush to own have cared yet less. Of the Eastern question I had not made even that extremely perfunctory study which the wide if thin field of leading articles affords. I had indeed repeatedly seen Turks at well as Russians fight in the Servian campaign of the previous year, but it was not difficult to discern that the fighting in Servia was not always "on the square." Having come thus blank to the observation of what has been passing in Bulgaria during the summer and autumn, I have no right to speak now as an argumentator, or commentator, or speculator ; I can only venture to ask for some recognition simply as a witness, to which character in the following article I shall



strive to confine myself. I ask to be regarded as an accurate witness, limiting myself to the sphere of my own personal observation: first, because I do in all humility think that I have some faculty of keen observation; secondly, because I am without any conscious prejudice except in favor of a good fighting man and against maudlin cant. And finally, I would ask to be regarded as an honest witness in virtue of the fact that what I am now doing must be greatly to my own detriment. In obeying the compulsion to fulfil a duty, I must offend many whose good-will I would fain cherish, must let go many friendships which I value very dearly. In virtue of this paper I am resigning the promised honor of a decoration which is given to foreigners with extreme rarity, and never given at all—wherein lies the pride of having it—but for some specific act of conduct on the battle-field.

#### I. THE RUSSIANS.

The Russian has so many charming qualities, that there is a sense of ungraciousness in referring to his qualities of another character. He is a delightful comrade, his good-humor is inexhaustible, he puts up with hardships with a light heart, he is humane, has a certain genuine if unobtrusive magnanimity, and never decries an enemy. In the whole course of my experiences I encountered only two boorish and discourteous Russian officers. There can be no greater mistake than that the Russians are a suspicious race. The frank simplicity of the army amounted to a serious military error; spies might have swarmed unchallenged, and I have no doubt were in truth plentiful. Newspaper correspondents once re-

ceived, were accorded a freedom of movement, and were unchecked for a boldness of comment, with a liberal toleration, and often indeed a frank encouragement, unprecedented in the annals of war. There was something magnificent, although it was not quite war, in the open candor of the advice given to correspondents, a week or so in advance, to betake themselves to specified points where interest was likely to develop itself. Generals or staff officers seldom hesitated to communicate to the inquiring correspondents the details of their dispositions, or to allow, indeed to encourage him to visit the forepost line. It is to the credit of correspondents with the Russians, many of whom were necessarily inexperienced in the discernment of what might probably be punished as against what ought to be withheld, that the responsibility of self-restraint was so generally recognized. The Russian officer has the splendid valor of his nationality ; he is no braggart, but does his fighting as a matter of course, and as part of the day's work, when he is bidden to do it. As for the Russian private, I regard him as the finest material for a soldier that the soldier-producing world, so far as I am acquainted with it, affords. He is an extraordinary weight-carrying marcher, tramping on mile after mile with a good heart, with singular freedom from reliance on sustenance, and with a good stomach for immediate fighting at the end of the longest foodless march. He never grumbles ; matters must have come to a bad pass indeed, when he lets loose his tongue in adverse comment on his superiors. Inured to privation from his childhood, he is a hard man to starve, and will live on rations, or chance installments of rations, at which the English barrack-room cur

would turn up his nose. His sincere piety according to his narrow lights, his whole-hearted devotion to the Czar—which is ingrained into his mental system, not the result of a process of reasoning—and his constitutional courage, combine to bring it about that he faces the casualties of the battle-field with willing, prompt, and long-sustained bravery. He needs to be led, however ; not so much because of the moral encouragement which a gallant leader imparts, but because, his reasoning faculties, for lack of education, being comparatively dormant, he does not know what to do when an unaccustomed or unlooked-for emergency occurs. He is destitute of perception when left to himself. Somebody must do the thinking for him, and impart to him the result of the process in the shape of an order ; and then he can be trusted while physical power lasts, to strive his pithiest to fulfil that order. But if there is nobody in front of him or within sight of him, to undertake the mental part of the work, the Russian soldier gets dazed. Even in his bewilderment, however, he is proof against panic, and we saw him with sore hearts at Plevna, on the 30th of July, standing up to be killed in piteously noble stubbornness of ignorance, rather than retreat without the orders which there were none to give. The Turkish soldier is his master in the intuitive perception of fighting necessities. The former is a born soldier, the latter a brave peasant drilled into a soldier. If the Turk advancing finds himself exposed to a flank attack, he needs no officer to order him to change his front : he grasps the situation for himself ; and this is what the Russian soldier has neither intuitive soldierhood nor acquired intelligence to do.

Of the multitudinous "atrocities" on Turkish refugees charged against the Russian soldiery with so great persistent circumstantiality by Turkish authorities and their abettors, I have never found the smallest tittle of evidence, and on soul and conscience believe the allegations thereof to be utterly false. But as I must not speak of mere belief, it behoves me to say that of all events which occurred south of the Balkans I have merely hearsay knowledge. "Atrocities" in plenty were, however, charged against the Russians north of the Balkans, and respecting these I can speak from a wide range of personal experience. The Turks resident in the towns and villages of Bulgaria were peremptorily enjoined by commands from Constantinople to quit their homes and retire before the advancing Russians. In the great majority of cases they did so, and their evacuation was accomplished before the first Russian reached the vicinage of their abodes. This was so at Sistova, at Batuk, and at many other places where murder and rapine were circumstantially and lyingly averred against the Russian soldiers. The Turks who anywhere chose to remain were unmolested without exception, so far as I know. The orders that they should be so were strictly inculcated on the Russian *éclaireurs*; the Bulgarians were made acquainted with the injunctions of the Emperor by the Imperial proclamation widely, although surreptitiously, circulated in Bulgaria before the Danube was crossed. To this day you may see the *cadi* of Sistova walking about the town with an air as if he owned it. Gorni Lubnica is a large village not two hours' ride south of the Imperial and Grand Ducal headquarters in Gorni Studeni. Nearly half its popu-

lation were Turks, more agricultural than most of their fellows, and of these a considerable number chose to remain in their dwellings and take their chance of the Russians. They were unmolested by the Bulgarian inhabitants and equally by the Russians. They dwell contentedly in their cottages, they have reaped their harvests and thrashed out their grain ; you may see them fearlessly sauntering about their lanes, turban on head, none making them afraid. About Poradim, on the Plevna front of the Russians, many Turks remained in their dwellings ; they met with no molestation, and are now earning a livelihood by carting to the front projectiles to be hurled against their brethren. It happened that by an accident I entered the town of Bjela in advance of the Russian cavalry, and while there still remained on its outskirts some Turkish irregulars. These went ; nearly the whole of the civilian Turks had already departed, but there remained behind a few, some living openly, some seeking concealment. In the evening the Russian cavalry came in. The Turks who had chosen to stay openly at home were simply visited by an officer and bidden to stay where they were ; those in concealment were searched for by the Russian soldiers aided in their investigation by the Bulgarians, when discovered kept under guard all night till the general had seen them, and then liberated, to return to their homes and avocations. The pillage of the subsequent night by Russian infantry stragglers was the only instance of serious indiscipline of which I am cognizant, and it was no pillage of Turks, but a rough miscellaneous sack of property, Bulgarian as well as Turkish, in which no personal injury was inflicted. A number of Bjela Turks who with their

families had sought refuge in the woods around, and were suffering much from hardship and exposure, were visited and invited to return by order of the Emperor. They reoccupied their habitations, reaped their harvests, and I have seen them walking about the place among the Russians and Bulgarians with the utmost independence of bearing. When the Turkish soldiers in a panic evacuated Tirnova, there remained behind some sixty Turkish families. The Russian force was a flying detachment chiefly of Cossacks. Tirnova swarmed with Bulgarians professing bitter hostility to the Turks, fraternizing warmly in copious raki with the Cossacks. Now, if ever, was the train kindled for insult and injury to the Turks at the hands of the Russians, under the temptations of instigation and drink. But by the Russians not a hair of their heads was injured, not a scrap of their property touched. As soon as might be, the officer in command detailed a guard to protect from marauding Bulgarians the section of the Turkish quarter where the population remained, and that guard was maintained till the Russians instituted at Tirnova a civic government. Constantly accompanying Cossacks and other Russian cavalry in reconnaissances on the front of the Rustchuk army, I never noticed even any disposition to be cruel. Where Turks were found they were made prisoners, in virtue of the obvious necessities of warfare; when complained of, the accusations were judicially examined and justice done deliberately according to martial law. I do not aver, remember, that atrocities were not committed on fugitive Turks; but not by the Russians. While the Turks yet remained in their entirety in the mixed villages, the Bulgarians did not

dare to meddle with them. Nor would they venture to interfere with remnants remaining behind from the general exodus, because they knew the terms of the Emperor's proclamation, and were afraid to be thus actively vindictive. But reprisals were not to be apprehended from Turks "on the run," encumbered with wives, children, and household substance ; there was little danger that any brutality perpetrated on these forlorn fugitives should reach the ears of the Russians ; and the Bulgarians in places unquestionless hardened their hearts, and fell on with bitter currish venom. But north of the Balkans, at least, Cossack lances and Russian sabres wrought no barbarity on defenceless men, women, and children. The Russian of my experience is instinctively a humane man, with a strong innate sense of the manliness of fair play. The Turkish prisoners I have ever seen well and even considerately treated.

The main causes of the inability of the Russian armies to achieve successes proportionate to the undoubted intrinsic quality of their fighting material are to my thinking three : corruption ; favoritism (with its inevitable concomitant and result, intrigue) ; and general deficiency of a sense of responsibility among the officers all down the roll. Let me devote a separate paragraph to each of these blighting causes.

I tremble to think how high corruption reaches in the Russian army ; I shudder to reflect how low it descends. It permeates and vitiates the whole military system. To be venal, so far from not being recognized as a crime, is not so much as regarded as a thing to be ashamed of. Peculation faces the inquirer at every turn ; indeed it lies patently,

glaringly on the surface. An illustrious personage, high in the army and near the throne, has mines which produce iron. Desiring to sell this iron for military purposes, he, spite of his rank and position, had to accede to the universal usage, and bribe to gain his purpose—a perfectly honest and legitimate purpose. A Vienna contractor comes to intendance headquarters with intent to sell boots to the army. He learns that it is no use to forward his tender direct in a straightforward business way; he must be introduced. He finds the right person to introduce him, and duly arranges with him the terms under which the favor of introduction is to be accorded. The introduction is made, and the contractor displays his samples and states that he is prepared to supply boots of that quality at six roubles a pair. The answer given him is that his offer will be accepted, but that his invoice must be made out at the rate of seven roubles per pair, although the payment will be at the rate of the tender. The Russian Government had an account with the Roumanian railway, whereon the statement of the latter showed the former to be a debtor to the amount of ten million roubles. The Roumanian people pressed for payment, but obviously a preliminary duty was a searching audit. The Russian functionary concerned comes to the director of the railway with a proposition. This proposition is that the audit shall be a merely formal operation, on condition that he, the Russian functionary, shall receive a *douceur* or commission of half a rouble on every thousand roubles, for smoothing the track of an operation which if rigidly, far more if hostilely, carried out, must be arduous and vexatious.



Fifty copecks on each thousand roubles seems a bagatelle, but where ten millions of roubles are concerned, the *doustouri* reaches the pretty penny of nearly a hundred pounds, Scarcely anywhere are the accumulated Russian stores—at Bucharest, at Fatesti, at Simniza, at Sistova, at Braila—protected by shedding from the destructive influences of weather. Why should they be, when it is in the interest of all concerned except the state and the army, that the inevitable result should ensue—the rotting and condemnation of a huge proportion of the accumulated stores? The contractors are paid by a commission on the quantity of material laid down by them in certain specified places; their commission is earned when that work has been accomplished; their commission swells in proportion to the quantities of fresh supplies rendered necessary by the unserviceability of what has already been laid down. Every intendant concerned has a pinch, greater or smaller according to his position, of this commission; it is to the direct general and several interest of the gang that as much weather damage as may be shall occur among the supplies when once laid down. If any man wants proof of the universal system of plunder, he has only to visit Roumania and use his eyes. He will find the restaurants thronged with gentlemen of the twisted shoulder-knots. Their pay is a pittance, and it is in arrears: Jews, Greeks, and Bulgarians, the *débris* of the mercantile class, they have no private fortunes. But each gallant besworded non-combatant eats of the costliest dishes, and orders sweet champagne in grating French; the *tout ensemble* of him would not be complete unless his companion were some French or Rouma-

nian beauty, as venal as himself, who is serving him as he is serving Holy Russia. A French correspondent, with a disinclination for going to the front, and a desire to employ his spare time, has been employing himself in collecting and authenticating cases of peculation throughout the Russian army, the record to be published at a safe season when the war is over. The exposure will astonish the world—at least that portion of the world which does not know Russia. In the meantime I venture to assert that every article of consumption or wear supplied to the Russian army costs, by the time it comes into use, more than double what it ought to do under a well-managed and decently honest system. Of other and yet baser corruption—of the little difficulty with which men of whom other things might be expected are to be found willing to be virtual traitors for a consideration, by offering to sell secrets and secret documents—I dare not trust myself to speak. The subject is too grievously melancholy.

Favoritism brings it about that commands are bestowed on men within its ring-fence, with little or no reference to qualifications. The Russian officer does not need merit if he can only attain to “protection.” With “protection” a youngster may be a colonel in command of the grizzled veteran of hard campaigns and many decorations, who, destitute of “protection,” is still but a first lieutenant. The aim in making appointments at the beginning of this war seems to have been to exclude from active service every man who has ever distinguished himself in a previous command. Todleben has been only sent for now as a last resource. Kauffmann, the conqueror of Khiva, was left behind to chew the cud of his

experience. Bariatinsky was not withdrawn from the neglected retirement into which he had been suffered to lapse. Kotzebue's experience of command in active service remained unutilized. Tchernaiëff, who with a mass of untrained militia kept the Turks four months at bay, was left for months to cool his heels in Russia, was at length insulted with the offer of the command of a brigade in Asia, and has now finally been ordered back into retirement at the instance of the Archduke Michael—jealous of the ovations with which a fine soldier and really capable chief was received on arriving at the former's headquarters. Nepokoitchitzky's claim to be chief of the staff lies simply, so far as I can gather, in his knowledge of the Danubian valley on the Roumanian side of the river, derived by having served in the force which in 1853-4 scarcely covered itself with glory in fighting against the Turks. At Ploesti he seemed to me to fulfil the rôle of a superior sort of staff sergeant, always walking about with a handful of returns and states. He is a dumb man—and dumb seemingly from not having anything to say. Levitsky, his *sous-chef*, is a young professor, utterly devoid of experience except in the handling in manœuvres of comparatively small bodies of men ; pragmatic and arrogant, but with a strong will, which, in conjunction with his incapacity has been one of the chief factors in the failure hitherto of the Russian army. But he is within the ring-fence of "protection," and holds his ground against the clamors and murmurs of the army. To be within that pale is to be safe, if not from contumely, at least from open disgrace. If there be one thing more certain than another in connection with this war, it is that Prince

Schakoffskoy ought to have been tried and broke for his insubordination and disobedience of orders at the battle of Plevna of the 30th of July. But he still commands his army corps, and, so far as I know, ~~did~~ not even receive a direct reprimand. In the old days Krüdener would have been sent to Siberia for the unmilitary and insubordinate act of assembling a batch of correspondents, and essaying to vindicate his conduct through them to the world by the publication of the essentially private orders under which he was forced peremptorily to act. But he holds his position in command of a corps, although his immunity may indeed be owing to the fact of his grimly and threateningly holding the telegrams which exonerate him at the expense of others. Schilder-Schuldner, the hero of the utterly "unspeakable" first fiasco at Plevna, still retains the command of the fragment of that brigade which his crass blundering shattered there. General Kriloff, who the other day, entrusted with a mass of Russian cavalry and charged with the task of blocking the Sofia road, supinely failed to intercept reinforcements and supplies marching on Plevna, enjoys the equivocal credit of an exploit which the English military reader may be excused for regarding as well nigh impossible. He commanded for a year a cavalry division at Warsaw, during the whole of which time he possessed no charger, although he drew rations, or rather their money, equivalent for six.

Favoritism as inevitably begets intrigue as rottenness engenders maggots. Under an irresponsible absolutism the Absolute must have an almost impossible thoroughness and strength of purpose if favors do not frequently go through

caprice and from other motives than the sheer claims of honest desert. So far as I can see, even the recognition of merit in the Russian Court and military circle is too often capricious. Young Skobeloff had fought as splendidly on the grey morning when we crossed the Danube and plashed through the mud on its further bank to come to close quarters with the enemy, as on the day when he gained the name of the "hero of Lovca," or on that other later day when he stood master of the three Turkish redoubts on the south-west of Plevna. But whereas on the news of Lovca he was toasted at the Imperial board, and whereas the Plevna fighting worthily earned him his Lieutenant-Generalcy, after the first exploit, when the Emperor embraced Dragimiroff and shook hands with Yolchine, he turned his back ostentatiously on Skobeloff, simply because he was out of favor, and had not yet got back into favor by dint of hard fighting. Every Russian circle I have had experience of—the camp—court, the headquarter staff, the subsidiary staffs, the regiment, the battalion—each is a focus of unworthy intrigue. Men live in superficial amity one with another, while, to use an Americanism, they are "going behind" each other by every underhand means in their power. Young Skobeloff was under a cloud, and Prince —— was his enemy. Skobeloff, who is not a courtier, cleft the cloud with the edge of his good sword, and the cloud drifts on to settle above Prince ——.

General Ignatieff is in high favor, seemingly fixed firmly in his place close to the Emperor's right hand, a man of power, influence, and position. The bad fortune of the war goads certain people on whom the odium lies of that bad fortune, to

wrath against the man who had done so much to bring the war about. There is a period of swaying to and fro of the forces of intrigue, and then Ignatieff goes back to Russia to assist his wife in the nursing of her sick sister. The wheel will come full circle again, no doubt, and then that presently afflicted lady will recover. The mischief of this all-pervading intrigue is that it is a distraction of the forces that ought to be concentrated on real and earnest duty. A man cannot concentrate all his energies on aiding in coping with the king's enemies without, when he has to spend—or waste—a share of them in plotting to get the better of the man in the next tent, or to foil the devices of that man to get the better of him. And, unfortunately, the man who is the greatest adept in intrigue, and benefits by it in the attainment of a high place, has not always—indeed, as intrigue is demoralizing, it may be said seldom—the qualifications which the high place into which he may have intrigued himself demands.

The deficiency in an adequate sense of responsibility is greatly caused by the evil treated of in the last paragraph. But, indeed, it seems to me that the lack of that thoroughness which a sense of responsibility inspires, is innate in the Russian military character, so far as preparation, organization, and system, distinguished from mere fighting, are concerned. The Orientalism of the Russian extraction tends to *laissez-faire*—hinders from the patient, plodding, steady industry of the North German soldiering man. Nobody holds himself directly charged with the responsibility of the urgent mending of a bridge, and the bridge is not mended. Nobody has it borne in upon him that it is a bounden duty he owes to

himself, to his comrades, and to the State, to see that reserves are ready at hand to be used in the nick of time, and an enterprise collapses for want of reserves. A general of division gets an order to send forward into the fight two of his regiments. His luncheon is spread under yonder tree. A German or an English general would disregard his food, and concentrate himself on the proper execution of the work ; his staff officers would compete with each other in orderly zeal for the successful fulfilment of the order, and crave furthermore for the good luck of being permitted to take a share in the " fun." It is as likely as not — I have witnessed the scene — that the Russian general endorses the order, and passes it on to the brigadier by the messenger who has brought it, while he and his *fain ant* staff officers, who have been sitting supinely about when they ought to have been in the saddle, seek the grateful shade of the tree and the contented enjoyment of the refection. Coming down from the Shipka Pass while the fate of the fighting there hung in the scales, I was sent for by the commander-in-chief to give a narrative of what I had seen. The circumstance vividly impressed me, that with the exception of Monseigneur himself, nobody appeared to feel that the general staff, and he himself as a member of it, had intense, engrossing, overwhelming concern with the issue of that terrible combat. The subject was discussed with vivacious interest—indeed, with curiosity, with more or less of intelligence ; but very much in the tone in which it might have been discussed by a coterie in the Army and Navy Club. With the exception indicated, there was no recognition or apparent realization of responsibility. I left the

kibitka with the curious sense that I, the stranger and the foreigner, was, save one, the man who felt the most concern in the episode and the result. Except as regards the actual fighting, there is a strange, inappropriate dilettantism about the soldiering of the officerhood of the Russian army. There is a disregard of the grand military fact that if success is to be achieved, every man, each in his place, must put his hand to the work as if he were working for his own hand—ay, for his own honor and his own life.

One word as to the Emperor. I would have it to be understood that no word I have written can apply to him. His position, in proportion to the fulness with which his character is recognized, must move to the sincerest respect and the deepest sympathy. He is a true patriot, earnestly striving for the welfare of his country. But he toils amid obstacles, he struggles in the heart of gathered and incrustated impediments, the perception of which on his part must, it seems to me, kindle wrath which is unavailable, bring about misgivings which must awfully perturb, induce a despair which must strike to the very heart. He is not answerable for the growing up of the false system which strikes at the vitals of the Russian army, but he cannot but recognize the blighting curse of it. He is not the Hercules to cleanse the huge Augean stable; but he knows, and in this hour of terrible trial must revolt from the foulness of it with a disgust that is all the more loathing because it is impotent. I sincerely believe that the Emperor is the Russian who in all unselfishness suffers the direst pangs of anguish under a Russian disaster.



## II. THE TURKS.

The Turks have blundered greatly in the management of their military affairs, but two mistakes of theirs were of such exceptional magnitude, that they loom high above minor errors. The Turks are barbarians, pure and simple. They have neither part nor lot in civilization : their religion and its injunctions, their origin, the area of their empire, their conservatism, bar them out from membership in the European family circle. It may be and has been contended that this being so, Europe is no place for them ; but with this phase of the subject, involving as it does argument, I have no concern. I would merely remark that when it shall have been conclusively proved that they are out of place in Europe, there remains the physical task of acting on the conclusion ; and that task, to the lot of whomsoever it may fall, does not quite bear the aspect of a holiday undertaking. Meanwhile they are barbarians, and they are in Europe. As barbarians and as non-aggressives, it would have been quite consistent for them this spring to hold some such language as the following to all whom it might concern : " We do not want to go to war, but if any power thinks proper to assail us, we give due forewarning that we are barbarians, and will defend ourselves by barbarian tactics. Our religion enjoins on us the ruthless slaughter of the infidel. If we are assailed we give fair warning that we will neither ask nor give quarter ; that we will, *more nostro*, torture, chop, hack, and mutilate our wounded enemies, encumber ourselves with no prisoners, despise such finicalities as flags of truce ; our battle-cry will be *deen* to the

Giaour. You are entitled to know this, because the knowledge may be a factor among the considerations which affect your final resolution. If after this intimation you are still bent on assailing us, why, then come on and see how you like it." This intimation the Turks did not make, but they have consistently acted according to its literal terms. I have myself seen great clumps of mutilated Russian dead on battle-fields. I have watched, without the need of a glass, the Bashi-Bazouks swarming out after an unsuccessful attack on the part of the Russians, and administering the *coup de grâce* with fell alacrity, under the eyes of the regulars in the sheltered trenches. This style of fighting is working its inevitable result on the Russian soldier, who hesitates to face this grim additional casualty of the battle-field, and it is no improbable supposition that the candid premonition of it would have weighed with the Russian authorities on whom would have vested the responsibility of making war in the face of it. But the Turks have tried to blow hot and cold—to profit by their barbarism, and plough with the heifer of civilization. While slaying and sparing not, they have addressed whining, and it may be added lying, appeals to Europe, invoking the enactments of the Geneva Convention, which they themselves set at naught. Wielding the axe and chopper of ruthless savages, they have acted like a pack of querulous and mendacious old women, in cackling to Europe their trumped-up allegations of violations of civilized warfare on the part of their enemies. They have thus sacrificed the sternly intelligible consistency of an attitude of persistent indomitable barbarism, and have admitted the jurisdiction of a court from whose bar it should have been

their policy to stand aloof. This has been one capital error on their part : an error which may cost them infinitely dearer than defiant contumacy would have done.

Their second cardinal error comes within the pale of civilized warfare. Not having chosen to resist in force the Russian crossing of the Danube, and having elected to fall back before the invaders of Bulgaria, it was on the part of the Turks a grave military omission that they did not lay waste the territory which they left open to that invader's occupation. Had the territory been exclusively inhabited by their own people, it would have been none the less a military duty to have destroyed the crops, burnt the villages to the last cottage, and left only desolation behind them. It might have been that some fanatic philanthropists might have clamored of the inhumanity of this line of action ; but sensible people would have sorrowfully recognized it as one of the stern necessities of ever-cruel war. The Russians could have uttered no reproach, with the precedent in their own history wrought by Kutusoff, Barclay de Tolly, and Rastapchin. If precedents are wanted of a later date, the American civil war—a war between brethren—swarms with them. If the Turks should have obeyed the demands of a military necessity, had the civilian population been mainly their own people, how much less incumbent on them was it to admit deterrent humanitarian considerations as the case stood ! The whole Turkish population was ordered back by a command from Constantinople : there remained only Bulgarians, co-religionists of the invader, notoriously sympathizers with his aims, notoriously disaffected to Turkish rule, sure to become guides,

spies, hewers of wood and drawers of water to their "deliverers," willing vendors to these of their substance. To leave behind, instead of reeking desolation, a land flowing with milk and honey, a land swarming with unmolested friends to the invader, was a piece of military lunacy almost unparalleled. The Turks should have driven the Bulgarian population inland before them to the last man, and left extant not a sheaf of barley that could have been destroyed. That they did not do so was the second of the two glaring mistakes I have indicated. When the defects of the Russian supply system are taken into consideration, there is no need to waste space in detailing the certainty, or in speculating on the probabilities, with which desolating tactics were pregnant.

It is no task of mine to inquire why the Turks did not pursue these tactics. It may be said that they did not because of their crassness, their hurry, their carelessness, their lack of military foresight ; why suggest further reasons ? But the outcome, as a hard fact, stands that the Bulgarian population, left behind unmolested when the Turks fell back, were spared unheard-of suffering. They were in fact left in full enjoyment of their prosperity, it might be forever, certainly for an indefinite period. I want to know, if the Turks choose to assert that they thus sacrificed themselves and spared the Bulgarians from motives exclusively of pure humanity, on what valid grounds is any one to contradict them ? If I find my way into a cellar full of untold gold, and am found coming out with empty pockets, am I not, even were I by habit and repute a thief, entitled to claim that my honesty deterred me from plunder ? I have said that the Turks are barbarians,

and that they are ruthless savages when their fighting blood is up ; but there is no inconsistency between this attribute and the attribute of contemptuous good-natured humanity, or rather perhaps tolerant unaggressiveness, when nothing has occurred to stir the pulse of the savage spirit. And I sincerely believe, on the evidence of my own eyes and ears, that the Turks—the dominant race in virtue of those characteristics which, until the millennium, will ever continue to insure the dominance of a race—allowed the Bulgarians—the subject race in virtue of those characteristics which, while they exist, will always make a race subject to some one or other—to have by no means a bad time of it. Proof of this belief I will adduce in detail when I come to deal with the Bulgarians. But just cast a hasty glance at the conduct of the barbarian Turks during the past two years. The period opens with the Bulgarians, subject indeed to the Turks, taxed, no doubt, heavily and arbitrarily, annoyed occasionally by a zaptieh who must have been nearly as bad as the omnipotent “agent” on the estate of an Irish absentee landlord, bound to dismount when encountering a Turk on the road, just as a rural inferior at home is virtually bound to touch his hat to his local superior ; but withal prospering mightily. The recently imported Circassians are a thorn in their flesh, against whom they have to put up iron bars and keep numerous fierce dogs, precautions which do not always avail ; but the Circassian nuisance may be “squared” by judicious occasional presents of poultry and farm produce to the moullah of the district. The Bulgarian population, it is true, are debarred from aspiring to any, even the meanest public function, not even having the distinguished

privilege, so much prized by the business Englishman, of being summoned on a jury when private avocations are exceptionally engrossing. To judge by the manner in which the Bulgarian civic functionaries appointed by Prince Tcherkasky are presently fulfilling their duties, from the municipal councillor who is making haste to be rich by pillaging alike casual Russian and resident countryman, to the street policeman of Tirnova or Gabrova, who, clothed in a little brief authority, whacks about him indiscriminately with his ratan, it may be questioned whether the general progress of the world was seriously retarded by the enforced abstention of the Bulgarians from a share in the management of public affairs.

It was no doubt a sad thing that the stalwart manhood of the Bulgarians was debarred from proving in the defence of the country that it had a heart in keeping with its thews and sinews, although circumstances may inspire a doubt whether the iron of this prohibition ate deeply into the Bulgarian heart. The country was badly governed, or rather in effect it was hardly governed at all, and this is exactly the state of things in which the astute man who knows the trick of buying protection is sure to get on by no means badly. I do not mean to say that it was all smooth and pleasant for the Bulgarians, or indeed for any of the races of which the population of Turkey in Europe is made up ; but their lot, from all I have been able to learn, was tolerable enough. It seems to have been a lot for which the practical British philanthropist would gladly see a considerable section of his fellow country people exchange their own wretched, sodden, hopeless plight. The life of the Bulgarian was eminently preferable to that of the

miserable victims of the "sweater" who exist rather than live in Whitechapel garrets. I think Devonshire Giles, with his nine shillings a week and a few mugs of cider, would cheerfully have put up with the zaptieh, exclusion from a share in the management of public affairs—although his home share of that privilege is so large and so highly prized—and would have even been resigned under the dispensation of debarment from military service, for the sake of the rich acres of pasture and barley land, the cattle and brood mares of the rural Bulgarian. I know that the Russian peasant soldier who has crossed the Danube as the "deliverer" of the Bulgarian from "oppression," feels with a stolid bewildered envy that, to use a slang phrase, he would be glad indeed "to have half his complaint."

The times, no doubt, had a certain roughness, and occasionally there were Bulgarians who could not accept the roughs with the smooths, and who kicked against the pricks. There have been Irishmen who have manifested active discontent with the rule of the "hated Saxon," and who have been made to suffer for their peculiar way of looking at things. The discontented Bulgarians sometimes were sent to prison, but mostly escaped into neutral territory without undergoing this infliction; and wherever they found themselves—in Bucharest, in Galatz, up among the hills at Cronstadt, or down in the flat at Crajovo or Turn Severin—there they sedulously plotted against the Turkish dominance over the Bulgaria from which they were exiles. I suppose they had a perfect right to do this, and to strive to implicate in their plots their brethren who still remained "oppressed," if prosperous: only the man

who plots and the man who joins a plot must, like the man who speculates, be prepared to take the consequences of failure.

As for the argument that the Turks were new-comers and have no abiding places in European Turkey, but that their tenure there is but the empire of superior power—if that is to be admitted and acted on, there logically follows a revolution in the face of the world, and all but universal chaos. We must quit India, and bid an apologetic adieu to the Maori, the Kaffir, and the Hottentot, the Spaniard from whom we wrested Gibraltar, the Dutchman from whom we masterfully took the Cape. We are to take ship from the jetties over which frown the Heights of Abraham, and leave the French *habitants* and the remnant of redmen left at Cachnawaga to settle between them the ownership of Canada East. Poland must revolt against Austria, Prussia, Russia ; the Tartars of the Crimea are to make a struggle for independence ; the Irish are to drive forth the Saxon viceroy and his myrmidons at the point of the shillelagh ; the Austro-Hungarian Empire shall blaze into a chaotic conflagration, in which “furious Frank and fiery Hun,” Serb, Magyar, Croat, and Teuton shall seethe confusedly.

The Bulgarians who abode at home, ignoring their substantial prosperity, and stimulated by their grudge against the Turk by reason of his masterfulness and his religion, tempted further by encouragement that came to them from Russian sources in Constantinople, listened to the voice of their exiled countrymen persuading them to insurrection. Persistent efforts have been made to minimize the radius and importance



of the organization of that uprising which collapsed so futilely and for which the penalty was so tragic. But these efforts can avail nothing before hard facts. When Tchernaieff was in England last winter, he detailed to me the widespread ramifications of the organization for revolt all over Bulgaria, north as well as south of the Balkans, of which documentary evidence and fullest verbal assurances were furnished to him by the various Committees outside Bulgaria, as he passed through the south of Russia and Roumania on his way to Serbia. I could name several gentlemen with whom Tchernaieff, during the same visit, entered into the fullest particularity of details on this subject. It was by reason of the assurances of support and co-operation on which his knowledge of this organization entitled him to rely, that he dared to violate strict military considerations, and struck across the frontier into Bulgaria as soon as Serbia had declared war. We know how feeble and patchy was the rising of the Bulgarians in reality, but that was owing not to the scanty area of the organization, but to the unpracticality of the conspirators and the faint-heartedness of the instruments. There was no outbreak at all north of the Balkans, but do not let it be supposed therefore that there was no organization for revolt. At Poradim, just before the July battle of Plevna, I, in company with a Russian staff-officer of high position, fell in with a Bulgarian who, now a thriving villager there, had during the previous year been the agent in Plevna of the American Book Society. Six years previously he had been imprisoned for active disaffection, but had regained his liberty by bribery. He had been the head centre of the insurrectionary organiza-

tion in and around Plevna in 1875-6. He showed us the lists of membership and of subscriptions—the latter not particularly reckless in their liberality. Everything had been pre-arranged, but when the time came there was not even a “cabbage garden” rising. The conspirators realized that the theory and practice of insurrection were two very different things, and remained content with the former luxury. The “head centre” had thought it prudent to relegate himself to village life and to make a friend of the local moullah through the medium of presents of poultry.

The Bulgarian risings, then, such as they were, occurred. The Turks probably were unacquainted with the extent of the organization, but we must assume that they at least knew something. For the rest, *omne ignotum pro magnifico*. They had their hands full already. Montenegro and the Herzegovine were harassing them sorely: Servia was getting ready for war with all the energy of which she was capable. Other insurrections threatened in other regions of the great incongruous empire. This one at least was in the hollow of their hand; it must be crushed, stamped out, annihilated. The barbarian had got his provocation, and the savage strain in his blood went aboil. We all know what happened in the hapless regions where afterwards Mr. MacGahan wrote and Lady Strangford worked. It can be the task surely of no decent man to be the apologist of the Turkish wild beasts who ravaged and ravished in those fell days. But, on the other hand, indignation is misplaced against wild beasts, who simply do what “’tis their nature to” when provocation kindles the savage “streak” in their nature. What is the use? It is

folly to feel wroth with the elephant who goes "must" and pulverizes his mahout. He is "must," and there is an end of it.\*

But the Turkish barbarities, like the Bulgarian actual risings, were localized. Perhaps the Turks were ignorant of the North Balkan complicity; perhaps they ignored it; perhaps, seeing it had come to nothing, they gave no heed to it at all. Be that as it may, in all my wayfarings, from the Lom near to the Vid, from the Danube to the Balkans, I could neither hear of nor find human being who had suffered because of the business of last year; and I am sure I inquired sedulously enough. I found no man scored with yataghan slashes, no woman with a story of outrage, which from my later experiences I believe she would have been frank enough with if she had cause to speak. Last year's straw stack

\* Nor can the barbarians, on whom rests the responsibility of the horrors of Batak and Prestovica, urge in extenuation that the history of races claiming the graces of civilization can afford them some instances which, in some sense, they can cite as precedents. It is a calumny that a modern Galgacus might have said of the men restoring quietude to the north of Scotland under the personal superintendence of Duke William of Cumberland, malignantly styled the Butcher—'*solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*. It is the most baseless chimera that a British general still alive, commanded with his suave "Ah, exactly, a thousand thanks!" that a batch of "niggers" should be blown from the mouths of British cannon, whom two words of inquiry would have proved to be performing menial service to his own column, or that British lancers in the same campaign could boast of having three women spitted on their lances at the same time. Pelissier, "alias Le Roy," was one of the mildest of men, and the insurgent Arabs, who died in the caverns of Dahra, perished from accidental asphyxiation. It is a ridiculous untruth that the military policy of the United States of America, as regards the Red Indian, is that of deliberate extermination. In the annals of Poland, 1831 is a halcyon year, and as for Mouravieff, he was soft-hearted to a fault.

stands in the farmyard of every Bulgarian cottager ; the color of its thatch proves that his habitation is not an erection of yesterday. The two-year colt trots on the ~~lea~~ along with the dam and the foal. His buffaloes are mature in their ~~ugliness~~ ; his wife's white-metal water pails are pitted with the dints of years. And if the belongings of the rural Bulgarian furnish testimony to the hitherto stable security of his way of life, not less do the surroundings of the townspeople prove their abiding conviction of non-molestation. Of the vines whose leaves and tendrils spread with verdant green shade over the garden arbors of Sistova, and whose fruit clusters dangle on the brown fronts of Drenova's old oaken houses, the gnarled stems are as thick as my wrist. Pretty Maritza of Tirnova shows you proudly her blooming balsams, and tells you how she took the trouble to bespeak the seed a year in advance from a famous balsam cultivator across the Balkans in Kesanlik. It is to be doubted now whether he will ever grow balsams more. Her mother displays the yet remaining large stock of her last autumn's preservings. And, by the way, it was of this same mother that the tale was written to England how the Pasha had informed her he would hang her, and indeed had even fixed the day for the operation, on the charge of concealing some obnoxious personage. I was given to understand, indeed, that some unpleasant communications had passed between the Pasha and the good lady, but how much, or little, she was perturbed thereby, may be gathered from the fact that she did not desist from her placid preparation of paprika paste—no, not on the very day named or reported to have been named for disqualifying her from the further enjoyment of that dainty.

The Turkish soldiers, when the Russians made good their footing on the southern bank of the Danube, evacuated Sistova without so much as breaking a twig on the front of a Bulgarian house. Their civilian brethren had already departed with like unanimity of harmlessness. The disorganized bands of soldiers fell back through the rural villages, without so much as filching a Bulgarian goose or requisitioning a Bulgarian egg. A Turkish army abode for days around Bjela, and finally departed, its rearguard consisting of irregulars, without a jot of injury wrought on the townfolk or their property. All along the Turkish retreat from the Jantra to the Lom, the Bulgarian experienced the same immunity. The Turkish inhabitants quitted, and the Turkish troops ran away from Tirnova without a blow or a robbery. It may, in fine, be said that the Turks departed absolutely harmlessly out of the territory from the Danube to the Balkans, of which the Russians stood possessed when their area of occupation was largest. How the Bulgarians requited this forbearance—or immunity, if the other word seems to ask too much—will have to be told later.

As the Russians have drawn in from the outskirts of that area, and the Turks have occupied the vacated territory, the immunity has ceased. It is not given to barbarians to accept with Christian resignation, or civilized phlegm, the spectacle of their dwellings wantonly razed, their crops stolen and sold, their little garden patches obliterated. They know that the miseries they find unaccountably remaining in the villages, deprived of Russian protection, were the culprits. They know that these welcomed the enemy of the Turk, acted as

his guides, served him as spies, and found in him a customer for the Turkish crops. They know that these hung on the rear of the hapless retreating Turkish villagers in July, and slew them ruthlessly—men, women, and children—when the safe chance offered. So the “unspeakable” Turk lets the rough edge of his barbarism come uppermost again, and perpetrates atrocities—inflicts reprisals? Bah! what matters it about a form of words?

### III. THE BULGARIANS.

I have found it impossible to avoid saying a good deal of the Bulgarians when writing under the preceding heading, and so much are the two subjects intermingled that in writing under the present heading I cannot hope wholly to exclude reference to the Turks. It must be understood that as I have never been across the Balkans, my observations in the character of a witness must be held as applying exclusively to the Bulgarians between that range and the Danube within the region of the Russian occupation. Nor must it be forgotten that this country is Bulgaria proper, where the Bulgarian race is purest: the Roumpelian Bulgarians are affected, whether for good or evil, by a considerable miscellaneous intermixture of other races.

An outspoken Russian of my acquaintance, after a large campaigning experience of them, gave it as his belief regarding the North-Balkan Bulgarians that they must either be the result of a temporary lapse in the creative vigilance, or that they must be accepted as a refutation of the Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest. My Russian friend had

doubtless good cause of disgust for the Bulgarians, but I venture to regard his expressions as rather too strong. My experience of the Bulgarians, indeed, is that they have fewer of the attributes calculated to kindle sympathetic regard and beget genial interest than any other race of whose character I have had opportunities of judging. But they have some good points, more especially the rural Bulgarians. They have prospered by reason of sedulous industry practised to some extent at least under arduous conditions, and this is an unquestionable merit. Their prosperity has indeed been used as an argument why the Turks, whose bent is far from being so keenly toward industry, and who accordingly do not display evidences of so great material prosperity, should therefore cease to be the master people. It is not for me to combat this or any other argument, but I may venture to suggest that if a maximum of prosperity is to be regarded as the criterion, we Britons must retire *en masse* into private life in favor of the Jewish element in our midst. It tells doubtless in favor of the Bulgarian that he is in name a Christian ; although his "evidences of Christianity," so far as I have cognizance of them, consist chiefly in his piously crossing himself in starting to drive a vehicle for the hire of which he has charged double a liberally reasonable sum, after having profusely invoked the name of the Saviour to corroborate his asseverations that the price he asks is ruinously low. He cannot be denied a certain candor, which sometimes has a cynical flavor in it, as when he coolly tells a Russian, who in the character of his "deliverer" is remonstrating against his withholding of supplies or his extortionate charges for them, that "the Turk was

good enough for him, and that he didn't want deliverance." The Bulgarian is singularly adaptive. He realised his "deliverance" with extreme promptitude of perception, resulting in bumptious arrogance. He drove his ox-cart with nonchalant obstinacy in the only practicable rut, and grinned affably when your carriage springs were broken in scrambling out of it to pass him. In the towns he held the crown of the causeway; in the country regions near the forepost lines he sees it to be expedient to pursue the career of a double spy and a double traitor.

In the preceding section I have spoken at length of his material prosperity prior to the arrival of the "deliverers." The two races—Turk and Bulgarian—dwelt apart; and the Bulgarian, as he drove his wainload of bearded wheat, or his herd of plump cattle and fertile brood mares down the slope to his white cottage among its cornstacks bowered among the trees by the fountain, must often have smiled grimly as his eye caught the barer farm-yards and the scantier comfort of the Turkish quarter, and the ramshackle hovels among the scrappy tobacco-plots of the Circassian squatters on or beyond the outskirts of the village. The Bulgarian kept the village shop, and the Turk, when he came for his necessities, had to sniff the hated odour of pork sausages. The village swarmed with Christian pigs, free to roam into the Turkish quarter till chevied by Moslem dogs. If in the towns and large villages the Bulgarian ear had to put up with the call of the Muezzin from the minaret of a mosque, the Osmanli were fain to tolerate the clangour of the bells from the glittering towers of floridly ornate Christian churches. For every mosque in Bul-



garia there are at least three churches. Draw near to Sistova from what direction you will, the sparkle of the metallic covering of the towers of churches, imposing in all the showy garishness of Byzantine architecture, first meets the eye. From the Russian batteries on the blood-stained height of Radisovo you discern where lies Plevna nestling among the foliage, not by the slender white minarets, but by the glittering domes and stately spires of her Christian churches.

If ever one race owed a deep obligation to another, the Bulgarians did to the Turks, for the forbearance of the latter in leaving them and theirs unmolested in the evacuation before the advancing Russians in the last days of June and in July. The non-molestation on the part of those "unspeakable" barbarians was as thorough as that on the part of the last remnant of the German army of occupation, which Manteuffel marched from out the gates of Verdun through fertile Lorraine and over the new frontier line bisecting the battle-field of Gravelotte. And how was this forbearance requited—a forbearance that might have gone far to dim the memory of the conventional "four centuries of oppression"? The moment the last Turk was gone from Sistova—not before, for your Bulgarian is not fond of chancing contingencies—the Bulgarians of that town betook themselves to the sack, plunder, and destruction of the dwellings vacated by the Turks. They might have served an apprenticeship with the Circassians, so dexterous and efficient was their handiwork. I have seen few dismaler spectacles than that presented by the Turkish quarter of Sistova when I visited it two days after the crossing. To me, as representing a journal whose good-will the Bulgarians cherished,

the Bulgarian *patres conscripti* of Sistova strove to mitigate the disgrace of this wanton outrage. It had been wrought by the scum of the place while as yet order had not succeeded to anarchy—the Cossacks had had a hand in it, which was a lie—the town was ashamed of the outburst of spite, for which nevertheless it was hinted there was some palliation in the “four hundred years of oppression.” But stern measures had been taken to arrest any further devastation (there was little left to wreck), a committee had been formed to collect into the care of the authorities all the plunder, penalties had been enacted for its retention, and the effects were to be stored to await the return of the owners, to whom in the meantime—some of them being understood not to have gone far—overtures were to be sent begging their return and assuring them of safety. I went out from among the *patres conscripti*, and, ascending the staircase in the minaret of a mosque which had been wrecked and defiled, saw from the summit Bulgarian youths pursuing unchecked the work of wanton destruction on outlying Turkish houses. If the committee was ever formed at all, no results followed. The plunder remained with the plunderers; nobody was punished.

The conscript fathers of Sistova told me also that, to save Bulgaria's discredit in the eyes of Europe, emissaries would be sent out into the villages and towns, praying their inhabitants to behavior more worthy of civilisation than Sistova had been able to compass. If they were sent with such a message, it must have been read backwards by the recipients. In every town and village of Bulgaria whence the Turkish in

habitants have fled, their houses were at once wrecked, the huts of the Circassian burnt to the ground. Colonel Lennox and Lord Melgund must be able to testify with how great order the Turks evacuated Bjela. I can speak to the unharmed state of the place when I entered it while as yet the Turkish irregulars were not out of sight. I can speak also to the zest with which its Bulgarian inhabitants began to wrack their spite on the houses of the Turks as soon as they believed that the presence of Arnoldi's dragoons on the heights above the place deprived the work of any risk. Before the Emperor came to Bjela, it took some days to repair or clear away the dilapidations wrought in the Turkish bey's house which he was to inhabit, and after all His Majesty could not but have noticed evidences of the ravage which had been wrought on it. Now this bey was a special favourite of the Bjela Bulgarians. He had effectually kept Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians from molesting them, and they had begged the good man not to go, assuring him that they would tell the Russians how much they owed him. He had to reply that his orders from Constantinople were imperative, and farewells passed with protestations of mutual goodwill. If the bey had thought better of it, and had come next day, he would have returned to a house wrecked by his well-wishers of the day before. For aught I know, the fittings and timbers of the abandoned Turkish houses of Tirnova still furnish its Bulgarian inhabitants with their supplies of firewood. This was so the last time I was in Tirnova, in the end of August.

It would be interesting to hear Prince Tcherkasky's candid opinion as to the fitness of the Bulgarians for civic self-

government. I never had but one occasion to appeal to an official Bulgarian, and the result was not encouraging. I had bought a pony from a Bulgarian citizen of Sistova. As I was not prepared for the moment to take the animal away, I handed to the vendor, in the presence of witnesses, half the purchase money, and a trifle to keep the pony well till I should send for it in a couple of days. The transaction occurred in the man's own house ; he was no horsecoper, but everything around him indicated that he was a respectable citizen. Two days later I sent my servant for the pony. On his way he met the citizen riding the beast. My servant hailed him, whereupon he immediately wheeled about and galloped off to parts unknown. My servant, and subsequently myself, visited his residence, where his sister, who was his housekeeper, smiled blandly upon us, and declared herself ignorant whither he had gone or when he would return. I made a formal complaint in writing to a Bulgarian official in the police-office indicated as the right man to whom to complain, but never again saw either citizen, pony, or money. The complaint died a natural death.

Let me say a few words of what was virtually the civil war between the Turks and Bulgarians, which fringed the edges of General Gourko's operations across the Balkans. I speak it is true, from hearsay evidence, but there could be no better, nor more direct hearsay evidence. The Bulgarians begged arms of the Russians, and received them ; then, hot with the fell memories of last year, and conscious that Russians were with and for them, they fell on the Turks with the most ruthless reprisals. I anticipate with interest the publication of

his experiences by Mr. Rose, the correspondent of the *Scotsman*, who accompanied General Gourko's advance, and in whose way fell frequent opportunities of witnessing the conduct of armed Bulgarians. Be it understood I am not blaming them for what they did. I neither praise any one nor blame any one. But this I say, that all the Turks are reported as having done on their reoccupation of the districts, the Turkish grip on which was temporarily let go by reason of Gourko's raid, is on credible evidence not one whit more barbarous than was the conduct of the Bulgarians towards the Turks when Gourko's star was in the ascendant. The barbarian has acted like a savage in his reprisals; the Christian acted equally like a savage in what were virtually his reprisals for what happened a year previously. The one "terror" has but followed on the other. Apologists for the proven barbarity of the Bulgarians—men who acknowledge that they saw them driven away with horror by Russian officers from their work of slaughtering Turkish wounded, over whom an advancing Russian column had passed—advance the plea, *ad culpam minuendam*, that the Bulgarians have at least not ravished. There is told a different tale in the sad spectacle of the four Jewish ladies, sisters, now forlornly resident in the house of a merchant banker in Bucharest of their own faith—outraged by God knows what ruffianism of uncouth Bulgarians in sight of their own father as he lay dying murdered in his own house in Carlovo.

I ought to say that what I have incorporated in the foregoing article has been gathered by me piecemeal with constant assiduity, by dint of personal investigation and question-

ing. I have tried never to let an opportunity slip of getting even a scrap or a sidelight of information. My medium of questioning was my servant, a Servian of whose truthfulness I have had long experience, and who spoke Bulgarian with the fluency of a native, and Turkish and Russian very fairly. I may add that, as a Serb, he was a bitter Turko-phobe, and that all his sympathies were with the Bulgarians.

## TURKEY.<sup>1</sup>

BY VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.<sup>2</sup>

### I.

IN this nether world of ours it often happens that what is most talked of is the least known. We like to have the sources of wonder well stirred within us. Life, in a physical point of view, is excitement. Wonder, by exciting our curiosity, quickens the sense of existence, and nothing leads more to wonder than the mysterious and unknown. Was ever country, for instance, more talked of and written about than Turkey? Yet in some respects, and those not the least im-

<sup>1</sup> THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, June and July, 1877.

<sup>2</sup> At the time of its publication in the Magazine, the following note to the Editor was prefixed to this paper by its author:—

SIR,—The article which occupies the last leaves in this number of your Review was, of course, known to you beforehand. You were also acquainted with the manner in which it came under my notice after being wholly out of sight and memory little less than fourteen years. It is with pleasure that I accede to your wish of publishing it. Whatever interest it retains may be traced to the essential vitality of the Eastern Question. Your own description of it as a *bird's-eye view* may best enable the reader to appreciate its character.

Circumstances and personal influences have necessarily had their effect upon the general question, and require some special notice in order to explain what here and there might otherwise seem to be contradictions.

Such statements or remarks as are thus required may find, I think, their most appropriate place at the close of each part of my original paper.

Yours truly,

STRATFORD DE R.

portant, Japan and New Zealand are better known to us than the Sultan's empire. Geographically, we have a fair notion of its outline by sea and by land. Historically, we are not without the means of learning by what succession of events and under what inspiration the Turks obtained so vast an extent of dominion. Commercially, we are acquainted with the principal products of Turkey, and the foreign articles which enter most into the consumption of its inhabitants. We possess even a general idea of the religious tenets and national usages which give more or less a peculiar form and color to that complicated texture of races, creeds, languages, and costumes, which is pictured on our mind's eye whenever we think of the Levant. But when some passing occurrence, some political omen, forces our attention into a closer examination of the actual state of Turkey, of the relations in which the sovereign and his people, the various classes of society, the government and foreign powers stand severally towards one another, we find it no easy matter to obtain a clear insight into these various departments of a most extensive and complicated subject. Have we occasion to appreciate with correctness the causes of weakness, disturbance and decay, which operate so powerfully on the Ottoman Empire, or the character and extent of those undeveloped resources on which the advocates of Turkish regeneration bottom their hopes, we are sadly at a loss for information calculated to enlighten our judgment and to fix our opinion on solid and practical grounds.

Our marked deficiency in these respects can hardly fail to expose us to serious errors. We are liable to form a mistaken estimate of the great interests which may at any moment be



irretrievably compromised by our ignorance, or to neglect the timely adoption of measures which might avert, or at least, indefinitely postpone, a dangerous and threatening contingency.

The author of these pages would mislead the public if he pretended to supply the amount of knowledge required to meet so vast a demand. He can only hope to bring more prominently and distinctly into view such circumstances in the state of Turkey as are essential to a clear apprehension of the subject, and to place in their proper light those leading considerations which are best calculated to settle our judgment as to the affairs of that country. Should he succeed in carrying out the plan thus limited, and render thereby his own convictions acceptable to others, he would find in that result a full compensation for the trouble and anxiety which are sure to wait on the performance of such a task. His motives for undertaking it are stimulated by recent events, particularly by the death of Sultan Abdul-Mehjid, and his brother's accession to the Ottoman throne. These unexpected changes have directed public attention more than ever towards the seat of power in Turkey, and it is by no means improbable that a crisis of vital importance to ourselves and to all Europe may speedily arise out of their consequences. A residence of some years in the Levant, and personal opportunities of observing much that has occurred there of late, may perhaps entitle him to an impartial hearing.

The Turks are separated from us by so many barriers that, when we are summoned to give them a thought, our first impression is one of surprise that we should have any interests

in common with them, or that we should entertain any wish either to press our advice upon them, or to step forward, at our own cost, in their defence. Why, it may naturally be asked, should a Christian State concern itself about the welfare of a people whose rule of action is the Koran? Why should those who live under a free constitution desire the maintenance of an empire governed on despotic principles? Why should a nation whose Saxon literature embraces the whole circle of knowledge, ally itself with a horde of Tartars—for such the Turks originally were—whose written idiom is almost exclusively confined to tracts and commentaries steeped in bigotry and alien from truth?

Yet, obvious and natural as these impressions may in appearance be, we cannot with prudence or safety adopt them as the grounds of our national policy. Long before we had any territorial footing in the Mediterranean, that spirit of trade and navigation, which belongs so emphatically to the British Isles, had led us into commercial intercourse with the shores of Turkey. Those who embarked in the trade with that country required protection for their persons and properties against the violence of a despotic government, the cupidity of local authorities, and the prejudices of a fanatical population. We are indebted to the same great Princess for the Levant and East India companies, which in their day, though now consigned to the common resting-place of humanity, rendered service to the States on no common scale of magnitude. It was in connection with the former, and in support of its establishment, that our first ostensible engagements with the Porte were contracted under the name of "capitulations."

These, and some additional treaties still in vigor, constitute our legal securities for justice and friendly treatment wherever the Sultan's power is practically maintained.

The charter of the Levant Company, though it originated in the year 1581, dates in its improved shape from the reigns of James the First and Charles the Second. The capitulations, as now existing, date from the year 1675, but refer in several of their preliminary clauses to earlier periods, beginning with the reign of Elizabeth.

The trade which, thus protected, took root and gradually spread through the Levant, has, we all know, of late years taken much larger proportions. It now comprises the transit trade with Persia, and altogether stands at a high figure in our table of imports and exports, as annually presented to the two Houses of Parliament. It also includes our trade in grain and other important articles of produce with the Danubian Provinces, and in other articles with the neighboring districts of Russia. The shipping employed in conveying such articles of export from that quarter, as well as the corresponding articles of exchange manufactured in Great Britain, must of necessity thread its way through the narrow well-fortified channels of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. No inconsiderable portion of our trade with Hungary, and in general with the states of Austria, inclines to follow the same direction ; and that tendency can hardly fail to be increased by the new and shorter lines of communication, which, as in the recent instance of Kustendjee, promise to facilitate our means of commercial intercourse, whether by rail or by canal.

M'Culloch in his celebrated work, the *Dictionary of Commerce and Commercial Navigation*, remarks that "the trade between England and Turkey is of much greater value and importance than is generally supposed, and it appears to be susceptible of an almost indefinite increase."

He goes on to say that "in 1825 we exported direct to Turkey, including what is now the kingdom of Greece, 13,674,000 yards of cotton cloth, and 446,462 lbs. of cotton twist. In 1831, we exported to Turkey (~~exclusive~~ of the Morea) 24,555,000 yards of cloth, and 1,735,760 lbs. of twist."

"Plain goods" (speaking of Manchester), he adds, "now form the half of our investments for Turkey, and it is impossible, seeing the extent to which articles of this sort are made use of in all parts of the Empire, to form any clear idea of the magnitude of this trade."

Ubicini, in his valuable letters on Turkey, refers to the eventual concession by the Sultan's government to European foreigners of the power to hold land as property in the Ottoman dominions.

Calculez (says he in the pursuit of this idea) l'essor prodigieux que peuvent prendre, en peu d'années, l'agriculture et le commerce de la Turquie, sortie de son mal précaire, dégagée des entraves qui la gênent, maîtresse de ses populations, et fécondée à l'intérieur par l'industrie et les capitaux de l'Europe, dont les armes la défendront contre les attaques du dehors.

In confirmation of these prospects, even under the existing system of Turkish law, we learn from the returns presented officially to Parliament that in the year 1854 our imports from Turkey, Moldavia, Wallachia, Egypt, and Syria amounted in

real declared value to 6,131,110*l.*, and from Turkey alone to 2,219,298*l.* ; that four years later, namely in 1858, the former of those two amounts had increased to 9,786,299*l.*, and the latter to 2,632,716*l.* ; that, moreover, taking the account of exports of British and Irish produce to all countries specified above for the same years respectively, in real declared value, the amount for 1854 was 4,475,483*l.*, for 1858, 7,188,528*l.*, and for Turkey alone 2,758,605*l.* in 1854, 4,256,406*l.* in 1858.

Experience and conjecture, facts and appearances, thus converge towards the same point, and warrant a steady belief that the interest we take in the welfare of Turkey is not imaginary, but well-grounded, substantial, and progressive. Be it remembered at the same time that in giving our support to the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, to the improvement of its administration, and to the expansion of its resources, we promote the interests of a State whose commercial policy is singularly liberal, and from an earlier period in advance of European legislation. M'Culloch, in his work already quoted, observes that "in almost all that relates to her commercial regulations Turkey is entitled to read a lesson to the most civilized European powers." Whatever may have been the cause of it, this superiority in so important a respect is highly to the credit of a government so constituted as that of Turkey. Ascribe it, if you please, to ignorance or to indifference — that ignorance, which steps instinctively before others into the right course, possesses a claim to our good-will, and that indifference, which opened a great empire to useful intercourse with all friendly countries, had at least the merit of not being repulsive in its character. But on either of

these suppositions how are we to explain the positive encouragement given by the Porte to commercial adventurers from abroad, and carried even to the extreme of allowing the ambassador and consuls of their nation to exercise judicial authority within the Turkish dominions ?

At all events, in so far as the Porte, however mechanically, acted on the principles of free trade, the advantage which her adoption of them conferred on foreign countries operated to the effect of diminishing that estrangement which mutual fanaticism had long engendered between the Christian and the Mussulman. England and France in particular were not slow to improve the opening afforded by these means to a more cordial understanding between their respective subjects and the inhabitants of Turkey. The British Government appears to have lost no opportunity of cultivating friendly relations with the Sultan. Its endeavors from an early period were directed towards the maintenance or restoration of a state of peace in the Levant, and those endeavors became more frequent and active in proportion as the declining strength of Turkey yielded to the pressure of neighboring powers. Even the apparent exceptions offered by our policy in 1806, when, in league with the Russians, we sent a squadron to the Bosphorus, and in 1827, when we joined with the Czar and the Bourbon in founding the constitutional monarchy of Greece, were not the results of any unfriendly sentiment. In the former case, which was that of a fearful crisis in European affairs, we had to detach the Porte from a dangerous and unwilling subserviency to France. In the latter we aimed at bringing the Porte into an arrangement which promised to have the

effect of closing a breach in her dominions favorable to Russian aggression, and of realizing a system of reform required for the recovery of her independence and internal prosperity.

Knolles in his history of the Turks, which was praised so highly by Dr. Johnson, relates that in the year 1621 Sir Thomas Rowe, a distinguished diplomatist of that time, arrived at Constantinople with the character of ambassador in ordinary from King James the First. Among the important objects which Sir Thomas was instructed to submit to Sultan Osman, there figures an offer of British mediation between His Highness and the King of Poland, who were then at war with each other. In the discharge of this duty the ambassador is stated to have used the following words on his sovereign's behalf :—

His Majesty hath commanded me to offer himself as a mediator of peace to accommodate the late breach with the kingdom of Poland, . . . which, if your Majesty shall hearken unto, the rather for his sake, as your royal ancestor hath done in the like occasion, His Majesty will accept it as a respect of your love, which will assure and increase the commerce and friendship of your dominions.

The Sultan in his reply to the king declares that—

whensoever on behalf of the Polacks an ambassador shall arrive at our high court, . . . and shall desire our favor and amity, by the mediation of your resident now in our imperial port, all matters shall be pacified and ended, and with a pen we will blot out all former differences, and the peace being so established, your instances and desires for them shall have grateful acceptance with us.

His Highness's letter concludes with the warmest expressions of good-will and friendship on his part towards the King of

England, and of a confident expectation that, "as in times past," the "ancient, perfect, and acceptable course of friendship will be always observed and maintained."

It is evident from a perusal of these passages that the mediation of England was acceptable to the Porte, that it had been used on previous occasions, and that both parties felt the value of each other's friendship, the one as taking a lively interest in the peace and welfare of Turkey, the other as liking to have an instrument of accommodation on which reliance could be placed in times of emergency.

The Turkish Empire, in proportion as its power declines, is exposed on every side to the encroachment of its neighbors. Even Persia, though a Mohammedan country, yet differing from Turkey on points of religious belief, and greatly inferior with respect to extent and population, is not a rival who can be safely despised. Since the last retreat of the Turks from before Vienna, Austria has succeeded in recovering much of the territory which she had previously lost in her wars with them; and although her habitual policy on that side is far from being aggressive, she would not be wanting in power to share the spoil should Turkey ever be marked by others for dismemberment. Justly or not, few doubt that France has an eye, eventually, to Syria and Egypt; not can anyone be reasonably surprised when Russia betrays her impatience to possess the golden key of the sick man's chamber-door. For other powers, who either participate generally in the Levant trade, or have a special share in that of the Black Sea, there would be little satisfaction in the transfer of the whole course of the Danube to Austria, or in that of the Dardanelles and



Bosphorus to Russia, whose commercial policy differs so widely from the commercial practice of Turkey. For us, who have strong inducements not to sympathize with such powers and who, moreover, are bound, in virtue of our East-Indian possessions, to prevent the Isthmus of Suez from falling into other and rival hands, there can be no prospect less attractive than that of a dissolution of the Turkish Empire. Any compensation which we might find it necessary in such case to seek for ourselves on the ground of international equipoise would probably cost us dear, and prove, at the best, inadequate,

Considerations of this kind must surely have weighed with those who successively administered the affairs of England from after the Revolution of 1688. I have already cited an early example of the policy thus recommended to the British Government by circumstances traceable to natural causes, or, at least, to causes independent of our control. Another, on a larger scale, is to be found in the later annals of Europe.

During many years, scarce less than twenty, the Turks had been engaged with Austria, or rather the Emperor of Germany, in hostilities, generally disastrous to themselves, when England in the reign of William and Mary, seconded by the States-General of Holland, mediated a peace between them. The treaty, which was not definitively signed till January, 1699, was accompanied with separate treaties between Poland, Russia, Vienna, respectively, and the Porte.

Again, in 1712 it appears from a letter, addressed by Sultan Achmet the Third to Charles the Twelfth of Sweden, and cited in the fifth volume of Russell's *Modern Europe*, that England, together with the States-General, had offered their

mediation to effect a lasting peace between the Porte and Russia, which is described as having received a full ratification from the two contracting parties. England and her colleague in the mediation are styled in this letter the "ancient allies" of the Porte.

In 1739 the war, which had commenced between Russia and the Porte three years before, and somewhat later between the Porte and Austria, was brought to a conclusion, not by the mediation of England, but with the assistance of France. The terms of peace were advantageous to the Sultan, whose arms had previously obtained more than one important success in battle over the Austrians. It may be inferred from these circumstances that if the British Government abstained from taking part in the negotiations for peace, they were actuated less by indifference to the interests of Turkey than by a well-grounded reliance on the strength of the Sultan's position.

The war which broke out in 1787 between the Turks and the Russians afforded the British Government an opportunity of displaying a very remarkable consideration for the interests of the former. They mediated between the belligerents, and even went so far as to arm in support of their proposition that the Porte should not be compelled to cede the fortress of Oczakoff to Russia. In the parliamentary debates of 1791-2 there is evidence of no small difference of opinion on this subject; but the views of the Ministers were supported by decisive majorities, and much of the difference is to be attributed to party spirit, then running high.

In tracing the policy of England towards the Ottoman

Empire from early times we now reach a period when the great questions brought into play by the Revolution of 1789 gave their own peculiar character to passing events, and when everything in public life took color from the passions engaged on the one side or the other. Our expedition to Egypt at the close of the last century originated, no doubt, in our state of war with France. But would not our friendly concern for Turkey and the interest we felt in preventing the transfer of Egypt to another power have alone induced us to oppose the progress of Buonaparte's arms? The Turks, at least, evinced no jealousy of our successes, and the co-operation of their forces with ours appears to have been cordial and effective. A few years later, indeed, the increased necessity of making head against a power which set no bounds to its ambition and hatred of British independence engaged us for Russian objects in a quarrel with our old allies. Yet history shows that no sooner had Russia been forced by the French Emperor to abandon her connection with us than we hastened to open a separate negotiation for peace with them, and that, much as they stood in fear of France, they finally received our plenipotentiary, and concluded a treaty with him. Nor can it be forgotten that, while we were still in a formal state of war with Russia, the Porte requested our mediation for the settlement of her own differences with the Czar, and that, by aid of confidential communications between the British Embassy at Constantinople and the Russian commanders in Wallachia, the treaty of Bucharest was concluded in May 1812.

The events which accompanied the Hellenic war of inde-

pendence, though often in appearance and effect hostile to Turkey, were certainly not so in spirit on the part of England. The war in its origin was kindled by internal fermentation, fanned, it may well be supposed, by Russian sympathy and something more. Our intervention, though friendly to the Greeks, was yet more friendly to the Turks, inasmuch as it was directed to a pacification calculated to limit sacrifices on their part, which could not be entirely avoided. The Porte, notwithstanding the massacres committed under her authority at Constantinople and Scio, might have settled the affairs of Greece by accepting conditions grounded on the concession of an independent administration for the Morea, with Turkish garrisons in its strong places. Sultan Mahmoud, deceived by misrepresentation and self-confidence, determined otherwise, and the results were not only the establishment of a Greek monarchy, but, to our great regret, the battle of Navarino and the Treaty of Adrianople.

It was not long before we displayed the true character of our policy in the Levant. At the risk of a war with France we bombarded St. Jean d'Acre, and helped to drive the forces of Mehemet Ali out of Syria, and later, at the price of much blood and treasure, we declared war against Russia for the protection of the Porte, and undertook in concert with France those vast expeditions which terminated so brilliantly for us and our allies.

The fall of Sebastopol, which most of us are old enough to have witnessed, had the effect of placing us in a new position towards the Ottoman Empire. For the first time in history the Porte has taken part, by means of a solemn treaty,

in that international system which has long prevailed among the Powers of Christendom, and we have pledged ourselves by an express and formal guarantee to maintain the independence and integrity of the Sultan's recognized dominions, We are no longer exposed, as heretofore, to the mere hazard of having, in virtue of a traditional policy, but also at our own convenience and discretion, to step forward in support of Turkish interests when threatened with some impending danger. We are henceforward bound by a distinct, imperative obligation, as in the case of Portugal, to redeem the pledge we have given in concert with our allies. Should any aggression be made on the territories or national independence of Turkey, we could not in honor reject the appeal which would doubtless be made to our good faith, even if it were to involve us in hostilities with an aggressive power or an aggressive coalition. It may be said that such a contingency is remote or improbable. The answer is obvious. What has happened already more than once may at any time happen again. What in earlier times required a long period and an unusual concurrence of circumstances to bring it about, may in these days of frequent innovation, of rapid movement, and of almost morbid impatience, be at our very doors before we are more than vaguely warned of its approach. Is this a fanciful representation? Let us test it by the experience of facts. Who, in the first week of February 1848, foresaw that the political movement in France announced more than the overthrow of a ministry and some extension of the popular franchise, that before the close of the month not only a sovereign but a dynasty would be expelled from the throne and

realm of France, and that a republic would as suddenly be established on the ruins of the exploded monarchy? Who could have imagined that, in little more than eight weeks from the period of those events, Berlin would be in the hands of its populace, Vienna at the mercy of its students and volunteers, Metternich an exile, and the Pope a fugitive? Who among those who went to bed in authority on the night which preceded the famous *coup d'état* at Paris, suspected that by daylight next morning he would be a prisoner or a convict holding his life at the will of a successful conspirator who but two days before had sworn fidelity to the commonwealth over which he presided? Let us not forget that a few words addressed by the French Emperor to the Austrian ambassador at his court, on New Year's day in 1859, gave to Europe the first intimation of a war which in less than six months made the dream of Italian resurrection a reality, and that the colossal struggle now frantically raging in America from one end of the Union to the other was unperceived by European forethought less than a year ago, and was then, even to American vigilance, no bigger than the prophet's embryo cloud on a remote horizon. Did not the massacres in Syria come upon us by surprise? Did we not feel the necessity of hastening to assist in their suppression? Were we not placed in the alternative of either sending out an expedition ourselves, or relying on the arms and good faith of a rival power? Have we any substantial security against the recurrence of similar horrors, of a similar necessity, and of a similar hazard?

But those who respect the faith of treaties, and acknowledge the claims of international law, may give full credit to

others for acting upon the same principles. Such, consequently, may find in the terms agreed upon at Paris a sufficient barrier against any danger to which the Ottoman Empire might otherwise be liable from inherent weakness or habitual misgovernment. For my own part, I should be glad to share this confidence, and to find it borne out by the consistent practice of nations. I fear, however, that experience, which cannot be discarded from political calculations with safety, points but too often in a contrary direction. A temporary pressure or change of political relations will never be wanting to excuse a loose attention to formal engagements. Duty has the pliancy of a sentiment ; interest operates with the force of a mechanical power. When the wind is too strong for plain sailing, we take in our canvas, and drive before the gale sometimes even under bare poles. The Congress of Vienna has something to teach us in this respect. Never were the interests of Europe more generally and deeply concerned than at that period. Never did plenipotentiaries meet under circumstances of greater solemnity. Never was there a louder call for honest dealing, and durable settlements. Lo ! half a century has not elapsed since the completion of its labors, and where are now the results of them ! Can anyone deny that they have become little more than a record and a name ? Have they held good in Italy ? Have they prevented the territorial aggrandizement of France ? Have they protected the rights of Switzerland ? Have they not been openly violated or tacitly disregarded in favor of the very parties whom they were expressly intended to restrain ? When the Emperor Nicholas suggested the dismemberment of Turkey, was he

not bound to that treaty which in 1841 declared the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in its integrity to be a point of solemn agreement amongst the parties who signed it? During the negotiation of the last treaty of Paris in 1856 and since its conclusion, have not appearances in some measure warranted the prevailing impression that France and Russia were prepared to act in concert, though cautiously, for bringing on a solution of the Eastern Question? On a distant and very different theatre, have more than seventy years of brotherhood in the same constitutional system prevented the two great divisions of Washington's Union from tearing their mutual ties asunder, and treating each other, respectively, as tyrants and rebels, the former enforcing and the latter dissolving those mutual obligations with equal injustice and questionable faith? In fine, there is too much reason to apprehend that the treaty guaranty may prove a snare to the Turks as well as to ourselves, without furnishing any reliable security against the dangers to which their dilapidated empire is exposed from other quarters. They, while relying on the guaranty, are tempted to neglect their internal resources, and we, in the sincerity of our purpose, are disinclined to counteract their negligence by adequate exertions.

A very important interest, already alluded to, comes in aid of the motives suggested by our obligations under the treaty. We are dependent on the Porte for our most direct and speediest communication with India. In proportion as Her Majesty's territories in that country become more identified with the Government at home, it is desirable that the established means of intercourse between both should be, as



much as possible, rapid and sure. Whether the telegraphic wires, and eventually the conveyance by steam, be carried over the Isthmus of Suez or along the valley of the Euphrates, both lines must necessarily stand in need of Turkish protection, and it is evident that whatever tends to weaken or endanger that protection must be injurious to our interests in no common degree.

Let us imagine Egypt in the possession of a power whose population, active, warlike, intelligent, and ambitious, is ever prone to entertain a jealous, and not unfrequently a hostile, feeling towards England. The Mediterranean shores of Egypt are so well fortified—thanks to the skill of French engineers—that whether the Viceroy were to raise the standard of independence, or to be overpowered by foreign stratagem, we should have little chance, and the Porte still less, of forcing his hands, except, perhaps, from the side of Syria, and not even there if the famous canal, with its intended system of defences and its magnificent breadth of water, were completed. In the time of the late mutiny we should have acted with far more immediate effect if a continuous line of electric wires had been at our disposal, and how much greater would have been our difficulties had the passage by Suez been closed to our despatches and our officers—had Sir Colin Campbell, for instance, been compelled to reach the scene of his future triumphs by a voyage round the Cape! The case here supposed may be improbable, the very supposition of it may be unjust; but where such momentous interests are at stake, it is our business to look out, and our duty to guard against the worst that may happen.

These eventualities, remember, are to be taken in connection with the magnitude of their consequences, should they at any time occur. We must take them also in connection with the requirements of our trade in those inland seas which bathe the extensive coasts of European and Asiatic Turkey, with the vast political interests which may be said to constitute us the natural supporters of the Ottoman Empire, and with the treaty obligations which, if they be let to come practically into force, can hardly fail to involve us in many perilous embarrassments and costly sacrifices. Our minds are thus involuntarily brought to an inquiry, bristling indeed with obstacles, but also overflowing with interest and instruction. What is the real condition of that empire in whose destiny we cannot but feel that our country is deeply concerned? How far is the prevailing opinion of its decay and approaching downfall borne out by facts? What are the nature and extent of its remaining resources? By what means can they be so drawn out as to avert or postpone indefinitely its utter ruin and dismemberment? These questions, in truth, are not of easy solution; but they lie in our path, and must be examined, if not removed, before we can hope to arrive at any distinct and satisfactory conclusion.

We owe to Macchiavelli, who is generally considered to be a strong-minded and unprincipled writer, the remark, which no doubt possesses much truth, that a conqueror has no middle course between the two extremes of mixing his own people with the vanquished race or exterminating the latter. The Turkish camp, with a Sultan on horseback for its leader, acted neither on the one nor on the other of these two princi-

ples. Jew, Christian, Hindoo, idolater, all, on submission and payment of tribute to the conquering Mussulman, were left in the enjoyment of their property, in the exercise of their respective forms of worship, and, to a certain degree, under the local authority of magistrates belonging to their own race and creed. Macchiavelli's maxim is vividly illustrated by the consequences of this undecided policy, and the Sultan's government is now reaping in progressive weakness what it originally sowed in the plenitude of self-relying power. Its Christian subjects, those of the Greek Church in particular, live and, in despite of much past oppression and continued humiliation, thrive, apart from their Mussulman fellow-subjects, as objects of mistrust, rather than as sources of strength, to the Empire at large. The modern changes in their favor, though mitigating in practice the disadvantages, have not essentially altered the character of their political position. Their numbers, wealth, and knowledge are generally on the increase, while the professors of Islamism decline for the most part in those respects under the influence of circumstances peculiar to their social condition.

The Sultan exercises a supreme sovereign authority over all classes of the population in his empire. He is at the same time a Caliph, hereditary successor of the Prophet, and, in our language, Commander of the Faithful. The laws by which he governs, and distributes justice through his ministers, are fundamentally those of the Koran and its supplementary traditions, constituting in the estimation of Mussulmans, as we all know, the revealed will of God, immutable and all-sufficient. This rule of administration derives an obstructive

character from its want of capacity for conforming to the variable wants of society and the expanding views of mankind. It operates moreover as an ever-growing source of discontent among those portions of the population who have no convictions to reconcile them to an arbiter of life, property, and honor, by no means invariably consistent with sound reason or common experience, and gradually more and more discredited by the evasions and corruptions which stain while they facilitate its administration.

The original mission of Islamism to force all nations into its pale, either as conformists or as tributary subjects, had naturally the effect of placing its professors in a state of hostility, at least virtually, with all independent neighbors. It sanctified aggression, not otherwise justified, on the rights of all, and made resistance, even of the preventive kind, a duty and a necessity on their part. The process, impulsive as it was, and long most wonderfully successful, carried in its bosom a principle of exhaustion, which eventually made further progress impossible, and reduced the spirit of conquest to a stagnation more fatal to its energy than productive of a sounder vitality. The same development of power which enabled the border states to say to the Turkish Empire, "Hither, and no further," rendered more apparent and less tolerable the vices of its internal system of government. The Christians within and the Christians without found in their mutual sympathies a fresh aliment of hope for the former and of ambition for the latter.

It may readily occur to anyone who compares the East with the West in point of public administration, that, as a

general, though varying, distinction between them, in Eastern communities the people are held to exist for the government and in Western the government for the people. In this respect the Porte does not belie its oriental origin. Simplicity of form, constitutional indolence, when there is no immediate stimulus, serve, however, to qualify the action of its authority, and, since the introduction of certain reforms, the Sultan's government is less insensible than of yore to the claims and welfare of the people. But enough remains of the old leaven to excuse our anxiety as to what principles and measures are likely to give a permanent character to the reign of Abdul-Aziz Khan. Appearances thus far announce a desire of improvement on his part, but whether in a Turkish sense, or, according to the notions of Europe, reactionary or progressive, is by no means so clear. A few months, or even a few weeks, may determine a question which ultimately involves the fate of the Turkish Empire.

Education as used among the Turks, the practice of domestic slavery, and, above all, the influence of the harem, are so many further obstacles to the social and political regeneration of the Turkish Empire. Each of those difficulties must be taken into account, as affecting, more or less, the whole population of Turkey, as well the families who live by their skill, their trade, or their labor, as those who either belong to the several professions, or enjoy the advantages of wealth and station alike in town and in country.

Children of both sexes are brought up together in the harem to an age which immediately precedes puberty. The boys are then submitted to a separate treatment. Most

parents in easy, and all in opulent, circumstances have a tutor at home for their sons. Others resort to such instruction as can be obtained at the established schools, where, with scarcely an exception, the teaching is confined to religious doctrine and the simplest elements of knowledge, with no language but Turkish or Arabic. What passes in the harem is little known without, but the girls, at best, are sure not to learn more than the boys, unless it be needlework and household duties. To ride, to throw the *djerid*, and to shoot at a target, are manly exercises reserved, or nearly so, for youths of condition and their principal attendants.

Of slavery little need be said. The moral effect, especially on young people, of having for servants or companions unhappy creatures possessing no will of their own, and regarded in law as hardly better than cattle, may be easily conceived, though the records of antiquity prove that, notwithstanding its evil tendency, it may coexist in the same minds with much intellectual vigor and a high sense of public duty.

The harem operates far more perniciously on the interests of society. It confines to the narrow circle of each family those holy influences of the wife, the mother, and the daughter, which in Christian countries purify and irradiate the whole sphere of social life, in so far as human infirmities will allow. It taints, moreover, and degrades those influences within its own contracted limits ; it entertains an atmosphere in which the low ungenerous passions grow into luxuriance, and it tends even to counteract by their indulgence the purposes of a beneficent Creator.

Mohammedan Turkey is thus infected with a poison which

circulates with its blood and goes far to explain those signs of a declining population which, except in the capital and at some few favored points, attract the attention and excite the wonder of travellers in that country. More than a century has passed away since tokens of depopulation were noticed there. I recollect to have read as much in some work of Montesquieu, though I can neither quote the passage nor remember its place. My own observation embraces half that period. Fifty years ago, as now, houses tumbling into ruin, or spaces cumbered with fragments of building, were visible in town and village. Graveyards with Turkish tombstones were seen by the roadside, or in open fields apart and far away from inhabited places. Both in Europe and in Asia large tracts of desolation, marked here and there by traces of the plough nearly obliterated, gave evidence of a declining empire. Whatever increase of buildings and inhabitants may be observed at Constantinople or at Smyrna, we cannot venture to take it as any proof to the contrary, since it is well known that whenever the means of living, or of living securely, in the provinces fall off without a prospect of revival, the rural or provincial population flows in upon the capital, and produces there a fallacious appearance of prosperity. Think of a freehold estate, comprising some forty thousand acres in surface, with a large porportion of it arable, and much timber, conveniently situated near a port and market town, within eighty miles of Constantinople by water, selling not long since for fifteen hundred pounds, after being possessed during several years by English proprietors, and improved through the management of an English bailiff.

The decrease of population affects the revenue and the army as well as the agriculture of the Empire. The taxes on land and produce are generally assessed for periods of not less than four or five years. The proprietors in every separate district of assessment are made responsible for the whole amount, and consequently, as they diminish in number, a greater burden is thrown upon each, together with less capability of meeting the demand and farming with profit. In regard to the army, which is recruited by conscription from among the Mohammedans, a failure in the required number has been felt for several years. This deficiency make it difficult for the government to spare those youths who, in many cases, are wanted for agriculture or the support of a family. Owing to the same cause, two-thirds of the Ottoman army exist only on paper, and there follows not merely a greater disposition to disorder in the province, but also a more exhausting pressure on the service, and less preparation for defence against external enemies. Many parts of Turkey are highlands inhabited by wild tribes, warlike in character, independent in their habits, and brought very imperfectly, if at all, under subjection to the Porte. Such, for instance, are the Koords, the Albanians, the Bosnians, the mountaineers of Taurus, Lebanon, and Montenegro. Such were those who, under the command of Scanderbeg, so long resisted whole armies sent or led against them by renowned vizirs, or the Sultan himself in person. Such were the progenitors of Druse and Maronite, opposed in quenchless hatred to each other, but capable of forming an impenetrable barrier against the Turks. The Sultan's troops, who may be said to act as a police with respect



to them, would have no lack of employment, were the military conscription carried out to its intended extent.

The various defects and sources of incalculable evil, thus rather enumerated than drawn out into their full proportions, are the more ruinous in a country where a low standard of knowledge, a rude system of finance, a loose method of collecting the revenue, and the want of internal communications, go far of themselves to neutralize the splendid advantages of a splendid climate, a productive soil, and an unrivalled position as well for power as for trade.

The practice of forcing a debased coinage into circulation has been long a source of disorder and discredit, with consequent weakness, in Turkey. That of issuing bonds or assignats on the faith of an arbitrary government has of late increased the mischief. The exposure of the Mirès loan has made it impossible for the Porte to seek any immediate relief in the money-markets of Europe. Her ministers have therefore resorted to a fresh and very extensive issue of paper money, under the name of *kaimés*, not, as heretofore, confined to the capital, but constituting a legal tender in all parts of the Empire. Necessity may excuse the measure, but its effect, especially if the *kaimés* are used for paying up the arrears of the army, is not the less to be apprehended.

Another evil in the department of finance is the habit of farming the principal branches of the revenue. It has nothing to recommend it but the ministerial convenience of having more positive and earlier data for the estimates for the year. Farming embraces sub-farming, and this part of the system weighs with peculiar severity on the tax-payer, without aug-

menting the receipts of the treasury. Every artifice is employed by the lowest grade of farmers in order to realize a profit on their purchase-money, and the exactions they resort to for that purpose must be supported by authority as a necessary condition of the system.

No country has more need of railways than Turkey. Nowhere can they be introduced with less sacrifice. When they were first adopted in England, the countless millions spent on turnpike roads, if not entirely confiscated, were at least superseded by the new invention. In the Sultan's dominions, with scarcely an exception, there are no roads. The inland communications are mere tracks, wide enough in some parts, and in fine weather levelled enough by use, for carts and small wagons, but generally more fit for horses and camels. Wherever, by exception, a causeway has been laid down, for the passage, perhaps, of troops and artillery, it belongs to earlier times, and now rather interrupts than assists communication by its broken pavement and clumsy construction. There are districts in Asia Minor—that of Siwas, for instance—where grain is so abundant as to sell for an old song, while on the Black Sea coast, not a hundred miles off, the rival produce of Russia commands a high price. For this impolitic advantage the Russians are indebted to the want of a carriageable road between Siwas and the port of shipment. No objection to railways can be charged to the Koran. Contracts for several have been made by the Porte with companies or enterprising individuals. With the exception, however, of thirty miles at Kustendjee, and about the same at Smyrna, none have yet been carried into effect.

Local wants, if not supplied from the seat of government, have little chance of being supplied at all. No great hereditary properties, no constituted aristocracy, no powerful municipalities exercise that influence which elsewhere gives weight to provincial applications. Some years ago it was decided that a road should be made between Broussa, the capital of what was ancient Bithynia, and the Sea of Marmora. The whole distance was not greater than twenty or, it might be, twenty-five miles. The necessary orders were given, the necessary funds were appropriated. The Pasha of Broussa was empowered to carry the plans into effect, and the neighboring population was required to devote its labor to the work for little or nothing. To this hour a good half of the road remains to be made. The works, for no apparent reason, came to a standstill, even before the great earthquake had furnished an excuse for their suspension.

If such and so many are the causes of decline within the Turkish Empire, they are not disproportioned to those dangers which threaten its existence from without. These are by no means confined to the ambition of powerful princes or to the working of adverse opinions in Christendom. They spring in great part from causes more strictly natural, from the physical position occupied by Turkey, and the circumstances which attended its political growth. Consider the length of frontier which separates the Sultan's dominions from those of Austria, Russia, and Persia—to say nothing of Greece, Egypt, and Barbary. The waters of the Euxine alone break the continuity of a line extending from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf. A policy of conquest, not so much resigned by choice

as dropped through necessity, operates even now so far as to keep up a jealous attention at the Porte to frontier interests. The Colossus stands on fragile feet, and therefore makes them the principal object of its care. Head and heart may shift for themselves, provided the extremities be respected. The Porte is thus brought into sensitive contact with its neighbors at a thousand points. Subjects of discussion, motives for quarrel, are seldom wanting ; intrigues and sympathy work together for the sick man's ruin ; the very distances from one point to another of a vast outline, and of all those points from the capital, serve to weaken the supreme authority and to harass its principal instrument, the army.

Russia cannot be at ease while the key of so large a portion of her empire remains in the Sultan's possession. If it be the will of Europe that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should undergo no change of hands, we can hardly wonder that Russian policy should seek to command the means of keeping the Porte in awe. That policy finds a natural auxiliary in the religious sympathy of the Greeks ; it finds another in the political or religious discontents of Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, and Bulgaria ; yet another in the questionable independence maintained by the highlanders of Montenegro and even of Bosnia. It made Sebastopol, its port and arsenal, what they were before the Crimean war, and it may be numbered among the motives which prevail with Russia to keep up a military establishment at once so onerous and so imposing. It works, moreover, by intrigue, by affiliation with the Armenians, by issuing protections in the form of passports to Christian subjects of the Porte, by tampering with frontier

tribes, and moving the springs of corruption wherever they can be played with advantage.

From other motives and in other ways the French, though not immediately bordering on Turkey, but too often act so as to warrant a certain degree of mistrust and apprehension on its part. Their conduct on various occasions in Egypt, Syria, Greece, Tunis, Algiers, and Montenegro, to say nothing of Moldavia and Wallachia, could hardly inspire the Sultan's government with perfect confidence in their views. They seem, in general, to entertain a low opinion of the Porte's capacity for improvement, and are therefore naturally inclined to shape their policy according to that impression, preparing rather to secure their own interests in case of a break-up than by a system of measures firmly and strenuously carried out to prevent so perilous a catastrophe. It is clear that their conduct tends, by the discouragement it diffuses, to accelerate the decay of the Ottoman Empire, and hence, however reluctantly, we cannot but give it a place in the list of dangers to which that Empire is exposed.

Of other Powers, and the relations in which they respectively stand towards the Porte, little need be said in this place. The policy of England in the Levant is well known, and offers no room for question, except as to manner and degree. Neither Austria nor Prussia is likely, under present circumstances, to take part in any measures unfriendly to the Porte. Together with Greece and Italy they might eventually pretend—and Austria the foremost—to have a share in the spoil, but they can hardly be suspected of wishing to hasten the overthrow of an empire whose dismemberment would offer much greater advantages to others than to themselves.

Be it as it may, we must in fairness admit that on mere grounds of appearance we have no right to impute ambitious schemes or evil intentions to those who despair of the sick man's recovery. Unfortunately there is illness enough to create a world of doubts in the most sanguine mind. The suspicion, to be fairly sustained, must find its justification in other circumstances, and the task of making out a case with respect to them is too invidious to be undertaken without an immediate necessity.

There is something more agreeable, something more promising in view, if we attempt to ascertain how far a disease, apparently deep-seated and attended with many forbidding symptoms, is nevertheless open to remedies and capable of yielding to a well-conducted method of treatment. The inquiry has its interests—it has also its difficulties. The proofs of disorder lie on the surface, and can hardly be mistaken. The means of recovery, when recognized, have much to contend with in their application, and their results in the commencement must be conjectural. That men are liable to perish from want of food is unquestionable ; but who can prove at seed-time what the harvest will be ? One thing is certain—we must sow betimes in order to reap in season. The alternative is fatal.

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*May 26, 1877.*

The many years which have passed away since I wrote the preceding pages have not been unproductive of incidents tend-

ing to modify opinions respecting the much-battered, but well-nigh inexhaustible, question of the East. Not that my own opinions as to its essential points have undergone any important alteration. They are still in favor of keeping the Turkish authority at Constantinople ; of reforming their political and administrative system ; of maintaining, or, as we must now express it, of restoring peace. Sundry changes of circumstance took place in the interval between the treaty of Paris in 1856 and the rising of Herzegovina in 1875, and to them may justly be ascribed any difference which marks the present state of opinion as to Turkish affairs compared with that which prevailed at the close of the Crimean war. I refer in particular to the policy, or rather the conduct, of Sultan Abdul-Aziz, to the loans contracted by the Porte in Christendom during his ill-omened reign, to the act of bankruptcy which marked the extinction of his credit, and in general to the neglect of those engagements which in reality formed the basis of a new and more cordial state of relations between Turkey and the chief countries of Europe at a period unusually favorable to their fulfilment. The Crimean war, commenced by Russia, had for its object to prevent that Power from realizing a paramount influence in Turkey under a conventional right to protect all Ottoman subjects of her religion. The treaty of Paris, which put the seal of Europe on the victorious career of the Allies, was intended to act as a barrier against the renewal of any similar pretensions. How far it has secured that result may be inferred from the Black Sea Convention of 1871, and the recent declaration of independence by the two Danubian Principalities. How far it was fitted to an-

swer its final purpose may be collected from other circumstances, which must be kept in sight both here and elsewhere.

By the seventh article of the treaty an engagement was taken by all the Powers in common to respect, and moreover to guarantee, the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. By the ninth article the Sultan's plenipotentiary annexed to the treaty a copy of His Majesty's *Hat-homayoon*, and the Powers engaged not to interfere with the internal affairs of the Porte in consequence of that communication. The Powers, no doubt, were bound by that engagement, but the engagement related to the *communication* alone, and to nothing else. The Sultan, on his part, was not the less bound to carry out his proclamation of reforms, and indeed he took it upon himself, on his imperial honor, to give it a full practical effect. Virtually this was the condition on which the Porte was received, to use a French expression, into the family of European States. Now what, let me ask, was the proclamation, and what was the manner in which it was carried out? The proclamation, though invested with the forms of imperial grandeur, was, in truth, a collection of reforms drawn up by a mixed assemblage of Turkish ministers and foreign ambassadors. The operation took place at the residence of the British embassy in Turkey just before the departure of the Ottoman plenipotentiary for Paris. It was, in truth, on that solemn instrument that His Excellency founded his claim to the full confidence of his Christian colleagues in the ensuing negotiation. To the conclusion of peace succeeded a period of more than nineteen years, during which the Porte was free from any danger of external ori-



gin, undisturbed indeed by any trouble of a serious character from within, supported by a threefold increase of its revenue, and gathering in addition by loans from the capitalists of Christendom very many millions of sterling money. If we ask to what account these splendid advantages were carried, the answer must be that the just expectations of Europe with respect to the correction of Turkish misrule were, with some few exceptions, painfully disappointed, and that the large sums of money derived from revenue and loans were either extravagantly wasted, or applied to that extension of naval and military force in reliance on which the Turkish statesmen and their sovereign have stood out against the united demands of all those other Powers who signed the treaty of Paris.

I would not be extreme in visiting on Turkey the entire responsibility for these lapses in point of good faith and political discretion, especially when I look in vain for signs of any serious endeavor on the part of Europe to check the course of Turkish impolicy and neglect of the Porte's obligations during its fatal progress under the sway of Sultan Abdul-Aziz. But if I had heard that our Government had withdrawn from their share in the engagements of Paris on the ground of the Porte's neglect of those reforms which the Sultan had accepted and proclaimed, my surprise, if any, would have been very moderate. That it was a duty on our part to insist on the full execution of the Imperial firman is, I think, unquestionable, though whether to the extreme of coercion must greatly depend on other and eventual circumstances. It is at all events difficult to conceive how any Christian Power could, without palpable discredit, throw its sword into the scale of

Turkish inviolability so long as the Porte maintains a system of misrule the more to be deprecated in proportion to the increased sensibility of its victims on one side, and of their sympathizers on the other. Finally, it would seem idle to dwell on such considerations as might attach to the treaty of Paris, since recent events show but too clearly that its practical force, if it has not ceased entirely, has at least for a time shrunk into a state of abeyance.

The popular movement which took place about two years ago in the Herzegovina was only an active form of a chronic disease. The ever-growing proportions it has since taken are now culminating in open war on a large scale between the two Powers who perform the part of hotbed to the Eastern Question. Hostilities are not yet sufficiently advanced to admit of a deeper look into the mill-stream than that of a general conjecture suggested by a comparison of the means employed and the resources possessed by each of the two belligerents. The current notion that Russia is superior in the latter respect, and not improbably in the former also, may be not far from the truth. But something must be left for time to reveal, and perhaps there is more to be gained by reflecting on the past than by peering too soon into the gloom of futurity.

## II.

FALSE principles of government, corrupt motives of action inflamed by religious animosities, conflicting interests arrayed against each other, rooted prejudices, and anti-social manners, have concurred to place the Ottoman Empire on an in-

clined plane. The position is one of natural determination towards a state of exhaustive weakness. The progress of other States in knowledge and national development increases by comparison the dangers of that decline. It has increased them practically, as a long series of defeats and losses on the side of Turkey may serve to testify. The expansive energies of civilization can no longer brook the inertness, and in some respects the exclusiveness, of a country so fertile in resources, so obstructively situated, and offering at the same time a field of almost boundless extent for remunerative enterprise. The problem which calls for solution is simply this: Can the strength of the Empire be so far restored by means consistent with the wants and spirit of the age as to preserve internal order and to command the respect of foreign Powers?

The incurables, who for such means look to the revival of Mohammedan convictions, must tell us by what process a faith, no longer entertained even in Turkey by reflecting or educated minds, can operate as the motive power of a Government compelled by the conditions of its tenure to restrain the passions, and frequently to counteract the impulsions, of an ignorant and fanatical race. Under a system of administration thus inspired, religious belief must evidently be the rule of right, and the measure of individual worth. How then would Jew and Christian fare both as to political rights and as to personal consideration? Would the peace and well-being of the Empire be secured by forcibly renewing the submission of one half of its population to the pride and bigotry of the other? Would there be "no complaining in the streets," no danger of resistance, no appeal to the foreigner, no resent-

ment in Christendom? Is the war of Hellenic independence a fable, the chastisement inflicted on Damascus a dream? Are the Greeks less sensible than they were of degradation and oppression, or the nations of Europe more deaf to the claims of humanity and the sympathies of religion?

Lord Overstone's "*Impossible!*" may be applied here as truly as to the supposed capture of London. Should any one attempt to force back the waters of a river to their source, he would only deluge the country, and perhaps even ruin, if not drown, its inhabitants.

Another and ampler basis than that of an unsanctioned revelation is wanted for the reconstruction of a dilapidated empire. Where but in the elements of social harmony, correction of discord and decomposition, can such a foundation be discovered? That civilizing process, which carries out materially and morally the benevolent purposes of Providence, and knits together the various classes and pursuits of mankind by the bonds of social interest, combines whatever is necessary for the external defence, internal welfare, and legitimate advancement of a constituted community. Religion, in respect of belief, like the action of the lungs, is involuntary, and therefore, however essential to moral, as breathing is to bodily health, is not in that sense properly a subject of legal enforcement on individuals as such, and still less a just obstacle to the freedom of legislative enactment in other matters. A body politic, the compound of individual men, partakes of their mutable and mortal nature. If linked inseparably to laws believed to be divine, and therefore unalterable, the interests of the community, which require

change of law with change of circumstances, must, in the end, be seriously, perhaps even fatally, compromised. To this dilemma it would seem that the Turks are now reduced. They must either be content to govern on larger principles, with the advantage of extending proportionally their means of improvement and independence, or they must incur the necessary consequences of persisting in error, and thereby having to contend with the disaffection of their Christian subjects and the resentment of their Christian allies. Sultans may continue to be caliphs for their Mussulman subjects, but they must learn to act as sovereigns for the people at large.

The difficulties suggested by this view of the question are by no means so great as they may appear to those who have only a general acquaintance with Turkey, its empire, and its history. The Koran is far from being that inelastic code of laws which many suppose. It has long ceased to be an exact mirror of Islamism as practised by the Ottoman authorities. The difference which has perceptibly grown up between the letter and the practice of the law is not merely one of suspension, such as the disuse of hostilities for the propagation of the faith, but positively active, as in the case of treaties and alliances with Christian Powers. This primary departure from the system of policy prescribed by Islamism dates from the sixteenth century. Solymán the Magnificent and Francis the First of France first set the example of an alliance between the sovereign of the Turks and a Christian Power. The act was founded on mutual convenience suggested by their respective international positions at the time. It led to the establishment of similar relations between the

Porte and other European Powers, to the reception of consuls in the outports of Turkey, and to the exercise of jurisdiction by them over their own fellow-subjects. It was the first link in a series of concessions which may be fitly called *extra-Koranic*, and which were gradually made, to the necessity, more and more felt by the Porte, of obtaining a less insulated position as to the State of Christendom.

Internal reforms were commenced in the same spirit towards the close of the last century by Selim, the last Sultan of that name. The Janissaries, excited no doubt by the Ulemah, broke into open rebellion, and the reaction which followed cost the reforming Sultan both his throne and his life. Mustapha, who succeeded to the throne, was not more fortunate than his cousin. It was reserved for his brother Mahmoud to realize the plans of Selim, and to revenge that Sultan's death by the extermination of the Janissaries. This ill-disciplined and unmanageable militia was replaced by a regular army formed on the European model. The Sultan put forth all his energy for its completion ; but the weakness of his empire, proved and increased by successive misfortunes—by the war with Russia which terminated in the treaty of Adrianople, by the independence of Greece which followed the battle of Navarino, and by the victorious progress of Ibrahim Pasha into Syria and Asia Minor—compelled him to enter into closer relations with Christian Europe. The proclamation of *Gulhané*, and the introduction of extensive reforms under the name of *Tanzimat-kairieh*, gave a solemn and imposing earnest of Mahmoud's sincerity. They laid the foundations of a real improvement in the Turkish adminis-

trative system, and more especially in the treatment of rayahs, non-Mussulman subjects bound to pay a yearly poll-tax to the Grand Seignior. Further and more decided measures of reform were subsequently adopted. Those of a judicial character were not the least important. A court was established for the trial of civil causes between the Porte's subjects and foreigners. It was a mixed tribunal, taking cognizance more particularly of differences arising in trade and navigation. Its maxims of law and rules of procedure were derived from Christian sources. Our leading principles and forms of trial, exclusive of juries, were even admitted by firman in some of the criminal courts ; and at Constantinople, in the highest of those courts where Mohammedan law prevailed, our Consul-General was allowed to sit with the power of watching the proceedings, and staying for his assent the execution of judgment on behalf of British subjects brought to trial on capital charges.

To these beneficial innovations are to be added the establishment of lazarettos for quarantine against plague and cholera ; the suppression of the negro slave-trade with a view to that of slavery ; the abolition of torture and of capital punishment in cases of conversion from Islamism ; and the recognition of Protestantism as one of the protected and established religions in Turkey.

During the Crimean war a notable enlargement took place in other branches of social progress, inconsistent, more or less, with the restrictions of Mussulman law, but required by the necessities of the Empire. Loans were raised at interest in foreign countries for the service of the State. The Porte's

Christian subjects were released from the payment of tribute, and were declared to be admissible as privates and officers to the Imperial army. Turkish battalions were placed under the command of British commanders, and British agents were allowed to raise levies among the Turks for an irregular military corps to be paid and officered by Her Majesty's Government. At one time the suburbs of Pera and Galata were held in aid of the police, by detachments of the French and English armies. On the cessation of hostilities all previous reforms, together with important additions, were confirmed and declared by an imperial proclamation known as the *Hatt-y-homayoon*, solemnly promulgated, and inserted, as a fact, in the general treaty of peace. Among its new provisions were two, in particular, characterized by a liberality which it would not be easy to surpass. By one the faculty of holding land in fee throughout Turkey was granted to foreign subjects, with a reserve of some preliminary arrangements. By the other both natives and foreigners were allowed full liberty of conscience in religious matters.

These are facts, and we are bound to give them our candid and serious attention. They remove a part of the difficulty which Islamism opposes in theory to the reformation of the Turkish Empire on European principles. They encourage a hope that the remaining obstacles may be gradually surmounted. Most of them show to demonstration that in Turkey, as elsewhere, custom and law must ultimately yield to consideration for the safety of the State. We are friends to the Sultan's Empire. We do not seek to overthrow or to undermine its dominant faith. We only desire that re-



ligion should cease to be so applied to worldly affairs as to render the administration of them ruinous to the public weal. We urge the expediency, and indeed the necessity, of carrying fully into effect those salutary reforms which have been long and strenuously recommended to the Sultan by his allies, which have been adopted by his supreme authority, proclaimed by him to the whole world, and recorded under the most solemn forms of international engagement. We desire, in other words, to obtain for the Porte a real instead of a fictitious independence—the well-grounded, durable respect, and not the mere precarious sufferance, of contemporary Powers.

All classes of the population would gradually feel the benefit of a change, which could not fail to operate favorably on their interests in a national sense. Any discontents which may prevail among the Turks arise principally out of causes independent of their religious prejudices, though naturally seen in connection with them. A state of transition in matters of deep and extensive concern is always attended with inconvenience to many, with a dislocation of partial interests and a rupture of much that is sanctified, as it were, by habit and early associations. To halt between two systems instead of frankly adopting the one which on the whole is preferable, can have no effect but that of prolonging evils incident to both. Unfortunately such has been hitherto the conduct of the Turkish Government, excusable indeed in some respects, but far from being necessary.

Under the old system, confiscations, crown lands, royalties, property lapsing to the Sovereign, forced labor, offerings not quite voluntary, requisitions in kind, and other inci-

dental sources of profit were auxiliary to the revenue derived from tithes, taxes, and customs. The Spahis and Timariotes, who held their lands on condition of military service, were bound, when called upon, to take the field armed and mounted at their own expense. On the extermination of the Janissaries in 1826 a regular army, as mentioned above, was formed by Sultan Mahmoud, and later a civil list was established in place of the crown lands and other imperial sources of revenue. Life, property, and honor were also secured by charter to subjects of all classes against the assaults of arbitrary power. The Sultan and his Government had in consequence to look exclusively to the exchequer for their ways and means in carrying on the administration, and providing for the peace, the defence, and general welfare of the Empire. Hence it became more than ever necessary that an improved system of finance should be adopted, and the collection of the taxes cleared of all those abuses and corrupt practices which at once oppressed the people and defrauded the treasury. A child may perceive that discontent, embarrassment, and ruin must be the necessary consequences of drying up the old sources of supply without opening new ones, of depriving the dominant classes of their long-cherished privileges without enabling them to realize the compensation offered by a more liberal and productive course.

Respect for the Sultan, consideration even for his weaknesses, submission to his authority, nay, to his pleasure, are still universal among the Mussulman population. From time to time, and not unfrequently, there are disturbances, now in this, now in that province, but they arise nearly always from

local causes, and are confined within narrow limits. Excesses may be committed by some body of insurgents ; the magistrates may be overpowered ; individuals may suffer, and the immediate object of aversion may be swept away. But after a time the Sultan's authority is sure to ride over all obstacles, and to restore the public peace with more or less severity and some feeble show of reparation. The army, inadequate as it is to the wants of the Empire, ill fed, ill clothed, and ill paid, thinned by frequent marches over miserable roads, and having no reason to rely upon its officers, rarely, if ever, fails to perform its duty. Discipline, though imperfect, gives it a constant advantage over the rude extempore levies opposed to its arms. The worst of it is that such occurrences tend more and more to exhaust the strength of the Empire by a twofold process. Parties brought locally into conflict wear each other down, and the Government, which finally reduces them to order, accomplishes its purpose at a loss, not easily repaired, in men and money. A despot's strength is the weakness of his subjects ; that of a constitutional government resides in the wealth and good-will of the people. Ill fares the country where neither strong hand nor willing heart is to be found.

The fortunes of the Turkish Empire, in their flow, are mainly to be ascribed to religious enthusiasm, military discipline, national character, unanimity of purpose, the confidence of success, submission to a single will, and also to the inferiority of its opponents. Their decline may be generally accounted for by the progress of Christendom, and particularly of Northern Christendom, in the arts of war, in population, in produce, and in every branch of knowledge, by the natural

consequences of error in policy, administration, and social manners, by the mutinous spirit of the Janissaries, by the enervating habits of the seraglio, and by the corrupt intrigues of adventurers at court and in office. Much, however, in the one period and in the other, belongs to the personal qualities of the Sultan, or of the principal depositary of his power. The nature of the government and the character of the people make it so. Mahomet, the conqueror of Constantinople, and his immediate successors are brilliant illustrations of the fact. Mahmoud, the present Sultan's father, ruled with power, and commanded general respect notwithstanding his losses, his reforms, his sanguinary executions, and the vile debaucheries which closed his life. His eldest son and successor fell into contempt through want of resolution and energy, although his reign, unsullied by any measures of injustice or cruelty, was marked, on the contrary, by a course of policy successful, on the whole, both at home and abroad. His failings were those of a gentle generous disposition unsustained by that vigor of mind and body which the difficulties of his perilous station required. If, as there is room to hope, his younger brother, the reigning Emperor, should carry out the reforms and improvements adopted by Abdul-Mehjid with the energy displayed by Mahmoud, Turk and Christian, the Empire and its allies, would have reason to rejoice. Appearances are, so far, favorable to this expectation, and if it be true that Sultan Abdul-Aziz intends in good earnest to limit his connubial establishment to a single wife, the prospect may soon ripen into a reality. Economy would be the least advantage of such a limitation. The morals and manners of the seraglio would undergo

a transformation much to be desired. The example would operate most beneficially throughout the whole range of Turkish society. The harem would cease to be a curse, and a great step would be made towards an intermixture of classes. But we must be content to wait a while in suspense. It is not the first time that a new reign has commenced with a clearance in the palace. Four thousand ladies and attendant officers are described in the Turkish annals as having been dismissed on one occasion. A vast increase of paper currency and its intended application to the payment of the army are measures of ominous import. The dismissal of the late Grand Vizir in favor of the present incumbent is a very questionable move. Other personal changes in the administration have no distinct character, and, with the exception of Riza Pasha, may be referred to motives of mere convenience.

Reduction of expense is an excellent thing to begin with, especially after the measureless extravagance of the late reign. But much more is wanted. Economy itself, to be remedial, must be applied with judgment. It is said that even the army is to be reduced. Now, the army is already too small for the defence of the Empire. I repeat that it does not exceed a third of the numbers displayed on paper. It is not equal to the maintenance of internal order, except by harassing and wasteful exertions. Its increase is more to be desired than its diminution, and means for that purpose should be sought in other reductions, particularly in the reduction of salaries and pensions, and also in a more effective management of the revenue, including its collection and administration.

Be it remembered that the Sultan's dominions, whether we look to climate, soil or position, are rich beyond conception in resources of every kind. We have only to name the countries which are comprised within their limits, and every doubt on this point must vanish from our minds. The wonder is that regions so blest with all varieties of produce, with climates so favorable to labor, with coasts so accessible to commerce, and with full experience of these advantages transmitted from age to age, should have been brought to such degradation at a period when other countries far less happily endowed by nature reached so great a height of prosperity and power. Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, the vast plains of Thessaly and Adrianople, those in Asia watered by the Hermus, the Mæander, the Cayster, the Caïcus, and the productive provinces extending on both sides along the Danube from Hungary to the sea—all these and many other districts of surpassing fertility are only waiting for the long-expected signal to enter upon a new career of industry, wealth, and glory. Let the doors be thrown open to the arts, the science, the capital of Europe ; let the emulation of the natives be encouraged and their fortunes sufficiently protected ; let the reforms to which the Imperial Government is pledged be put into a regular course of execution, and the most satisfactory results would be sure to follow. Even as it is, the Porte's revenue has increased by a fourth since the Crimean war, and the financial embarrassments which have accompanied that progress may be fairly attributed to extravagance, corruption, and mismanagement, or to the cost of putting down disturbances engendered by a vicious course of administration.

The reforms which are here recommended must be viewed as a whole in order to be fully appreciated. They are comprehensive in principle and also in application. They are by no means limited to the Christian subjects of the Porte. They are calculated to promote the welfare of all classes, whatever may be the separate creed of each. The imperial proclamation, in which the new concessions are embodied together with the earliest, is a real charter of franchises, the *Magna Charta*, in a broader sense than ours, of the Turkish Empire. Honor to Sultan Abdul-Mehjid who gave it, and to Reschid Pasha with whom its leading ideas originated ! The various provisions it contains may be severally classed under the following heads :—

I. Confirmation of beneficial ordinances already proclaimed.

II. Extension of previous concessions.

III. Removal of existing abuses.

IV. Securities for the observance of new measures.

V. Improvements of a material kind.

The field, it must be allowed, is a wide one, and surely in its compartments there is no want either of liberality or of apparent sincerity. A system of reform which aims at the removal of all abuses, the perpetuation of all franchises, the fusion of all classes, the development of all resources, the entire liberty of public worship and of private conscience in religious matters, the extension and security of civil rights, and an enlarged intercourse with foreigners, can hardly fail to engage our sympathy, and, considering the difficulties which surround it in a country like Turkey, to command our

admiration and hearty concurrence. We boast too much of the spirit of our age to be indifferent to one of its greatest and least expected achievements. Our free institutions, our Protestant faith, our commercial enterprise, our skill in manufactures, all these sources of our national greatness are deeply interested in the triumph of such principles over bigotry, ignorance, and corruption in one of their strongest and most extensive holds.

What our Mussulman allies now stand in need of is a practical application of those principles in full, with an earnest enforcement of corresponding measures. Unfortunately fresh obstacles occur at this point. The Sultan looks to his ministers; the ministers look to each other. Some are restrained by the fear of responsibility, some by their personal interests; others have to contend with false impressions contracted in their youth, and others again with an indigenous love of ease and habitual self-indulgence.

Among those statesmen at the Porte who admit the necessity without promoting the progress of reform, no allegation is more common than the deficiency of suitable agents. There is no doubt truth, but there is also much exaggeration, in this plea. Men of sufficient ability are seldom wanting for the public service, when the authority under which they act is clear and determined in its views, and adequate motives for individual exertion are brought into play.

It will soon be forty years since the present era of Turkish reforms began. A new generation has sprung up within that period. The young men of Sultan Mahmoud's time have now attained the experience of age. Those who were only children



then have already overstepped the halfway road\*of life. It would be strange indeed if there were none among them whose natural intelligence had taken the impress of the time, none who felt that in serving a reform government with zeal they could best fulfil their public duties and consult their own interests. Their minds have ripened in the warmth of new ideas ; they have had access, in maturity, to broader avenues of knowledge than were open to their predecessors, who nevertheless sent out from their ranks the earliest instruments, the most active pioneers of reform. Between the two classes, the elder and the younger, a sufficient supply might surely be found, if not for giving full effect to all the ministerial offices, at least for conducting the principal departments, and setting an example of vigor and consistency to other branches of the government. A Turk of good manners, who can talk French, who has visited the chief cities of Christendom, and has some acquaintance with European literature, is no longer, as in the last century, a phoenix or a black swan. The Greeks have ceased to monopolize the main channel of communication between the Porte and the foreign ambassadors at Constantinople. The functions of chief interpreter are performed by a Mussulman.

What serves to counteract the natural tendencies of so important a change is favoritism, which is still but too often the arbiter of public appointments in Turkey. This practice may be traced to three distinct sources. The candidates for office receive their education in general either at the Porte or in the seraglio. Their first appointment is made on the recommendation of some influential person at one of those two

seats of power. Their promotion is frequently the result of a similar exercise of patronage. The relations of patron and client, which formed so strong an element of public life in ancient Rome, survive to a certain degree at Constantinople. The great man is at times sustained by his political dependants, who, in turn, look up to him for the advancement of their fortunes. Official establishments, though of late curtailed, are still expensive, and the plurality of incumbents have little but their salaries and their expectations wherewith to support them. Debts are consequently incurred, and the bankers, who lend, employ their credit, which is considerable, in keeping or reinstating in office their respective debtors. Hence a routine most favorable to misconduct, incapacity, and corruption; hence a discouragement to those who seek to rise by honest means and honorable exertions; hence an assurance that no amount of disgrace will permanently exclude the most undeserving characters from office and power. Such pashas as Riza and Saffeti must laugh at being dismissed, since, however clear their delinquency, they are allowed to keep their ill-gotten spoils, with the certainty of returning to office at no distant period, and in the enjoyment meanwhile of colossal pensions.

There is much, we must confess, in these abuses to dishearten the advocates of Turkish revival. But they are not irremediable, and other countries have succeeded in throwing off the same impediments. Even here, in our own country, the struggle of private interest with public spirit was long and anxious. It survived both the Reformation and the Revolution. It was a cloud on our expanding prospects in the

last century. It required the resolution, the integrity, and the genius of a Burke to check its progress ; and even now we look for its death-blow to a doubtful experiment—that of our competitive examinations.

If, in this respect, we are better, on the whole, than those who went before us, what securities have we against the dangers of a relapse ? The answer is obvious. We are less exposed to temptation, and we act under the control of public opinion. The servants of the State, whatever their rank or denomination, are regularly if not abundantly paid, and an act of peculation brought home to the delinquent would, at least, be stamped with ignominy and hopeless dismissal from office. Appointments also are made in the public service on sounder principles and under a stricter responsibility. The Turks, it is true, have no parliament, and still less a parliament composed of individuals responsible to a popular constituency. But they have a sovereign whose power is absolute, whose interest is that the Empire should be honestly served, and who has no aristocratic, municipal, or party combinations to manage. In fact, without the immediate sanction of the Sultan, no issue of money, no official appointment is made ; no act of administration, no decision of council, no sentence of criminal justice, goes into effect. The laws against malversation, bribery, and corruption are stringent, and to every breach of them a penalty, more or less severe, is attached.

In aid of the Sultan there is a Privy or Cabinet Council for affairs of state, whether internal or foreign. There is also a more comprehensive council, having judicial as well as deliberative powers, and comprising, together with the Grand

Mufti and others of the Ulemah, most of the principal functionaries. To these may be added a Board of Reform, whose president is a member of the administration, and occasionally, under urgent circumstances, a Council of Notables convened by supreme authority from the provinces and in part elected there. However, in each province there is a separate council for local affairs under the presidency of the respective pashas. In these assemblies the elective principle is in some degree employed, and a representative of each non-Mussulman community sits among the members.

The pashas are no longer invested, as of old, with plenary powers. They are now little more than civil commissioners. The troops are placed under a military commander, and the provincial revenue is administered by a separate authority. No capital sentence can be carried into effect without a special order from Constantinople. This new distribution of power, though doubtless in some respects useful, has the drawback of leaving too much in the hands of the council, whose leading members are men of influence in their neighborhood, swayed by local interests, indifferent, if not hostile, to the imperial policy, and capable at times of giving law to the pasha.

A surer and stronger link is wanted between the supreme government and the provincial authorities, and such a link might perhaps be found without disturbing the present divisions of the Empire. The existing pashaliks might be grouped into clusters determined by territorial conformation or by local convenience, and each of the clusters might be superintended by a Governor-General or Lord High Commissioner,

representing the Sultan, and enjoying the full confidence of his government. Examples of this kind of delegation are to be found in Turkish history. One of them has lately been given in the person of Fuad Pasha, who, under peculiar circumstances, was invested with extraordinary powers for the restoration of order in Syria. Another took place a few years before, when the two adjacent provinces of Thessaly and Epirus were united for a time under the administration of a single pasha, who in earlier days would probably have received the appropriate and well-known title of Bey-ler-bey, or Lord of Lords. There would be little difficulty in arranging a sufficient control for the exercise of so high a trust, and the body of Turkish statesmen would not be required to supply more than twelve or fifteen individuals capable of fulfilling its duties, and giving thereby a general and uniform effect to the Sultan's beneficent intentions.

The execution of such a plan might in time be greatly assisted by opening a wider field of instruction to candidates for public employment. The first step has been taken in this direction. A college, founded by the government, exists in the principal suburb of Constantinople. The students are partly Christian and partly Mussulman. They are brought up together on equal terms. The institution was originally a school of medicine. It has been expanded into larger proportions, and may be said to contain the rudiments of an university. No principle stands in the way of its further extension. As a model for similar foundations in the chief provincial cities, its importance can hardly be overrated.

I have already intimated that, in my opinion, the Turkish

army, far from being too large for the wants of the country, stands rather in need of a considerable increase, with reference at least to the numbers actually enrolled. The objections are not entirely of a financial character. The conscription operates on the Turkish population alone, and the supply from that quarter is not equal to the demand. This deficiency has been felt for some years, and it is to all appearance a growing evil. How is it to be supplied if not by recruiting among those portions of the people who, on religious grounds, have been hitherto exempted from military service? This idea has been adopted by the Porte, and made acceptable to the Christians by substituting a war-tax for the degrading *haratsch*, and levying it on all religious classes alike. But the egg has been addled in the hatching. The Christians complain of the new tax as pressing unfairly on them, and as no arrangements have yet been made for placing them as soldiers on a proper footing, the army is still dependent on its one declining source of recruitment.

Whatever may be hereafter the composition of the army, its numbers cannot be increased without a corresponding increase of expense. On this account, as well as on others, it is evident that measures calculated to remove financial abuses, and to render taxation more productive, stand foremost in the line of reform. Retrenchment and economy are the best, and indeed indispensable, starting-points. They alone can at present obtain, for any security the Porte could offer in raising money on loan, that confidence which might reopen the money markets of Europe to her proposals. The pump must have water to make it work. The first remedial operations

in finance would be attended with a stoppage of the customary expedients, and it is difficult therefore to imagine how the curative process could be effected without a temporary accommodation. Ten years ago this harbor of refuge was closed to the Porte by traditional scruples, which subsequently gave way to pressure, as other mistaken notions will also give way to a similar force of circumstances.

Here, as on other points, much, no doubt, is wanted. But the resources are natural ; the obstacles are conventional. Opinion works in such a manner as to bring out the former, and to test the latter by their actual utility. Things deemed impracticable have come into every-day use. The progress of improvement is no less rapid than extension.

It was during the Crimean war that strangers commissioned by foreign governments were first allowed to take part in the Porte's financial deliberations. They had to contend with much jealousy and many prejudices. They were often baffled in their researches ; and if they did any good, it was all but limited to the prevention of evil. The Porte has now accepted the services of two gentlemen who are actually clerks in the British Treasury, and to them, in honorable reliance on a friendly government, the mysteries of Turkish finance are said to be fairly unfolded. Even to those who have watched at hand the course of events in Turkey, such changes appear little short of miraculous. They are earnest of further advancement, and seem to forbid the surrender of a single hope.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that nothing has yet been done except on paper. In every department some

practical steps have been taken more or less in the right direction. Progression languishes rather from moral than from material causes, less from want of will in the government than from the temperament of individuals. The "*haul of all*," so well known in our navy, the "*strong pull, long pull, and pull all together*," so potent in a British rowing match, have still to be impressed on our Ottoman friends. In every great enterprise, energy, method, system, concurrence, are needed for success. In Turkey, as now circumstanced, and more perhaps than elsewhere, these qualities of national movement have to be sustained, if not inspired, from without. Happily for the Turkish Empire, sufficient means and motives for giving in a friendly spirit the requisite impulsion to its endeavors are no longer out of reach. The principal States of Christendom are solemnly pledged to support the integrity of that Empire, and to regard it as a member of what is rather affectingly styled the "great European family." Together they are capable of urging their joint counsels on the Porte without the danger to its independence which might accompany the single interference of a neighboring and rival power. Supposing their views to be honest, and their recommendations to agree with the Porte's declared principles, the pressure thus exerted would be no less safe than useful. Were interested motives to prevail in secret with one or more of them, the vigilance of England would not go to sleep, and the Porte's position would not be worse than if it were one of political estrangement and insincere profession. Union, moreover, though perhaps a mere show, would repress any tendency to foul play by making its exposure more discreditable and



offensive. It would also be unreasonable to expect the best results from our advice when tendered with the twofold advantage of inspiring confidence as British, and commanding attention as European. The treaty of peace, which guards the Porte expressly against foreign interference as between the Sultan and his subjects, would be anything but satisfactory if it were held to preclude the Sultan's allies from insisting on the enforcement of those reforms which have been adopted freely by him as of vital importance to his Empire. Who will deny that the continued neglect of that duty exposes them more and more to the perils and sacrifices attendant, under their existing engagements, on its dissolution, whether by force or intrigue ?

Granted that the prospect of a diplomatic conference installed at Constantinople is by no means attractive. But the advantage, or, it may be, the necessity, when weighed against the inconvenience, will be found to preponderate. Meanwhile such conferences as may serve to patch up a local or passing disturbance abound. We are but lately relieved from one, the parent of numberless protocols, in Syria. The affairs of Montenegro, those of the Danubian principalities, have likewise, in turn, been subjects of European deliberation. We know not how soon or where the kites may be again collected by a massacre or an insurrection.

It were well to bear in mind that such occasional meetings have also their portion of inconvenience and risk. Their failure is discreditable ; the effect of their success, at best, transient and partial. The evils they are meant to correct are themselves the offspring of one pervading evil, the source

of which is Constantinople. In cases of sickness, consultations are not of good omen ; but at times they cannot be avoided, and then it is usually thought best to call them where the patient resides, and not on the spot where his fever was caught or his leg fractured.

In these high matters, to which the principal Powers of Europe habitually and necessarily direct their attention, although the interest, the legitimate interest, is common, and the right equal, our own government occupies a peculiar position, comparatively advantageous, but also, in proportion to the advantage, responsible. The causes of this are manifest. Of all the Powers, Great Britain has most to lose by the inertness and decay of the Ottoman Empire, and least to gain by its dismemberment. Though her course of policy may at times give umbrage to the Porte, the circumstances in which she is placed, and the character of our institutions, exempt her from its mistrust. Others may be more feared, and consequently more favored, by the Turkish authorities ; but confidence and good-will depend less on fear than on hopes and sympathies.

The subject in hand is so large, its bearings so multiplex, and the questions it embraces so momentous, that even in this rapid sketch of it there may be enough to weary, if not to bewilder, the most patient of readers. We never thought of bringing all its elements, however briefly, within so narrow a compass ; and even now we do not pretend to more than a very light notice of two or three outstanding points, which ought not to be entirely overlooked.

Authors, in seeking to explain the decline of Turkish power

have noticed two practices in particular as helping greatly to accelerate it. One, which we have already touched upon, is the debasement of the coinage. The other is the exclusion of the Imperial Princes from all share in public business. The discredit, uncertainty, and temptation to fraud, which attend the former illusion, have at all times and in all countries produced, more or less, the same deplorable effects. Our own history may be quoted to confirm the truth of this remark. A prominent example is offered by Froude in his account of the financial embarrassments which occurred under the Protectorate of Somerset. Some of us can personally remember with what determination Parliament, on the report of the Bullion Committee in 1816, enacted at every hazard the renewal of cash payments at the Bank.

With respect to the princes, it stands to reason that the restrictions to which they are condemned must operate with twofold venom upon the State. The jealousy which keeps them spell-bound in the seraglio hoodwinks their understandings, and renders the want of knowledge an heirloom in the ruling family, at the same time that it confirms their imperial keeper in those habits of indolence and self-indulgence which the dread of competition and popularity on their side might otherwise counteract. It tells with unusual force in a country where so much depends on the personal acquirements of the sovereign, and at a period when every government is expected to give proof of qualities commensurate with the wants of its people and the progress of its rivals. A word would suffice to remove this night-mare from the palace, and its consequences from the Empire.

It would certainly require more than a word to redress the defects of the currency. But the temporary sacrifice essential to that object would be overpaid by its results, and a real economy, such as now, it appears, is in progress, followed by other productive reforms, and sustained by the concurrent action of friendly Powers, would go far to revive the credit and open the resources of the Porte to an indefinite extent.

Those to whom every molehill is a mountain, every redoubt an impregnable fortress, may fancy that the greatest success in these respects would have little or no effect—if any, a disastrous one—on that diversity of races and consequent opposition of feelings and interests which make the Turkish Empire a hotbed of internal dissension. That there, as elsewhere, difficulty and danger exist in circumstances of social antagonism, cannot be fairly denied ; but candor, while making the admission, is entitled to dissent from its exaggeration. In their days of prosperity, the most enlightened of Turkish ministers might reasonably have opposed any serious relaxation of the Mussulman system. It was sufficient for their purpose that all went on as usual, and that no defeat or deficit, insurrection or calamity, was likely to throw more than a passing shadow on the stability of the Empire. Turks were Turks, and rayahs rayahs. Both were to move invariably in their separate spheres ; and if Christian heads were exposed to Turkish sabres, it was natural that they should be occasionally cut off. But the successors of those statesmen have no such luxury to enjoy. They are embarked on a current, generated by false principles and vicious courses, which threatens to sweep them into ruin—government, relig-

ion, empire, and all. It is only by straining or rowing strenuously against the flood that they can hope to escape. Their best exertions may ultimately fail ; but, taken in the right direction, they offer good chances of safety, retarding meanwhile the consummation to be dreaded, and softening the approaches to what in the end may prove inevitable.

This for the worst. But the danger itself is far less considerable than might be supposed at a distance. Numerous, and at heart disaffected, as the Sultan's non-Mussulman subjects are, they have by no means the force either of union or of endurance. Their separation into different classes on the ground of race or creed is evidently a source of weakness to them. They have little sympathy for each other. They are rivals for Turkish favor, and in some respects antagonistic among themselves. What they have most in common is the habit of submission to Turkish rule. Neither Greek, nor Armenian, nor Slavonian can hope to occupy a throne left vacant by the professor of Islamism. Each class in the supposed case would probably consent more cheerfully to the Sultan's authority than accept the rule of an adverse Christian sect. The Christians, in proportion as the Turks extend the circle of their privileges, and treat them with forbearance and consideration, have less to stimulate their longing for independence, and less to raise them above the dread of their long-established conquerors. On the same account their hold upon the sympathies of Christendom, and the confidence they might derive from that source, are greatly attenuated. Besides, the weight of the Ottoman sceptre has never pressed upon them by an immediate contact with the whole surface of

their every day life. From the time of the conquest they have been allowed in some important respects to manage their own affairs. Even the collection of the *haratsch*, before the abolition of that tax, was entrusted to their own magistrates. The amount to be levied on each district was fixed by the Porte, or, it might be, by the pasha ; but the assessment was regulated by the elders or notables of each religious community. What they most felt, and what in reality they had most to complain of, was the arbitrary abuse of power, the unauthorized exaction, the oppressive or humiliating treatment of individuals. But all these motives to revolt have been gradually dispelled, and are more likely to die away from want of fuel than to gather fresh strength from an increase of liberty and the prospect of further improvement.

More, much more, might be written on this inexhaustible theme. What is written already might have been more judiciously treated, more clearly developed, more ably compressed. Writer and reader have, nevertheless, travelled on together, and have now reached, not indeed the terminus, but a station where they may conveniently take a breath, and review, as from some elevated point, the various stages of their road. The object of the journey is not an idle one. Its character is serious. It cannot be dismissed from thought like a railway excursion or a dissolving view. Let us, before we part, compare notes and determine, if possible, whether from argument and statement, as here set forth, we are warranted in drawing conclusions on which our minds may rest with a certain amount of conviction, and whether we are entitled, in conscience, to wish that our convictions should pass,

as eventual rules of action, into the minds of others more powerful than ourselves.

Has it been fairly established in the preceding pages that we have, as a nation, strong motives, continually in operation, and founded on our own immediate interests, for maintaining and improving our friendly relations with Turkey ; that a considerable and growing portion of our trade is derived from the Turkish dominions ; that, from a political point of view, we have much to apprehend from their decline or dissolution ; and that our communications by steam and telegraph with India and our immense possessions there are dependent on the goodwill and protection of the Ottoman Government ?

In the next place, are we satisfied that it has been our policy and also our practice, from an early period, to cultivate friendly relations with the Porte ? Have we not in later years, and in critical emergencies, either hastened to her succor by means of counsel, mediation, and even occasionally by active assistance, or taken part, however reluctantly, in coercive measures calculated to bring her into a state of political harmony with the Powers of Christendom ?

Thirdly, is it not proved that, as one of them, we have given our formal guaranty for the independence and integrity of the Sultan's dominions, and incurred thereby a positive obligation to redeem our pledge, when called upon, at the cost or immediate risk of British treasure and blood ?

Fourthly, is it not manifest that, whether from within or from without, the Turkish Empire is exposed to an imminent danger of falling into confusion and becoming eventually a prey to the ambition of its most powerful neighbors—of

neighbors liable at any time to become adverse to our policy and jealous of our prosperity?

Fifthly, has it not been shown that Turkey, notwithstanding its many causes of weakness and social embarrassment, possesses a fund of resources which have only to be worked by means within reach in order, as a consequence of the process, to retard indefinitely, if not to avert entirely, the impending catastrophe? May it not be added, with truth, that the obstacles to improvement are so far from being irremovable that many of them, and some in appearance the most obdurate, have already yielded to the pressure of necessity and the evidence of facts?

Sixthly, can it be denied at the same time that the Turkish Government has displayed, together with a sense of its weakness, an utter incapacity for extricating itself, without support and assistance, from the dangers which surrounded it; that, left to its own unaided exertions, it has no reasonable prospect of escape; that even now it depends for existence on the forbearance of the Christian Powers; and that we are bound in duty no less than entitled to require, as the price of our generosity, its strenuous enforcement of such measures as are necessary, according to its own proclaimed and recorded confession, to sustain its vitality, and to justify the responsible confidence of its allies?

If, as it would seem, there can be only one true answer to these questions, the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from them may be left with safety to the deliberate judgment of the country. The interests of our trade with Turkey, Persia, and the Danube; those of our political power on the shores of



the Euxine, the Archipelago, and the Mediterranean ; those, again, of our direct communication with India—to say nothing of China and Australia—are palpably concerned in the decision. Are we to relinquish, when it is most needed, a policy dating from one of the best periods of our history? Are we to surrender a position acquired by the exertions of our diplomacy and by the triumphs of our arms? Are we to wait with fettered limbs and bandaged eyes for that solution which we have most reason to deprecate of the Eastern Question? Or are we, in a wiser and a nobler spirit, to confront the peril, which hitherto we have never ceased to acknowledge—to employ at once, though with some inconvenience and doubt, the means required for meeting it with effect, and to do our best, without hesitation, for diverting a calamity which, be it far or near, must be attended in its consummation with evils of the greatest magnitude?

A straight, an obvious course lies open before us. It is recommended no less by a consistent view of our interests than by rights and obligations pressed home on our sense of duty by a just apprehension of worse. We are free to enter upon it, or rather to persist in following in, without any immediate sacrifices, even of a financial kind, and with no greater difficulties to encounter than must ever attend upon a course of diplomatic action limited by its object rather than by time, and applied, in concurrence with other Powers, less in earnest, perhaps, than ourselves, but engaged ostensibly as we are, to the complicated affairs of a distant empire and a mistrustful government.

Should doubts remain, let the alternative, such as it is

described above, be fairly and fully weighed. Let it be weighed together with our special engagements, and let this additional consideration be thrown into the scale. A course of policy which has for its object the maintenance of peace by means of an improved system of administration throughout the Turkish Empire, and of the concurrent operation of the Porte and her allies, even were it to fail as to the ultimate results, would, in its progress, work, beneficially for Europe, to the relief of millions who are still suffering under the joint effects of ignorance, misgovernment, and fanaticism.

It is reasonable to presume that, under Providence, every great depositary of power in this world has its mission. The Crown and Parliament of England have theirs, a proud and also a responsible one. It is the mission of knowledge, freedom, and humanity, issuing from the highest of sources, and hallowed throughout its course by Christian love. Power is the instrument of our practical fidelity to its duties. Let us take heed. Indifference to the end may involve a forfeiture of the means.

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June 18, 1877.

Such are the opinions which I threw upon paper some four or five years after the termination of the Crimean war, of that war which rescued Turkey from the domineering pretensions of Russia by means of auxiliary forces derived from England and France, placing in a strong light both the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the strength of those motives which

brought the two allies to its support, with the moral or more than the moral concurrence of other European Powers. In a general sense, and from my point of view, those opinions have undergone no change. But circumstances have not maintained the same consistency. Turkey, instead of calling out the political sympathies of Western Europe as a State threatened with loss of independence by the demands of an ambitious neighbor, has now exposed itself to just reproach by causing a great disturbance, attributable in its origin to the Porte's oppressive principles of government, and later to its haughty rejection of those salutary counsels which it received from all its co-signatories of the treaty of Paris. It has, moreover, incurred the imminent peril attached to open unaided war with a contiguous empire far more powerful than its own in every respect, and whose eventual triumph might entail disastrous consequences on the greater part of European Christendom. There may have been, and probably were, intrigues from without which ripened into insurrection the discontent of Bosnia and Herzegovina ; but surely it required a deep sense of misrule on the part of a suffering and unarmed population to lay itself bare, by acts of disobedience, to the rigors of an unsparing and fanatical despotism. The reign of Sultan Abdul-Aziz gained no favor even from those of his subjects who were of His Majesty's own race and religion, nor can it be forgotten that in his ill-omened time the neglect of promised reforms went hand in hand with the acquisition of millions obtained from the wealth of Christendom, and cancelled by an act of indefinite bankruptcy.

It can hardly be denied that facts of this kind weigh

heavily in the balance when the Porte's engagements distinctly implied, though perhaps not always formally expressed, are put into one scale, and its fragments or shadows of performance into the other. The marked disproportion between them may well throw doubt on the Porte's appeal to the beneficial clauses of the treaty of Paris. If any degree of validity may still be ascribed to that treaty, it cannot with justice or reason be made to bear upon those securities which all Europe, so to say, has deemed it necessary to demand for the complete execution of the proclaimed reforms, and the restoration of peace on solid grounds in the disturbed provinces. Whatever may be the results of the war which is now unhappily in progress on a colossal scale, the mediating Powers have respected the permanent independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire. The temporary interference of foreign agents with the internal arrangements of the Porte must of course be unpleasant to the Sultan and his Mussulman subjects; but its necessity, supposing its real character to be such, originates with the Turkish authorities, and has for its object the tranquillity of Europe and the welfare of Turkey itself.

The capacity of Mussulman Turkey for reforms may not be equal to its need of them, but it has always appeared to me sufficient for the introduction of a real and progressive improvement. On this account it is the more to be regretted, and also the more to be resented, that nearly a score of years from the treaty of Paris, so remarkable for increase of revenue and freedom from disturbance, should have left such scanty traces of advancement and good faith, and such ample

proofs of impolicy and extravagance. How could Austria, whose territory bordered on the insurgent district and was peopled with numerous sympathizers, look with indifference on a movement so likely to compromise her interests, and, in the propable event of its expansion, to produce a mischievous excitement elsewhere? Were not the elements of that political disease, the Eastern Question, discernible in the first local symptoms of resistance to authority? Was it to be expected that the insurgents would consent to lay down their arms and resume their previous habits of obedience, on a simple assurance of pardon and better treatment for the future? Sympathies naturally sprang up on both sides of the frontier. Popular enthusiasm impelled the Christian Governments at the same time that its effects alarmed the Porte, so that while the pressure from without increased, the resistance within hardened into positive refusal. In proportion to their determination to reject the demand of securities, the Turks abounded in professions and enactments of reform. They replied to the armed menace of Russia by an exhaustive display of force, they threw down the barrier of creed, and united the various classes of population into one patriotic mass under the common appellation of Ottomans, represented by a Parliament composed of two houses—a Senate and Deputies. Great and radical indeed is this change in the institutions of Turkey. Can it succeed? can it last? are the obvious questions which it suggests. A mixture of antagonistic elements shaped by a flash of urgency, and forced at once into action under circumstances severely trying, may well be viewed with surprise and doubt. The sincerity of its princi-

pal author is to all appearance unshaken, although it was probably hurried into existence as a refuge from the importunity of foreign dictators. There are those who would have given it a fair chance by leaving the Porte, as it were, on trial for a reasonable time after the departure of the ambassadors from Constantinople, and reserving the right of their Governments to interfere afresh upon the evident failure of the new system. Such a course would certainly have postponed the war, and perhaps might even have prevented it from ever breaking out. Come what may short of a Turkish dismemberment, the work of Midhat Pasha is not likely to pass away without leaving salutary traces of its temporary existence. The Sultan's uncontrolled authority, the inveterate corruptions of the metropolitan Ministry, and the cat-and-dog relations between Mussulmans and Christians can never be the same as heretofore.

Although it is not my intention to censure bygone transactions, I cannot entirely suppress the regret with which I look back on some of the incidents preliminary to the present deplorable war. What, for instance, could be more ominous of failure than the want of union among the mediating Powers from the very commencement of their proceedings? What more offensive to the Turks than the unscrupulous hostilities of Servia and Montenegro? What more disreputable both to Turkey and to Europe than the manner in which the convicted perpetrators of the Bulgarian outrages escaped from the pursuit of justice? What more injudicious than the unyielding obstinacy with which the Porte repelled the modified counsels of its allies, and refused to settle the terms of a mutual

disarmament with Russia by means of an accredited representative at St. Petersburg ?

No doubt the Eastern Question is a network of difficulties and dangers, affecting very important interests, exciting violent passions, and even when lulled into a state of rest liable to break out again with ruinous activity. The elements of which it is composed explain its character. A northern Power, possessing a vast extent of territory, and capable of bringing a most formidable array of forces into the field, presses down to the south upon an empire which, though apparently verging towards its ruin, comprises whole regions of splendid fertility and the choicest positions for sway and trade. The former is thought to covet, at the very least, some important portions of its neighbor's dominions, and to seek the accomplishment of its views by an intriguing policy in times of peace, and by downright conquest in times of war. The Porte facilitates its rival's success by a system of misrule which paralyzes its natural advantages, and comes in aid of strong original causes to produce a spirit of disaffection among the majority of its subjects. Russia, on the other hand, is thereby furnished with millions of partisans from within the Turkish Empire, and the energies of an impulsive sympathy from without. Of late, indeed, she has drifted into a position of which she has availed herself to assume the guise of Europe's champion, and at the same time to drive the Sultan into a single-handed war fraught with chances fatal to his independence. Other European Powers, for various reasons and in different degrees, see at all times much to alarm them even in the prospect of a rupture between the two parties.

They know that the small dark cloud on the horizon may surge into a sweeping tempest, and they must lose no time in determining when and by what means they may have to protect their own particular interests even to the extremity of war. Of such inducements to hostile action, England may be said to have the lion's share. Whatever consideration obliges her to rest her sheet anchor on peace, she may be carried into stormy latitudes by resistless forces incidental to a wide expanse of surface on land as well as at sea.

We of the British Isles have to thank Providence for being still able to hold to the anchor of peace. We are declared neutrals. But the contest which is now raging in the home of the Eastern Question throws all generalities into the shade. Public curiosity fastens eagerly on news from the seat of war, whether it be on the banks of the Danube or among the mountains of Armenia. Speculation on tip-toe strains its sight to catch a glimpse of things beyond our actual horizon, and the dimness of the objects would seem to sharpen the appetite for discovery. No wonder that such should be the case. The mill-stone is accessible to all, and I cannot deny my wish, like that of thousands, to penetrate its mysteries, and also, unlike that of many, my sense of inability to reach their place of seclusion. What opinions I may venture to entertain are at the service of my readers. The first to be mentioned turns upon the supposition that Russia is bent on something more than the redress of grievances in European Turkey. If so, the present appearances warrant a conjecture that the intended passage of the Danube is a demonstration, and the incursion from Circassia the reality. Imagine the



Russians to advance so far on the two lines of invasion as to bring the Porte to terms. What more plausible than for them to say: "We are content to redeem our pledge in Europe. We ask nothing there for ourselves; but we are entitled to a fair indemnity for the cost and sacrifices of war, and on this ground we propose to retain a part or the whole of territory in Asia already won and actually occupied by our armies"? A demand so appropriately stated might include a cession of Erzeroum, and with it the entrance of the Euphrates Valley, which terminates only in the Gulf of Persia. There are politicians who see in such an acquisition by Russia a danger which threatens our Indian dominions, and consequently raises the question of what should be done to counteract it. An answer may perhaps be suggested by the map. Any one who consults that oracle will perceive that distance alone presents a serious difficulty to hostile enterprise from that quarter; and surely, if we had to contend with an enemy in the Indian or Persian seas, our resources in point of force, recruiting, and provisioning, would not be inferior to his. As for the Suez Canal, it may be that our possession of shares would not preclude the necessity of employing force for the defence of its freedom; but it may perhaps fairly be said that sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof, especially as we may reckon confidently on having all neutral nations on our side when called upon to act on its behalf. We must not, however, lose sight of the facilities to be derived from the river by an invading army, nor of the effect which the possession of Armenia might have in helping to cover the line of advance from the Caspian Sea into Central Asia.

Other more exposed interests may be brought into jeopardy by the existing war, should it take a turn decidedly favorable to Russia. The fettered navigation of the Danube, an indefinite occupation of the befriended provinces in Turkey, a free passage of the Dardanelles, and even the appropriation of Constantinople itself, are all contingencies which the negotiation of a peace dictated by Russian victory might raise into dilemmas of the most formidable kind. More than one question is involved in the solution they require. Which of them, if any, would leave us no choice but that of hostile resistance? Which would entitle us to the co-operation of one or more auxiliaries? Could we enter upon hostilities with a reasonable prospect of success, and with no sacrifice greater than what the fruits of success would repay? It is clear that not one of the enumerated conditions could be accepted by the Porte without more or less injury, commercial, territorial, or political, to the interests of other States, and more particularly, in some respects, to those of Great Britain. The mere introduction of Russian armed vessels into the Archipelago and Mediterranean from the Black Sea would make a very objectionable alteration in the relative position of other naval Powers, and be a constant source of anxiety and peril to the Ottoman authorities. The transfer of Constantinople itself to the possession of Russia would manifestly place the adjacent straits at the mercy of a Power whose maxims of trade and exclusiveness of policy might at any time hamper, if not suspend, the trade of Europe with the countries which they enclose. Questions of vital importance had better rest with governments and representative as-

semblies. But private individuals may fairly, and sometimes even usefully, hazard an opinion on exceptional points. In the present instance two things are clear to the commonest understanding ; the one as pressing on every government concerned, the other as touching all that is most valuable to every inhabitant of a contented country. Every nerve should at once be strained to prepare for the expected crisis, not only by readiness of measures and means within, but by union of counsels and concert of operations without. The other indispensable duty is to ascertain, as nearly as possible, the amount of effective means for a successful issue. If there be one proposition more obvious than another, it is that war, at the best, carries with it such great sacrifices that to undertake it without necessity or calculation is akin to madness. History records the consequences of neglect in these matters, and our recent proclamation of present neutrality seems to warrant the expectation of a deliberate but unfettered policy in this country.

If the Russians, like other nations of the high north, have a natural leaning towards the sun and the brighter regions of the earth, we have the assurances of their sovereign and his ministers that they confine their views of success in Turkey to points on which they have already in principle the concurrence of Europe ; and it may be found wiser to display our reliance on their sincerity, while we observe their movements with vigilance, and prepare to counteract any failure in their promises.



# MONTENEGRO.<sup>1</sup>

## A SKETCH.

BY THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE.

IT is sometimes said, in relation to individuals, that the world does not know its greatest men. It might at least as safely be averred, in speaking of large numbers, that Christendom does not know its most extraordinary people. The name of Montenegro, until within the last two years, was perhaps less familiar to the European public than that of Monaco, and little more than that of San Marino. And yet it would, long ere this, have risen to world-wide and immortal fame, had there been a Scott to learn and tell the marvels of its history, or a Byron to spend and be spent on its behalf. For want of the *vates sacer*, it has remained in the mute inglorious condition of Agamemnon's predecessors.<sup>2</sup> I hope that an interpreter between Montenegro and the world has at length been found in the person of my friend Mr. Tennyson, and I gladly accept the honor of having been invited

<sup>1</sup> THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, May, 1877. See, also, *Le Monténégro Contemporain*. Par G. FRILLEY, Officier de la Légion d'Honneur, et JOVAN WLAHOVITI, Capitaine au Service de la Serbie. Paris: 1870. *Monténégro und die Montenegriner geschildert von* SPIRIDION GOPTCHEVITCH. Leipzig: 1877.

<sup>2</sup> Hor. *Od.* IV. ix. 25.

to supply a commentary to his text.<sup>1</sup> In attempting it I am sensible of this disadvantage—that it is impossible to set out the plain facts of the history of Montenegro (or Tsernagora in its own Slavonic tongue) without begetting in the mind of any reader strange, and nearly all are strange, to the subject, a resistless suspicion of exaggeration or of fable.

The vast cyclone of Ottoman conquest, the most formidable that the world has ever seen, having crossed the narrow sea from Asia in the fourteenth century, made rapid advances westward, and blasted, by its successive acquisitions, the fortunes of countries the chief part of which were then among the most civilized, Italy alone being excepted, of all Europe. I shall not here deal with the Hellenic lands. It is enough to say that Bulgaria, Serbia (as now known), Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, gradually gave way.

Before telling the strange tale of those who, like some strong oak that the lightning fails to rive, breasted all the wrath of the tempest, and never could be slaves, let me render a tribute to the fallen. For the most part, they did not succumb without gallant resistance. The Serbian sovereigns of the fifteenth century were great and brave men, ruling a stout and brave people. They reached their zenith when, in 1347, Stephen Dushan entitled himself Emperor of Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians. In an evil hour, and to its own ruin, the Greek Empire invoked against him the aid of the Ottoman Turks. In 1356, he closed a prosperous career by a sudden death. On the fatal field of Kossovo, in 1389,

<sup>1</sup> In the NINETEENTH CENTURY, Tennyson's well-known sonnet, "Montenegro," preceded this article.—*Ed.*

treachery allied itself with Ottoman prowess to bring about the defeat of the Serbian army ; and again it was by treacherous advances that a qualified subjection was converted into an absolute servitude. The West, with all its chivalry, can cite no grander examples of martial heroism than those of Marko Kraljevitch, so fondly cherished in the Serbian lands, and of George Castriotes or Scanderbeg, known far and wide, and still commemorated by the name of a *vicolo* of Rome.

The indifference, or even contempt, with which we are apt to regard this field of history, ought to be displaced by a more rational, as well as more honorable, sentiment of gratitude. It was these races, principally Slavonian, who had to encounter in its unbroken strength, and to reduce, the mighty wave, of which only the residue, passing the Danube and the Save, all but overwhelmed not Hungary alone, but Austria and Poland. It was with a Slavonian population that the Austrian Emperor fortified the north bank of the Save, in the formation of the famous military Frontier. It was Slav resistance, unaided by the West, which abated the impetus of the Ottoman attack just to such a point, that its reserve force became capable of being checked by European combinations.

Among the Serbian lands was the flourishing Principality of Zeta. It took its name from the stream which flows southward from the mountain citadel towards the Lake Scutari. It comprised the territory now known as Montenegro or Tser-nagora, together with the seaward frontier, of which a nig-gardly and unworthy jealousy had not then deprived it, and with the rich and fair plains encircling the irregular outline of the inhospitable mountain. Land after land had given

way ; but Zeta ever stood firm under the Balchid family. At last in 1478 Scutari was taken on the south, and in 1483 the ancestors of the still brave population of Herzegovina on the north submitted to the Ottomans. Ivan Tchernoevitch, the Montenegrin hero of the day, hard pressed on all sides, applied to the Venetians for the aid he had often given, and was refused. Thereupon he, and his people with him, quitted, in 1484, the sunny tracts in which they had basked for some seven hundred years, and sought, on the rocks and amidst the precipices, surety for the two gifts, by far the most precious to mankind, their faith and their freedom. To them, as to the Pomaks of Bulgaria, and the Bosnian Begs, it was open to purchase by conformity to a debasing peace. Before them, as before others, lay the *trinoda necessitas*, the alternatives of death, slavery, or the Koran. They were not to die, for they had a work to do. To the Koran or to slavery they preferred a life of cold, want, hardship, and perpetual peril. Such is their *Magna Charta*; and, without reproach to others, it is, as far as I know, the noblest in the world.

To become a centre for his mountain home, Ivan had built a monastery at Cetinje, and declared the place to be the metropolis of Zeta. What is most of all remarkable in the whole transaction is, that he carried with him into the hills a printing-press.<sup>1</sup> This was in 1484, in a petty principality ; they were men worsted in war, and flying for their lives. Again, it was only seven years after the earliest volume had been printed by Caxton in the rich and populous metropolis of England ; and when there was no printing-press in Oxford,

<sup>1</sup> Frilley and Wlahoviti, p. 18.



or in Cambridge, or in Edinburgh. It was only sixteen years after the first printing-press had been established (1468) in Rome, the capital of Christendom: only twenty-eight years after the appearance (1456) of the earliest printed book, the first-born of the great discovery.

Then and there,

They few, they happy few, they band of brothers<sup>1</sup>

voted unanimously their fundamental law, that, in time of war against the Turk, no son of Tsernagora could quit the field without the order of his chief; that a runaway should be for ever disgraced, and banished from his people; that he should be dressed in a woman's clothes, and presented with a distaff; and that the women, striking him with their distaffs, should hunt the coward away from the sanctuary of freedom.

And, now for four centuries wanting only seven years, they have maintained in full force the covenant of that awful day, through an unbroken series of trials, of dangers, and of exploits, to which it is hard to find a parallel in the annals of Europe, perhaps even of mankind.

It was not to be expected that the whole mass of any race or people should have the almost preterhuman energy, which their lot required. All along, from time to time, the weaker brethren have fallen away; and there were those who said to Ivan, as the Israelites said to Moses, "Wherefore have ye made us to come up out of Egypt, to bring us unto this evil place?"<sup>2</sup> The great Ivan died in 1490, and was succeeded by his eldest son George, who in 1499 was persuaded by his

<sup>1</sup> Shakespeare, *Henry V.*

<sup>2</sup> Numbers xx. 5.

Venetian wife to go back into the habitable world ; not of Islam, however, but at Venice. Worse than this, his younger brother Stephen had gone with a band of companions to Constantinople and proposed to Bajazet the Second the betrayal of his country. He, and those whom he took with him, were required to turn Mahometans, and they did it. None could be so fit, as traitors, to be renegades. They then set out with an Ottoman force for the work of conquest. They were met by George, and utterly defeated. But these victors, the men of the printing-press as well as of the sword, were no savages by nature, only afterwards when the Turks in time made them so. They took back their renegade fellow-countrymen into Montenegro, and allowed them the free exercise of their religion.<sup>1</sup>

On the retirement of George, which seems only to have become final in 1516,<sup>2</sup> the departing prince made over the sovereign power to the Metropolitan. And now began, and lasted for 336 years, an ecclesiastical government in miniature over laymen, far more noble than that of the Popes in its origin and purer in its exercise as well as in some respects not less remarkable.

The epithet I have last used may raise a smile. But the greatness of human action, and of human character, do not principally depend on the dimensions of the stage where they are exhibited. In the fifth century, and before the temporal power arose, there was a Leo as truly Great as any of the famous mediæval Pontiffs. The traveller may stand upon the rock of Corinth, and look, across and along the gulf, to the

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Goptchevitch, p. 6.

Acropolis of Athens: and may remember, with advantage no less than with wonder, that these little States, of parochial extension, were they that shook the world of their own day, and that have instructed all posterity. But the *Basileus*, whom Greece had to keep at arm's-length, had his seat afar; and, even for those within his habitual reach, was no grinding tyrant. Montenegro fought with a valor that rivalled, if it did not surpass, that of Thermopylæ and Marathon; with numbers and resources far inferior, against a foe braver and far more terrible. A long series of about twenty prelates, like Moses, or Joshua, or Barak, or the son of Jesse, taught in the sanctuary, presided in the council, and fought in the front of the battle. There were among them many, who were admirable statesmen. These were especially of the Nigcush family, which came in the year 1687 to the permanent possession of power: a power so little begirt with the conveniences of life, and so well weighted with responsibility and care, that in the free air of these mountains it was never coveted, and never abused.

Under the fourteen Vladikas, who had ruled for 170 years before this epoch, the people of Montenegro not only lived sword in hand, for this they have since done and still do, but nourished in their bosom an enemy more deadly, say the historians,<sup>1</sup> than the Pashas and their armies. Not only were they ever liable to the defection of such as had not the redundant manhood required in order to bear the strain of their hard and ever-threatened existence; but the renegades on the banks of the Rieka, whom they had generously taken back,

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 21.

maintained disloyally relations with the Porte, and were ever ready to bring its war-galleys by the river into the interior of the country. At last the measure of patience was exhausted. Danilo, the first Vladika of the Nigush dynasty, had been invited, under an oath of safe conduct from the Pasha of Scutari, to descend into the plain of Zeta, among the homes of his ancestors, for the purpose of consecrating a church. While engaged on this work, he was seized, imprisoned, and cruelly tortured.<sup>1</sup> At last he was released on a ransom of 3,000 ducats, a sum which the hillsmen were only enabled to make up by borrowing in Herzegovina. It was felt that the time had arrived for a decisive issue ; and we come now to a deed of blood which shows that for those human beings with whom the Turk forced himself into contact, and who refused to betray their faith, there were no alternatives but two : if not savages they must be slaves, if not slaves they must come near to being savages.

It was determined to slay by night every one of the renegades, except such as were willing to return to the faith of their fathers. The year was 1702, and the night chosen was that which divided Christmas Eve from Christmas Day. The scale was not large, but the operation was terrible ; and the narrative, contained in an old *Volkslied*, shows that it was done under that high religious exaltation which recalls the fiery gloom of the *Agamemnon*, and the sanguinary episodes of the Old Testament.

The hallowed eve draws onwards. The brothers Martinovitch kindle their consecrated torches. They pray fervently to the new-born God.

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<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 22. G., p. 8.

Each drains a cup of wine; and seizing the sacred torches, they rush forth into the darkness. Wherever there was a Turk, there came the five avengers. They that would not be baptized were hewn down every one. They that embraced the Cross were taken as brothers before the Vladika. Gathered in Cetinje, the people hailed with songs of joy the reddening dawn of the Christmas morning; all Tsernagora now was free!<sup>1</sup>

The war had been a standing rather than an intermittent war, and each party to it was alternately aggressor and defender. The Turk sought to establish his supremacy by exacting the payment of the *haradsch*, the poll or military service tax, paid in kind, which sometimes, in the more open parts, as we may suppose, of the territory, he succeeded in obtaining. Once the collector complained that the measure used was too small. The tax-payer smashed his skull with it, and said: "That is Tsernagora measure."<sup>2</sup> But the Montenegrins were aggressive as well as the Turks. Of the fair plains they had been compelled to deliver to the barbarian, they still held themselves the rightful owners; and in carrying on against him a predatory warfare they did no more than take back, as they deemed, a portion of their own. This predatory warfare, which had a far better justification than any of the Highland or Border raids that we have learned to judge so leniently, has been effectually checked by the efforts of the admirable Vladikas and princes of the last hundred years; for as long as it subsisted, the people could not discharge effectually the taint of savagery. It even tended to generate habits of rapine. But the claim to the lands is another matter; there is no lapse of title by user here; the bloody suit has been prosecuted many times in the course of

<sup>1</sup> G. p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

each of twelve generations of men. That claim to the lands they have never given up, and never will.

From 1710 onwards, at intervals, the Sovereigns of Russia and Austria have used the Montenegrins for their own convenience when at war with Turkey, and during the war of the French Revolution the English did the like, and, by their cooperation and that of the inhabitants, effected the conquest of the *Bocche di Cattaro*. To England they owe no gratitude ; to Austria, on the whole, less than none, for, to satisfy her, the district she did not win was handed over to her with our concurrence. She has rigidly excluded the little State from access to the sea, and has at times even prevented it from receiving any supplies of arms. Russia, however, from the time of Peter the Great, though using them for her own purposes, has not always forgotten their interests, and has commonly aided the Vladikas with a small annual subvention, raised, through the liberality of the Czar now reigning, to some 3,000*l.* a year ;<sup>1</sup> the salary of one of our Railway Commissioners. Nor should it be forgotten that Louis Napoleon, seemingly under a generous impulse, took an interest in their fortunes, and made a further addition to the revenues of the Prince, which raised them in all to an amount such as would equip a well-to-do English country gentleman, provided that he did not bet, or aspire to a deer-forest, or purchase Sèvres or even Chelsea porcelain.

The most romantic and stirring passages of other histories may be said to grow pale, if not by the side of the ordinary life of Tsernagora, at least when brought into com-

<sup>1</sup> Stated by Goptchevitch as high as 4,000*l.* a year.

parison with that life at the critical emergencies, which were of very constant recurrence. What was the numerical strength of the bishop-led community, which held fast its oasis of Christianity and freedom amidst the dry and boundless desert of Ottoman domination? The fullest details I have seen on this subject are those given by Frilley and Wlahoviti. The present form of the territory exhibits the figure which would be produced if two roughly drawn equilateral triangles with their apices slightly truncated, had these apices brought together, so that the two principal masses should be severed by a narrow neck or waist of territory. The extreme length of the principality from the border above Cattaro on the west to Mount Kom, the farthest point eastwards of Berda, is about seventy miles; the greatest breadth from north to south is a good deal less; but the line at the narrow point from Spuz on the south to Niksich on the north, both of them on ground still Turkish, does not exceed twenty miles. The reader will now easily understand the tenacity with which a controversy seemingly small has just been carried on at Constantinople between the delegates of Prince Nicholas and the Porte; with *andirivieni* almost as many as marked the abortive Conference of December and January, or the gestation of the recent Protocol. At these points, the plain makes dangerous incisions into the group of mountains;<sup>1</sup> and from them the Turk has been wont to operate. The population of his empire is forty millions; and I believe his claims for military service extend over the whole, except the five millions (in round numbers) of free people, who inhabit the Serbian and Roumanian prin-

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., pp. 89-an dast 91.

cialities. Let us now see what were the material means of resistance on the other side. About A.D. 1600, there are said to have been 3,500 houses and 8,000 fighting men in Montenegro. The military age is from twelve to fifty ; and these numbers indicate a population not much, if at all, over 30,000. This population was liable to be thinned by renegadism and constant war ; but, since the early siftings, the operation of the baser cause appears to have been slight. On the other hand, freedom attracts the free ; and tribes, or handfuls, of Turkish subjects near Montenegro have had a tendency to join it. Until a few years back, it never had a defined frontier ; it is only in recent times that its eastern triangle, that of Berda, has been added to Tsernagora proper. About 1800, the population had risen to 55,000. In 1825, to 75,000. In 1835, the official calendar of Cetinje placed it at 100,000, and in 1865 at 196,000. This included the districts of Grabovo, Rudine, and Joupá, conquered under Prince Danilo. For the mere handful of mountaineers has been strong enough, on the whole, not only to hold but to increase its land. Yet, on the establishment of free Serbia, a tendency to emigrate from the sterile rocks into that well-conditioned country was naturally exhibited ; and two battalions composed of the children of Montenegrins helped to make up that small portion of the army of General Tcherniaeff, on which alone, in the operations of the recent war, he could confidently rely.

While the gross population of Montenegro, in men, women, and children, was slowly growing through three centuries from thirty to fifty thousand, we must inquire with curiosity what amount of Turkish force has been deemed by the Porte equal



to the enterprise of attacking the mountain. And here, strange as it may seem, history proves it to have been the general rule not to attack Montenegro except with armies equalling or exceeding, sometimes doubling or more, in numbers, all the men, women, and children that it contained. In 1712, under the Vladika Danilo, 50,000 men crossed the Zeta between Podgoritz and Spuz. Some accounts raise this force beyond 100,000.<sup>1</sup> Danilo assailed their camp before dawn on the 29th of July, with an army, in three divisions, which could hardly have reached 12,000 men. With a loss of 318 men, he slew, at the lowest estimate, 20,000. And in these alone, so far as I know of all modern wars, it seems not uncommon to find the slain among the Turks exceeding the gross number of the highland heroes arrayed against them. Great is the glory of the Swiss in their Burgundian wars for freedom; but can it be matched with the exploits of the bishops of Montenegro and their martial flocks? Once more the heart of the little nation relieves itself in song.

The Seraskier wrote to Danilo: "Send me your paltry tribute, and three of your best warriors for hostages. Refuse, and I will lay waste the land from the Morea to the salt-sea<sup>2</sup> with fire and sword, and will seize you alive,<sup>3</sup> and put you to death by torture." As he read this letter the Vladika wept bitterly. He summoned the heads of communities to Cetinje. Some said, "Give them the tax;" but others, "Give them our stones." . . . They determined that they would fight to the last man. They swore with one accord that all they would give the Turk should be the bullet-rain of their muskets.

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<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 23. G., p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> G., p. 10. The Morea was not then Turkish. Does the "salt-sea" mean the White Sea?

<sup>3</sup> As opposed to the ordinary practice in these wars, of death on the field without quarter.

And thus continues the tale. Three Montenegrins went down to the Turkish encampment by night, and traversed the slumbering masses ; just as, in the tenth Iliad, Odusseus and Diomed moved amid the sleeping allies of Troy. Vuko, one of the three, said to his comrades : " Go you back ; I abide here to serve the cause." They returned to Cetinjë, and said : " So many are the Turks, that, had we three all been pounded into salt, we should not be enough to salt a supper for them." How this recalls the oldest census in the world, the census of Homer, who says :<sup>1</sup> " Were the Achaians divided into parties of ten, and every Trojan employed in serving them with wine, one for each party, many a ten would lack a wine-server." But, not to terrify their friends, they added that this vast host was but a host of cripples. So the people heard mass, received the benediction of their Vladika, and then set out upon the errand of victory or death. Vuko had induced the enemy to rest by the Vladinia, on the plea that they would not find water between that stream and Cetinjë. Here, before dawn, came down on them the bullet-rain. They were slaughtered through three days of flight ; and the bard concludes ; " O my Serbian brothers, and all ye in whose breast beats the heart of liberty, be glad ; for never will the ancient freedom perish, so long as we still hold our little Tsernagora ! "

The very next year, the Turks assembled 120,000 of their best troops for the purpose of crushing the mountaineers, whose numbers fell within the satirical description, applied by Tigranes to the Romans : " Too many for an embassy, too

<sup>1</sup> Hom. *Il.* ii. 128.

few for an army." But even this was not enough of precaution. Thirty-seven head men of Montenegro, who had proceeded to the Turkish camp to negotiate with the commander, were basely seized and put to death. The Turks now ventured to assail a force one-tenth of its own numbers and deprived of its leaders. They burned the monastery, they carried thousands of women and children into slavery, and then, without attempting to hold the country, they marched off to the Morea, while the men of Tsernagora descended from their rocky fastnesses and rebuilt their villages.<sup>1</sup> They powerfully befriended Austria and Venice in the war they were then waging, and, as was too commonly the case, were left in the lurch by their allies at the peace of Passarowitz in 1719. The Turks accordingly made bold to attack them in 1722 with 20,000 men under Hussein Pasha. One thousand Montenegrins took this General prisoner, and utterly discomfited his army.<sup>2</sup> In 1727, another Turkish invasion was similarly defeated. In 1732, Topal Osman Pasha marched against the Piperi, who had joined them with 30,000 men, but had to fly with the loss of his camp and baggage. In 1735 the heroic Danilo passed into his rest, after half a century of toil and glory.

These may be taken as specimens of the military history of Montenegro. Time does not permit me to dwell on what is perhaps the most curious case of personation in all history, that of Stiepan Mali, who for many years together passed himself off upon the mountaineers as being Peter III. of Russia, the unfortunate husband of Catherine, and, in that

<sup>1</sup> G., p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> G., p. 13. F. and W., p. 25.

character, partially obtained their obedience. But the presence of a prince reputed to be Russian naturally stimulated the Porte. Again Montenegro was invaded in 1768 by an army variously estimated at 67,000, 100,000, and even 180,000 men. Their force of 10,000 to 12,000 was, as ever, ready for the fight; but the Venetians, timorously obeying the Porte, prohibited the entry of munitions of war. Utter ruin seemed now at length to overhang them. A cartridge was worth a ducat, such was their necessity; when 500 of their men attacked a Turkish division, and had for their invaluable reward a prize of powder. And now all fear had vanished. They assailed before dawn the united forces of the Pashas of Roumelia from the south and Bosnia from the north. Again they effected the scarcely credible slaughter of 20,000 Turks with 3000 horses, and won an incredible booty of colors, arms, munitions, and baggage. So it was that the flood of war gathered round this fortress of faith and freedom, and so it was that flood was beaten back. *Afflavit Dominus, ac dissipantur.*

In 1782 came Peter<sup>1</sup> to the throne, justly recorded, by the fond veneration of his countrymen, as Peter the Saint. Marmont, all whose inducements and threats he alike repelled, has given this striking description of him: "Ce Vladika, homme superbe, de cinquante ans environ, d'un esprit remarquable, avait beaucoup de noblesse et de dignité dans ses manières. Son autorité positive et légale dans son pays était peu de chose, mais son influence était sans bornes."<sup>2</sup> As bishop, statesman, legislator, and warrior, he brought his

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., pp. 35-59.

<sup>2</sup> I quote from F. and W., p. 495.

country safely through eight-and-forty years of scarcely intermitted struggle. Down to, and perhaps after, his time, the government was carried on as in the Greece of the heroic age. The sovereign was Priest, Judge, and General ; and was likewise the head of the Assembly, not representative, but composed of the body of the people, in which were taken the decisions that were to bind the people as laws. This was called the Sbor ; it was held in the open air ; and when it became unruly, the method of restoring order was to ring the bell of the neighboring church. Here was promulgated for the first time in the year 1796, by his authority, a code of laws for Montenegro, which had hitherto been governed, like the Homeric communities, by oral authority and tradition. In 1798 he appointed a body of judges, and in 1803 he added to the code a supplement. With the nineteenth century, in round numbers, commenced the humanizing process, which could not but be needed among a race whose existence, for ten generations of men, had been a constant struggle of life and death with the ferocious Turk. From his time, the *haradsch* was no more heard of.<sup>1</sup> Here is the touching and simple account of the calm evening that closed his stormy day :—

On the 18th of October, 1830, Peter the First, who was then in his eighty-first year, was sitting, after the manner of his country, by the fire-side of his great kitchen, and was giving to his chiefs, assembled round him, instructions for the settlement of some local<sup>2</sup> differences which had

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<sup>1</sup> G. p. 21 n.

<sup>2</sup> Among the *Plemenas*, which may be called *Parishes* : subdivisions of the eight *Nahias*, say *Hundreds*. All Montenegro is but a moderate county.

arisen. The aged Vladika, feeling himself weak, announced that his last hour was come, and prayed them to conduct him to the humble cell which, without fire, he inhabited as a hermit would. Arriving there, he stretched himself on his bed; urged upon his chiefs to execute with fidelity the provisions set forth in the Will he had that day dictated to his secretary; and then, in conversation and in prayer, rendered up his soul to God. So died this illustrious man, whom a Slavonic writer has not scrupled to call the Louis XIV. of Tsernagora, but who in a number of respects was also its Saint Louis.<sup>1</sup>

Thirty-five years after his death Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby, in their remarkable tour, visited the country. They found still living some of those who had lived under St. Peter; and thus they give the report of him which they received:—

There are still with us men who lived under St. Peter's rule, heard his words, and saw his life. For fifty years he governed us; and fought and negotiated for us; and walked before us in pureness and uprightness from day to day. He gave us good laws, and put an end to the disorderly state of the country. He enlarged our frontier, and drove away our enemies. Even on his deathbed he spoke words to our elders, which have kept peace among us since he has gone. While he yet lived, we swore by his name. We felt his smile a blessing, and his anger a curse. We do so still.<sup>2</sup>

The voice of his people declared him a saint. Did the Vatican ever issue an award more likely to be ratified above?

I have already indicated resemblances between the characteristic features of Montenegro and of Homeric or Achaian Greece. One of the most remarkable among them is the growth of men truly great in small theatres of action. Not Peter the First only, but his successors, will bear some comparison with those, whom the great Greek historians of the

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> *Travels* of Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby, p. 628 (ed. 1867). Also see Goptchevitch, p. 21.

classic period have made so famous. To Peter the First succeeded his nephew Radatomovo, aged seventeen years. He was thereupon invested with the ecclesiastical habit and the sovereignty, and in 1833, when aged only twenty, he received at St. Petersburg episcopal consecration. Sir Gardner Wilkinson informs us that he was nearly six feet eight inches in height, and thoroughly well proportioned. His skill with the rifle was such that, when one of his attendants tossed a lemon into the air, he would readily put a bullet through it. At nineteen the cloud of Turkish war broke upon him from Scutari; for he had refused to accept a *berat* from the Porte, which would have sealed him as a vassal. The pasha's advanced guard of several thousand men<sup>1</sup> was defeated by a body of 800 Montenegrins, at the head of whom the Pope Radoviti fell bravely fighting; and no more was heard of the invasion. But this Vladika, following up St. Peter's work, set his face sternly against all such lawless habits as remained in the country. In his modes of repression there are curious traits of manners. The man-slayer was shot,<sup>2</sup> but the thief was ignominiously hanged. In the matter of shooting there was a great difficulty; for the terrible usage of the *vendetta*—which had by no means been extirpated from the Ionian Islands twenty years ago—bound the kin or descendants of a man to avenge his death on the person who slew him. The expedient adopted was to shoot by a large platoon, so that the killer could not be identified. I read that, before brigandage and the *vendetta* could be thoroughly put down, some hundreds of lives<sup>3</sup> were taken; more, probably, than were

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 30. G., p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> G., p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> G., p. 39.

ever lost in the bloodiest battle with the Turk. Internal reform, which partook of a martial character, was the great task of this reign. But not exclusively. Under him was performed one of the feats incredible except in Montenegro. Ten men in 1835 seized by a *coup de main* the old castle of Zabliak, once the capital of Zeta, held it for four days against 3,000 Turks, and then surrendered it only by order of the Vladika, who was anxious to avoid a war. Nearly all his battles were victories.

This giant had received at St. Petersburg a high education and was a cultivated man. A friend of mine has seen and admired him at Venice. He goes by the title of "the hero, statesman, poet Vladika;" and his verse has given him a high place in Slav literature. He is thus described:<sup>1</sup>—

One while he was to be seen a captain, sword in hand, giving an example of every military virtue at the head of his troops; another, as a priest and preacher, carrying the cross alone, and subduing his wild compatriots into gentleness; again, as an inexorable judge, ordering the execution of culprits in his presence, or as a prince incorruptible, and refusing all the favors by which it was sought to fetter his independence.

Down to his time, there had been a civil governor who acted under the metropolitan as sovereign; but the holder of the office was deposed for intriguing with Austria, and when the Vladika died at thirty-nine, no successor had been appointed. This perhaps tended to accelerate the change, which was effected on the death of Peter the Poet in 1851. But a share of it was due to that subtle influence, the love of woman, which has so many times operated at great crises upon human affairs. The young Danilo, the nephew of the deceased Vladika, des-

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 62.



ignated for the succession, was attached to a beautiful girl in Trieste, and the hope of union with her could only be maintained in the event of his avoiding episcopal consecration, which entailed the obligation of celibacy. The Senate almost unanimously supported him in his determination ; and thus was effected a change which perhaps was required by the spirit of the times. The old system, among other points, entailed a great difficulty with respect to regulating the succession, which, among a people less simple and loyal, would have been intolerable. So, then, ended that line of the Vladikas of Montenegro, who had done a work for freedom, as well as for religion, never surpassed in any country of the globe. Of the trappings and enjoyments of power, they had known nothing. To them, it was endeared as well as sanctified only by burdens and by perils. Their dauntless deeds, their simple self-denying lives, have earned for them a place of high honor in the annals of mankind, and have laid for their people the solid groundwork on which the future, and a near future as it seems, will build.

Danilo did no dishonor, during his short reign, to the traditions of his episcopal predecessors. He consummated the great work of internal order, and published in 1855 the statute-book in force until 1876. In the war with Omar Pasha (1852—3), the military fame of the country was thoroughly maintained, under admirable leaders, though as usual with inferior arms and numbers. During the Crimean struggle, he maintained the formal neutrality of his country, though it cost him a civil war, and nearly caused the severance of Berda from the ancient Montenegro.<sup>1</sup> In May, 1858, his brother Mirko

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., pp. 65-70. G., p. 35.

revived and rivalled at Grabovo all the old military glories of Tsernagora. Having no artillery, and very inferior arms, the Montenegrins swept down from the hill upon the gunners of the Turks, and destroyed them. In this battle the Ottoman force, enclosed in a basin or *corrie*, without power of retreat, displayed a desperate valor, for which on most other occasions they have not been by any means so remarkable. Nor was their numerical superiority so manifold as it commonly had been. They were defeated with the loss of several thousand lives, fourteen guns, colors, baggage, and munitions. From the bodies of many dead were taken English as well as French medals, obviously granted for the Crimean war, which were seen by Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby among the collection of trophies at Cettinje.<sup>1</sup> The victory of Grabovo produced a great excitement among the rayahs of Turkey. But the great Powers of Europe came to the help of the Porte and its huge empire against the Lilliputian State, that is scarcely a speck upon its map. It had to abide a diplomatic verdict. A Commission, sitting at Constantinople, accorded to it the advantage of establishing in principle the delimitation of its frontiers, and in 1859 admitted its envoy, notwithstanding the protest of Ali Pasha, to take part in its deliberations. But the Powers had in 1857 determined at Paris that, in return for some small accretion, and for access to the sea, Montenegro should definitely acknowledge the suzerainty of the Porte.<sup>2</sup> Her refusal was positive, despite the wishes of the prince. It was to French<sup>3</sup> not British advocacy that she seems to have

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie and Irby, p. 610.

<sup>2</sup> F. and W., p. 72.

<sup>3</sup> It is fair to say that there is, as far as I know, no English account of the affair.

owed a declaration of May 1858,<sup>1</sup> which acknowledged the independence of the Black Mountain.

In August 1860, Prince Danilo was shot on the quay of Cattaro. The assassin was prompted by a motive of private revenge, for which different grounds are assigned. Like his predecessors, he lived and died a hero. In what estimation he was held, let Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby testify. On his death his body had been carried up the mountain, and deposited in a church. For many weeks afterwards, as they tell us, this church was filled, morning, noon, and all night through, by his people, men, women, and children ; and stalwart warriors were, as of old, dissolved in tears.

Danilo was succeeded by his nephew Nikita, the present Prince of Montenegro. He had not at his accession completed his nineteenth year. It is characteristic of the Principality that his own father Mirko, the victor of Grabovo, contentedly gave way to him. Goptchevitch, the brother of his aunt Princess Darinka, acquaints us that he set out with two fixed ideas—the first, to prosecute the civilizing work among his people ; the second, to liberate the sister Serbian lands still in servitude.<sup>2</sup> This writer appears disposed, in regard to the present sovereign, rather to play the part of critic than of eulogist ; but ascribes to him great merit in his political conduct and in the prosecution of social reforms. Soon after his accession, Montenegro was worsted, after a long resistance, in a war with Turkey. She had been driven to her crags, when diplomatic mediation brought about a set-

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> G., p. 40.

tlement. It was then proved that an empire of 35,000,000 *could* gain the advantage against a tribe under 200,000. Only, however, when she could concentrate against it all or nearly all her forces ; when she had a general, not a Turk, of the ability of Omar Pasha ; when she had reformed her whole armament by means of European loans ; and when Montenegro had but her old muskets and old ways. Since then a great change has taken place. The army has been organized in 30 battalions, 800 strong ; and now for the first time we hear of an endeavor to establish a certain strength of cavalry. The fighting men are reckoned at 35,000 ; but the military age begins at twelve. The obligation for offensive service runs only from seventeen ; but it appears that the zeal of patriotism carries the people while yet boys into the ranks. The force available for general operations, between seventeen and fifty, amounts to 24,000. The arms have been greatly improved, two-thirds having breech-loaders, all (as is stated) revolvers, and most of them carrying the *handschar*. During the war from July to October, 1876, we heard much of the Turkish victories over a Serbian army composed principally of peasants put suddenly into the ranks, with a *salting* of real soldiers ; but very little, in comparison, of their failures and defeats in the conflict with Montenegro. Goptchevitch has supplied<sup>1</sup> a detailed account of the operations. I shall refer only to the most remarkable. On the 28th of July the men of Tsernagora encountered Muktar Pasha, and for once with superior force. Four thousand Turks were killed, but

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 188-93.

only seventy men of Montenegro. Osman Pasha was taken ; Selim was among the slain. At Medun, on the 14th of August, 20,000 Turks were defeated by 5,000 of these heroic warriors ; and 4,700 slain. On the 6th of September five battalions of Montenegro defeated Dervisch Pasha in his movement upon Piperi, and slew 3,000 of his men. On the 7th of October Muktar Pasha, with 18,000 men, drove three Montenegrin battalions back upon Mirotinsko Dolove. Here they were raised, by a junction with Vukotitch, to a strength of 6,000 men. Thus reinforced, they swept down upon Muktar, and, after an action of sixteen hours, drove him back to Kloluk, leaving 1,500, dead behind him. On the 10th of October Dervisch Pasha effected an advance from the south, until he found himself attacked simultaneously at various points, and had to retreat with a loss of 2,000 men. On the 20th of October Medun was taken, and the Ottoman general fled to Scutari, leaving garrisons in Spuz and Podgoritza. The armistice arrested this course of disasters, when the southern army (Dervisch) had been reduced from 45,000 to 22,000, and the northern (Muktar) from 35,000 to 18,000.

So much for that "indomitable pluck" of the Turks, which has since moved the enthusiastic admiration of a British Minister.

Goptchevitch reckons the slain on the Turkish side at 26,000 ; on the side of Montenegro, at 1,000. And there is no wonder if we find the Montenegrins now aspire to breech-loaders and to cavalry: they captured from their enemies (with much besides) 12,000 breechloaders and 1,500 horses.

Montenegro brought into action, in all, 25,000 men ; 17,000

of her own, 2,000 allies, and 6,000 insurgents from the Turkish provinces: a fact, this last, highly indigestible for those who contend that rebellions in Turkey are not sustained by natives, but by foreigners. The entire Turkish force directed against Tsernagora is stated at the enormous total of 130,000. It was, of course, chiefly Asiatic.

It will be observed that the whole of these figures are taken from a work on the Slavonic side. The author has had the best means of information; and the statements are written not for our information, but for that of the sober and studious Germans. They are such as might at first sight well provoke a smile of incredulity. Yet, strange to say, they are in pretty close conformity with the general, the nearly unbroken, tenor of a series of wars reaching over four centuries. This is the race which, when asked for tribute, offered stones; whose privations were such, that on one occasion, having taken some hundreds of Turkish prisoners, they gladly accepted in exchange the same number of pigs; who clothe the coward in the garb of woman, but those women freely grasp the rifle in the hour of need; yet whose men of war weep like women for the dead prince they love; and whose fathers in 1484 carried the printing-press with them to the mountains.

What became of that printing-press? Probably, when, not long after the removal to the hills, a vast army of Ottomans penetrated to Cetinje and burned the monastery, it perished in the flames. The act of carrying it there demonstrated the habits, and implied the hopes, of a true civilization. But those habits and those hopes could not survive the cruel, in-

exorable incidents of the position. Barbarous himself in origin, and rendered far more barbarous by the habitual tyranny incident of necessity to his peculiar position in these provinces, the Turk has barbarized every tribe about him, except those whom he unmanned. The race of Tsernagora, with their lives ever in their hand, have inhabited not a territory, but a camp ; and camp life, bad at the best, is terrible in its operation when it becomes continuous for twelve generations of men. It was only a fraction of the brutality and cruelty of Turks that in course of time was learned by the mountaineers. But even that fraction was enough to stir a thrill of horror. Of the exposure of the heads of the slain I cannot speak so strongly as some, who appear to forget that we did the same thing in the middle of the last century which Montenegro carried on into this one ; and that a Jacobite, fighting for his ancient line of kings, may fairly bear comparison with a race which had claimed a commission not only to conquer all the earth, but to blast and blight all they conquered. On both sides this was a coarse, harsh practice, and it was nothing more. The same cannot be said of the mutilation of prisoners. There was an undoubted case of this kind during the late war, when a batch of Turks had their noses or upper lips or both cut away. This is certainly very far less bad than burning, flaying, impaling, and the deeds worse even than these in Bulgaria, for which rewards and decorations have been given by the Porte. But it was a vile act ; and we have to regret that no measures have been taken by the British agency which published it to trace it home, so that we might know the particulars of time, place, and cir-

cumstance, and learn whether it was done by Montenegrins or by their allies, who have not undergone the civilizing influence of the last four reigns in Tsernagora. The unnaturally severe conditions, which have been normal in Montenegrin existence, will be best of all understood by the ideas and usages which have prevailed among themselves towards one another. Firstly, we are told that death in battle came to be regarded as natural death, death in bed as something apart from nature. Secondly, agriculture, and still more all trading industry, fell into disrepute among these inveterate warriors, and the first was left to the women, while they depended upon foreign lands to supply the handicrafts. Thirdly, when a comrade was wounded in battle so as to be helpless, the first duty was to remove him ; but if this were impossible from the presence of the enemy, then to cut off his head, so as to save him from the shame or torture which he was certain to incur, if taken alive by the Turks. Not only was this an act of friendship, but a special act of special friendship. There grew up among the mountaineers a custom of establishing a conventional relationship, which they called bond-brotherhood; and it was a particular duty of the bond-brother to perform this fearful office for his mate. In fact, the idea of it became for the Montenegrin simple and elementary, as we may learn from an anecdote, with a comic turn, given by Sir Gardner Wilkinson.

When the Austrians and Montenegrins were fighting against the Turks, allies of the French, on a certain occasion a handful of men had to fly for their lives. Two Austrians were among them, of whom one had the misfortune to be



what is called stout. When the party had run some way, he showed signs of extreme distress, and said he would throw himself on the ground, and take his chance. "Very well," said a fellow-fugitive, "make haste, say your prayers, make the sign of the cross, and I will then cut off your head for you." As might be expected, this was not at all the view of the Austrian in his proposal, and the friendly offer had such an effect upon him, that he resumed the race and reached a place of safety. Under the steady reforming influences, which have now been at work for nearly a hundred years, few vestiges of this state of things probably remain.

But I will dedicate the chief part of my remaining space to the application of that criterion which is of all others the sharpest and surest test of the condition of a country—namely the idea it has embraced of woman, and the position it assigns to her.

This is both the weak, the very weak, and also the strong point of Montenegro. The women till the fields, and may almost be said to make them; for Lady Strangford testifies that she saw various patches of ground in cultivation, which were less than three feet square, and it seems handfuls of soil are put together even where a single root will grow. More than this, over the great ladder-road between Cetinje and Cattaro, the women carry such parcels, bound together, as, being over ten pounds in weight, are too heavy for the post; and Goptchevitch records the seemingly easy performance of her task by a woman who was the bearer of his large and long portmanteau.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, though the race is

<sup>1</sup> G., p. 81.

beautiful, and this beauty may be seen in very young girls, as women they become short in stature, with harsh and repulsive features. Nor is their social equality recognized, since they not only labor but perform menial offices for the men. One of our authorities <sup>1</sup> informs us that the husband often beats his wife. This, however, to my knowledge was a practice which did not excite general repugnance, one generation back among the Hellenic inhabitants of Cefalonia.

The portrait thus set before us is sufficiently ungainly. let us turn to its more winning features. Crime of all kinds is rare in Montenegro: Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby inform us that in a year the gaol had but two prisoners. But the crimes, or sins, which have reference to woman, are, whether in their viler or their milder forms, almost unknown. Not violation only, but seduction and prostitution, says Goptchevitch, are not found in Montenegro.<sup>2</sup> The old law of the country punished all unchastity with death: a law, of which there seem to be traces also in Bulgaria. Everywhere the purity and modesty of the maiden enjoy an absolute respect; and a woman, in every defile, every hamlet of Tsernagora, is a perfect escort for the traveller. Moreover, even the French writer, to whom I am so much indebted, and who seems to view this matter through a pair of Parisian spectacles, candidly admits that the Montenegrin woman is quite satisfied with her state. "*La Monténégrine semble du reste se complaire dans ce rôle d'infériorité et d'abjection.*"<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> F. and W. p. 153.

<sup>2</sup> G., pp. 767.

<sup>3</sup> F. and W., p. 150

If the condition of the women was not Parisian, neither, it may be truly said, was that of the men.

The women have the same passionate attachment with the men to family and country, and display much of the same valor. Goptchevitch supplies two most remarkable examples. A sister and four brothers, the four of course all armed, are making a pilgrimage or excursion to a church. The state of war with the Turk being normal, we need not wonder when we learn that they are attacked unawares on their way, in a pass where they proceed in single file, by seven armed Turks ; who announce themselves by shooting dead the first of the brothers, and dangerously wounding the second. The odds are fearful, but the fight proceeds. The wounded man leans against the rock, and, though he receives another and fatal shot, kills two of the Turks before he dies. The sister presses forward, and grasps his rifle and his dagger. At last all are killed on both sides, excepting herself and a single Turk. She asks for mercy ; and he promises it, but names her maidenly honor, as the price. Indignant, and perceiving that now he is off his guard, she stabs him with the dagger. He tears it from her hand, they close, and she dashes the wretch over the precipice into the yawning depth below.<sup>1</sup>

The second anecdote is not less singular. Tidings reach a Montenegrin wife that her husband has just been slain by a party under the command of a certain Aga. Knowing the road by which they are travelling, she seizes a rifle, chooses her position, and shoots the Aga dead. The rest of the party

<sup>1</sup> G., p. 79.

take to flight. The wife of the dead Aga sends her an epistle. "Thou hast robbed me of both my eyes. Thou art a genuine daughter of Tsernagora. Come to-morrow alone to the border-line, and we will prove by trial which of us was the better wife." The Tsernagorine appeared, equipped with the arms of the dead Aga, and alone as she was invited. But the Turkish woman had thought prudence the better part of valor, and brought an armed champion with her, who charges her on horseback. She shot him dead as he advanced, and, seizing her faithless antagonist, bound her and took her home, kept her as a nursemaid for fourteen years, and then let her go back to her place and people.<sup>1</sup>

Such, in the rudest outline, is the Montenegro of history, and of fact. Such it was. Such it is. But what will it be? On some points we may speak with boldness; on others it must be with reserve. However unskilful may be the hand which has inscribed these pages, it can hardly have expelled so completely from the wonderful picture both its color and its form, as not to have left in it vestiges at least and suggestions of a character greatly transcending the range of common experience, and calculated to awaken an extraordinary interest. Montenegro, which has carried down through four centuries, in the midst of a constant surge of perils, a charmed life, we may say with confidence will not die. No Russian, no Austrian eagle will build its nest in the Black Mountain.<sup>2</sup> The men of Tsernagora, who have never allowed the very shadow of a Turkish title to grow up by silent prescription,

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* p. 78. F. and W., p. 159.

<sup>2</sup> In the arms of Montenegro appears a "sovrän eagle" crowned.

will claim their portion<sup>1</sup> of an air and soil genial to a man, and of free passage to and fro over the land and sea which God has given us. It is another question whether their brethren of the Serbian lands will amalgamate with them politically on an extended scale, and revive, either by a federal or an incorporating union, the substance, if not the form, of the old Serbian State. Such an arrangement would probably be good for Europe, and would go some way to guarantee freedom and self-government to the other European provinces of Turkey, whether under Ottoman suzerainty or otherwise. There is another question deeper and more vital. Rudeness and ferocity are rapidly vanishing; when their last trace disappears, will the simplicity, the truth, the purity, the high-strung devotion, the indomitable heroism, lose by degrees their native tone and their clear sharp outline, and will a vision on the whole so glorious for them, so salutary and corrective for us,

“Die away,  
And fade into the light of common day?”<sup>2</sup>

To the student of human nature, forty years ago, Pitcairn's Island offered a picture of singular interest, no less remote morally than locally from common life, a Paradise, not indeed of high intellect and culture, but of innocence and virtue. It became necessary to find for the growing numbers a larger site; and they were carried to Norfolk Island, when it had been purged of its population of convicts double-dyed. The spot was lovely, and the conditions favorable; but the organism would not bear transplanting, and the Pitcairners

<sup>1</sup> F. and W., p. 500.

<sup>2</sup> Wordsworth, *Ode on Recoll. of Childhood*.

fast declined into the common mass of men. Is this to be the fate of the men of Montenegro when they substitute ease, and plenty, and power, and the pleasures and luxuries of life, for that stern but chivalrous wooing of Adversity, the "relentless power," in which they have been reared to a maturity of such incomparable hardihood? I dare not say: they have a firmer fibre, a closer tissue than ever was woven in the soft air and habitudes of Pitcairn; may they prove too strong for the world, and remain what in substance they are, a select, a noble, an imperial race!

In another point of view, they offer a subject of great interest to the inquiries of the naturalist. Physically, they are men of exceptional power and stature. Three causes may perhaps be suggested. The habits of their life have been in an extraordinary degree hardy, healthy, simple; if they have felt the pressure of want at times, have never known the standing curse of plethora,

*Nec nova februm  
Terris incubuit cohors.*

Next, may not the severe physical conditions of the Black Mountain have acted as a test, and shut out from the adult community all who did not attain to a high standard of masculine vigor? Among other notable features, they are a people of great longevity. Sir G. Wilkinson (shade of Lewis, hear it not!) found among them, living together as a family, seven successive generations; the patriarch had attained the age of 117, with a son of 100. A youth at 17 or 18 very commonly marries a girl of 13 or 14.<sup>1</sup> But, thirdly, I conceive that

<sup>1</sup> G., p. 76.

moral causes may have cooperated powerfully with outward nature in this matter. *Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis.* The men who went up with Ivan were men of great souls ; and this greatness, transmitted with blood and fortified by habit, may have assisted in supplying us with what seems to be a remarkable case of both natural and providential selection.

For the materials of this sketch I have been principally indebted to the two works named at its head. They are, I believe, the best on the subject ; one is large and elaborate, the other, also full, coming down almost to this day. There is as yet no comprehensive book on Montenegro in our language. We have recently had articles on it in the *Church Quarterly Review* and in *Macmillan*, the latter guaranteed by the high name of Mr. Freeman. Sir Gardner Wilkinson led the way thirty years ago with some chapters on the Mountain in his Dalmatian work. Dr. Neale has supplied some very brief but interesting notices. Lady Strangford's sketch is slight and thin, but with ample power of observation. Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby were able to bestow far more of time and care on a subject well worthy of them, and have probably made by much the most valuable contribution extant in our language, under this as under other heads, to our knowledge of those South Slavonic provinces whose future will, we may humbly trust, redeem the miseries of their past. "Whereas thou hast been forsaken and hated, so that no man went through thee ; I will make thee an eternal excellency, a joy of many generations."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Isaiah lx. 15.





*THE*  
*POLITICAL DESTINY OF CANADA.*<sup>1</sup>

BY PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH.

IGNORANCE of the future can hardly be good for any man or nation ; nor can forecast of the future in the case of any man or nation well interfere with the business of the present, though the language of colonial politicians seems often to imply that it may. No Canadian farmer would take his hand from the plough, no Canadian artisan would desert the foundry or the loom, no Canadian politician would become less busy in his quest of votes, no industry of any kind would slacken, no source of wealth would cease to flow, if the rulers of Canada and the powers of Downing Street, by whom the rulers of Canada are supposed to be guided, instead of drifting on in darkness, knew for what port they were steering.

For those who are actually engaged in moulding the institutions of a young country not to have formed a conception of her destiny—not to have made up their minds whether she is to remain for ever a dependency, to blend again in a vast confederation with the monarchy of the mother country, or to be united to a neighboring republic—would be to renounce statesmanship. The very expenditure into which Canada is led by her position as a dependency in military and political railways, in armaments and defences, and other things which

<sup>1</sup> THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, *April*, 1877.

assume the permanence of the present system, is enough to convict Canadian rulers of flagrant improvidence if the permanency of the present system is not distinctly established in their minds.

To tax forecast with revolutionary designs or tendencies is absurd. No one can be in a less revolutionary frame of mind than he who foresees a political event without having the slightest interest in hastening its arrival. On the other hand, mere party politicians cannot afford to see beyond the hour. Under the system of party government, forecast and freedom of speech alike belong generally to those who are not engaged in public life.

The political destiny of Canada is here considered by itself, apart from that of any other portion of the motley and widely scattered "Empire." This surely is the rational course. Not to speak of India and the military dependencies, such as Malta and Gibraltar, which have absolutely nothing in common with the North American colonies (India not even the titular form of government, since its sovereign has been made an empress), who can believe that the future of Canada, of South Africa, of Australia, of the West Indies, and of Mauritius will be the same? Who can believe that the mixed French and English population of Canada, the mixed Dutch and English population of the Cape, the negro population of Jamaica, the French and Indian population of Mauritius, the English and Chinese population of Australia, are going to run for ever the same political course? Who can believe that the moulding influences will be the same in arctic continents or in tropical islands as in countries lying within

the temperate zone? Among the colonies, those, perhaps, which most nearly resemble each other in political character and circumstances are Canada and Australia ; yet the elements of the population are very different ; and still more different are the external relations of Australia, with no other power near her, from those of Canada, not only conterminous with the United States, but interlaced with them, so that at present the road of the Governor-General of Canada, when he visits his Pacific province, lies through the territory of the American republic. Is it possible to suppose that the slender filament which connects each of these colonies with Downing Street is the thread of a common destiny ?

In studying Canadian politics, and in attempting to cast the political horoscope of Canada, the first thing to be remembered, though official optimism is apt to overlook it, is that Canada was a colony not of England but of France, and that between the British of Ontario and the British of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are interposed, in solid and unyielding mass, above a million of unassimilated and politically antagonistic Frenchmen. French Canada is a relic of the historical past preserved by isolation, as Siberian mammoths are preserved in ice. It is a fragment of the France before the Revolution, less the monarchy and the aristocracy ; for the feeble parody of French feudalism in America ended with the abolition of the seigniories, which may be regarded as the final renunciation of feudal ideas and institutions by society in the New World. The French Canadians are an unprogressive, religious, submissive, courteous, and, though poor, not unhappy people. They would make excellent factory hands if

Canada had a market for her manufactures ; and, perhaps, it is as much due to the climate as to their lack of intelligent industry that they have a very different reputation as farmers. They are governed by the priest, with the occasional assistance of the notary ; and the Roman Catholic Church may be said to be still established in the province, every Roman Catholic being bound to pay tithes and other ecclesiastical imposts, though the Protestant minority are exempt. The Church is immensely rich, and her wealth is always growing, so that the economical element which mingled with the religious causes of the Reformation may one day have its counterpart in Quebec. The French Canadians, as we have said, retain their exclusive national character. So far from being absorbed by the British population, or Anglicized by contact with it, they have absorbed and Gallicized the fragments of British population which chance has thrown among them ; and the children of Highland regiments disbanded in Quebec have become thorough Frenchmen, and prefixed Jean Baptiste to their Highland names. For his own Canada the Frenchman of Quebec has something of a patriotic feeling ; for France he has filial affection enough to make his heart beat violently for her during a Franco-German war ; for England, it may be safely said, he has no feeling whatever. It is true that he fought against the American invaders in the revolutionary war, and again in 1812 ; but then he was animated by his ancient hostility to the Puritans of New England, in the factories of whose descendants he now freely seeks employment. Whether he would enthusiastically take up arms for England against the Americans at present,

the British War Office, after the experience of the two Fenian raids, can no doubt tell. With Upper Canada, the land of Scotch Presbyterians, Irish Orangemen, and ultra-British sentiment, French Canada, during the union of the two provinces, led an uneasy life ; and she accepted confederation, on terms which leave her nationality untouched, rather as a severance of her special wedlock with her unloved consort than as a measure of North American union. The unabated antagonism between the two races and the two religions was plainly manifested on the occasion of the conflict between the French half-breeds and the British immigrants in Manitoba, which presented a faint parallel to the conflict between the advanced posts of slavery and anti-slavery in Kansas on the eve of the civil war ; Quebec openly sympathizing with Riel and his fellow-insurgents, while Ontario was on fire to avenge the death of Scott. Sir George Cartier might call himself an Englishman-speaking French ; but his calling himself so did not make him so ; much less did it extend the character from a political manager, treading the path of ambition with British colleagues, to the mass of his unsophisticated compatriots. The priests hitherto have put their interests into the hands of a political leader, such as Sir George himself, in the same way in which the Irish priests used to put their interests into the hands of O'Connell ; and this leader has made the best terms he could for them and for himself at Ottawa. Nor has it been difficult to make good terms, since both the political parties bid emulously for the Catholic vote, and, by their interested subserviency to those who wield it, render it impossible for a Liberal Catholic party, or a

Liberal party of any kind, to make head against priestly influence in Quebec. By preference the priests, as reactionists, have allied themselves with the Tory party in the British provinces, and Canada has long witnessed the singular spectacle, witnessed for the first time in England at the last general election, of Roman Catholics and Orangemen marching together to the poll. Fear of contact with an active-minded democracy, and of possible peril to their overweening wealth, has also led the priesthood to shrink from Annexation, though they have not been able to prevent their people from going over the line for better wages, and bringing back with them a certain republican leaven of political and ecclesiastical unrest, which in the end may, perhaps, lead to the verification of Lord Elgin's remark, that it would be easier to make the French Canadians Americans than to make them English. Hitherto, however, French Canada has retained, among other heirlooms of the *Ancien Régime*, the old Gallican Church, the Church of Louis XIV. and of Bossuet, national, quiet, unaggressive, capable of living always on sufficiently good terms with the State. But now the scene is changed. Even to French Canada, the most secluded nook of the Catholic world, Ultra-montanism has penetrated, with the Jesuit in its van. There is a struggle for ascendancy between the Jesuits and the Gallicans, the citadel of the Gallicans being the Sulpician seminary, vast and enormously wealthy, which rises over Montreal. The Jesuit has the forces of the hour on his side ; he gains the day ; the bishops fall under his influence and take his part against the Sulpicians ; the Guibord case marks, distinctly though farcically, the tri-

umph of his principles ; and it is by no means certain that he, a cosmopolitan power playing a great game, will cling to Canadian isolation, and that he will not prefer a junction with his main army in the United States. Assuredly his choice will not be determined by loyalty to England. At all events, his aggressive policy has begun to raise questions calculated to excite the Protestants of the British provinces, which the politicians, with all their arts, will hardly be able to smother, and which will probably put an end to the long torpor of Quebec. The New Brunswick School case points to education as a subject which can scarcely fail soon to give birth to a cause of war.

Besides the French, there are in Canada, as we believe we have good authority for saying, about four hundred thousand Irish, whose political sentiments are generally identical with those of the Irish in the mother country, as any reader of their favorite journals will perceive. Thus, without reckoning a considerable German settlement in Ontario, which by its unimpaired nationality in the heart of the British population attests the weakness of the assimilating forces in Canada compared with those in the United States, or the Americans, who, though not numerous, are influential in the commercial centres, we have at once to deduct one million four hundred thousand from a total population of less than four millions in order to reduce to reality the pictures of universal devotion to England and English interests which are presented by the speeches of official persons, or of persons professing to know Canada, but deriving their idea of her from the same source.

Confederation, so far, has done nothing to fuse the races,

and very little even to unite the provinces. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, besides being cut off from Ontario by French Canada, have interests of their own, separate, and in some degree divergent, from those of Ontario, New Brunswick especially being drawn by her commercial interests towards New England. The representatives of each of the smaller provinces form a separate group at Ottawa, giving or withholding their support to a great extent from provincial considerations. Each of the two political parties has its base in Ontario, which is the field of the decisive battles; and they can hardly be said to extend to the maritime provinces, much less to Manitoba or to British Columbia. When the Ontarian parties are evenly balanced the smaller provinces turn the scale, and Ontario leaders are always buying them with "better terms," that is, alterations of the pecuniary arrangements of Confederation in their favor, and other inducements, at the sacrifice, of course, of the general interests of the Confederation. From the composition of a cabinet to the composition of a rifle team sectionalism is the rule. Confederation has secured free trade between the provinces; what other good it has done it would not be easy to say. Whether it has increased the military strength of Canada is a question for the answer to which we must appeal once more to the British War Office. Canadians have shown, on more than one memorable occasion, that in military spirit they are not wanting; but they cannot be goaded into wasting their hard-earned money on preparations for a defence which would be hopeless against an invader who will never come. Politically, the proper province of a federal government is the management



of external relations, while domestic legislation is the province of the several states. But a dependency has no external relations ; Canada has not even, like South Africa, a Native question, her Indians being harmless ; and consequently the chief duty of a federal government in Canada is to keep itself in existence by the ordinary agencies of party, a duty which it discharges with a vengeance. English statesmen bent on extending to all the colonies what they assume to be the benefits of confederation, should study the Canadian specimen, if possible on the spot. They will learn, first, that while a spontaneous Confederation, such as groups of states have formed under the pressure of a common danger, develops mainly the principles of union, a confederation brought about by external influence is apt to develop the principles of antagonism in at least an equal degree ; and, secondly, that parliamentary government in a dependency is, to a lamentable extent, government by faction and corruption, and that by superadding federal to provincial government the extent and virulence of those maladies are seriously increased. If an appeal is made to the success of confederation in Switzerland, the answer is that Switzerland is not a dependency but a nation.

It is of Canada alone that we here speak, and we speak only of her political destiny. The ties of blood, of language, of historical association, and of general sympathy which bind the British portion of the Canadian people to England, are not dependent on the political connection, nor it is likely that they would be at all weakened by its severance. In the United States there are millions of Irish exiles, with the

wrongs of Ireland in their hearts, and the whole nation retains the memories of the revolutionary war, of the war of 1812, and of the conduct of the British aristocracy towards the United States during the rebellion of the South—conduct which it is difficult to forgive, and which it would be folly to forget. Yet to those who have lived among the Americans it will not seem extravagant to say that the feelings of an Anglo-American towards his mother-country are really at least as warm as those of the natives of dependencies, and at least as likely to be manifested by practical assistance in the hour of need. A reference to the history of the opposition made to the war of 1812 will suffice at least to bring this opinion within the pale of credibility.

The great forces prevail. They prevail at last, however numerous and apparently strong the secondary forces opposed to them may be. They prevailed at last in the case of German unity and in the case of Italian independence. In each of those cases the secondary forces were so heavily massed against the event that men renowned for practical wisdom believed the event would never come. It came, irresistible and irrevocable, and we now see that Bismarck and Cavour were only the ministers of fate.

Suspended of course, and long suspended, by the action of the secondary forces, the action of the great forces may be. It was so in both the instances just mentioned. A still more remarkable instance is the long postponement of the union of Scotland with England by the antipathies resulting from the abortive attempt of Edward I., and by a subsequent train of historical accidents such as the absorption of the energies of

England in continental or civil wars. But the union came at last, and, having the great forces on its side, it came for ever.

In the case before us, it appears that the great forces are those which make for the political separation of the New from the Old World. They are—

1. The distance, which may be shortened by steam and telegraph for the transmission of a despot's commands, but can hardly be much shortened for the purposes of representative government. Steam increases the Transatlantic intercourse of the wealthier class, but not that of the people, who have neither money nor time for the passage. Everything is possible in the way of nautical invention; fuel may be still further economized, though its price is not likely to fall; but it is improbable that the cost of shipbuilding or the wages of seamen will be reduced; and the growth of manufactures in the New World, which we may expect henceforth to be rapid, can hardly fail to diminish the intercourse dependent on Transatlantic trade. A commonwealth spanning the Atlantic may be a grand conception, but political institutions must after all bear some relation to nature and to practical convenience. Few have fought against geography and prevailed.

2. Divergence of interest, which seems in this case to be as wide as possible. What has Canada to do with the European and Oriental concerns of England, with her European and Oriental diplomacy, with her European and Oriental wars? Can it be conceived that Canadian traders would allow her commerce to be cut up by Russian cruisers, or that Canadian farmers would take arms and pay war taxes in order to prevent Russia from obtaining a free passage through the Dar-

danelles? An English pamphlet called "The Great Game" was reprinted the other day in Canada; but the chapter on India was omitted as having no interest for Canadians. For English readers that chapter had probably more interest than all the other chapters put together. On the other hand, whenever a question about boundaries or mutual rights arises with the United States, the English people and the English government betray, by the languor of their diplomacy and the ease with which they yield, their comparative indifference to the objects in which Canada is most concerned. A Canadian periodical some time ago had a remarkable paper by a native writer, showing that the whole series of treaties made by Great Britain with the United States had been a continuous sacrifice of the claims of Canada. It was not, assuredly, that Great Britain wanted either force or spirit to fight for her own rights and interests, but that she felt that Canadian rights and interests were not her own. Her rulers could not have induced her people to go to war for an object for which they cared so little, and had so little reason to care, as a frontier line in North America. Another illustration of the difference between the British and the Canadian point of view was afforded by the recent dispute about the Extradition Treaty: England was disposed to be stiff and punctilious, having comparatively little to fear from the suspension of the treaty; while to Canada, bordering on the United States, the danger was great and the renewal of the treaty was a vital necessity before which punctiliousness gave way. One object there is connected with the American continent for which the British aristocracy, if we may judge by the temper it showed and the line it took

towards the American republic at the time of the Rebellion, would be not unwilling to run the risk of war. But that object is one with regard to which the interests of British aristocracy and those of Canadian democracy not only are not identical, but point directly opposite ways. With regard to economical questions, the divergence is, if possible, still clearer than with regard to diplomatic questions. The economic interests of Canada must evidently be those of her own continent, and to that continent, by all the economic forces, she must be and visibly is drawn. Her currency, whatever may be the name and superscription on the coin, is American, and it is the sure symbol of her real connection. In the British manufacturer the Canadian manufacturer sees a rival ; and Canada at this moment is the scene of a Protectionist movement led, curiously enough, by those "Conservative" politicians who are loudest in their professions of loyalty to Great Britain.

3. More momentous than even the divergence of interest is the divergence of political character between the citizen of the Old and the citizen of the New World. We speak, of course, not of the French Canadians, between whom and the people of Great Britain the absence of political affinity is obvious, but of the British communities in North America. The colonization of the New World, at least that English portion of it which was destined to give birth to the ruling and moulding power, was not merely a migration, but an exodus ; it was not merely a local extension of humanity, but a development ; it not only peopled another continent, but opened a new era. The curtain rose not for the old drama with fresh

actors, but for a fresh drama on a fresh scene. A long farewell was said to feudalism when the New England colony landed with the rough draft of a written constitution, which embodied a social compact and founded government not on sacred tradition or divine right, but on reason and the public good. The more one sees of society in the New World, the more convinced one is that its structure essentially differs from that of society in the Old World, and that the feudal element has been eliminated completely and for ever. English aristocracy, fancying itself, as all established systems fancy themselves, the normal and final state of humanity, may cling to the belief that the new development is a mere aberration, and that dire experience will in time bring it back to the ancient path. There are people, it seems, who persuade themselves that America is retrograding towards monarchy and Church establishments. No one who knows the Americans can possibly share this dream. Monarchy has found its ways to the New World only in the exceptional case of Brazil, to which the royal family of the mother country itself migrated, and where after all the Emperor is rather an hereditary president than a monarch of the European type. In Canada, government being parliamentary and "constitutional," monarchy is the delegation of a shadow; and any attempt to convert the shadow into a substance, by introducing a dynasty with a court and civil list, or by reinvesting the Viceroy with personal power, would speedily reveal the real nature of the situation. Pitt proposed to extend to Canada what as a Tory minister he necessarily regarded as the blessings of aristocracy; but the plant refused to take root in the alien soil.

No peerage ever saw the light in Canada ; the baronetage saw the light and no more ; of nobility there is nothing now but a knighthood very small in number, and upon which the Pacific Railway scandal has cast so deep a shadow that the Home Government, though inclined that way, seems shy of venturing on more creations. Hereditary wealth and the custom of primogeniture, indispensable supports of an aristocracy, are totally wanting in a purely industrial country, where, let the law be what it might, natural justice has always protested against the feudal claims of the firstborn. To establish in Canada the State Church, which is the grand buttress of aristocracy in England, has proved as hopeless as to establish aristocracy itself. The Church lands have been secularized ; the university, once confined to Anglicanism, has been thrown open ; the Anglican Church has been reduced to the level of the other denominations, though its rulers still cling to the memories and to some relics of their privileged condition. As a religion, Anglicanism has little hold upon the mass of the people ; it is recruited by emigration from England, and sustained to a certain extent by a social feeling in its favor among the wealthiest class. More democratic churches far exceed it in popularity and propagandist force : Methodism especially, which, in contrast to Episcopacy, sedulously assigns an active part in church work to every member, decidedly gains ground, and bids fair to become the popular religion of Canada. Nor is the militarism of European aristocracies less alien to industrial Canada than their monarchism and their affinity for State Churches. The Canadians, as we have already said, can fight well when

real occasion calls ; so can their kinsmen across the line ; but among the Canadians, as among the people of the Northern States, it is impossible to awaken militarism—every sort of galvanic apparatus has been tried in vain. Distinctions of rank, again, are wanting ; everything bespeaks a land dedicated to equality ; and fustian, instead of bowing to broadcloth, is rather too apt, by a rude self-assertion, to revenge itself on broadcloth for enforced submissiveness in the old country. Where the relations of classes, the social forces, and the whole spirit of society are different, the real principles and objects of government will differ also, notwithstanding the formal identity of institutions. It proved impossible, as all careful observers had foreseen, to keep the same political roof over the heads of slavery and anti-slavery. To keep the same political roof over the heads of British aristocracy and Canadian democracy would be an undertaking only one degree less hopeless. A rupture would come, perhaps, on some question between the ambition of a money-spending nobility and the parsimony of a money-making people. Let aristocracy, hierarchy, and militarism be content with the Old World ; it was conquered by the feudal sword ; the New World was conquered only by the axe and plough.

4. The force, sure in the end to be attractive, not repulsive, of the great American community along the edge of which Canada lies, and to which the British portion of her population is drawn by identity of race, language, religion, and general institutions ; the French portion by its connection with the Catholic Church of the States ; the whole by the Roman economic influences, against which artificial arrangements and



sentiments contend in vain, and which are gathering strength and manifesting their ascendancy from hour to hour.

An enumeration of the forces which make in favor of the present connection will show their secondary and, for the most part, transient character. The chief of them appear to be these :—

*a.* The reactionary tendencies of the priesthood which rules French Canada, and which fears that any change might disturb its solitary reign. Strong this force has hitherto been, but its strength depends on isolation, and isolation cannot be permanent. Even the “palæocrystallic” ice which envelops French Canada will melt at last, and when it does French reaction will be at an end. We have already noted two agencies which are working towards this result—the leaven of American sentiment brought back by French Canadians who have sojourned as artisans in the States, and the ecclesiastical aggressiveness of the Jesuits.

*b.* “United Empire Loyalism,” which has its chief seat in Ontario. Every revolution has its reaction, and in the case of the American Revolution the reaction took the form of a migration of the Royalists to Canada, where lands were assigned them, and where they became the political progenitors of the Canadian Tory party, while the “Reformers” are the offspring of a subsequent immigration of Scotch Presbyterians, mingled with wanderers from the United States. The two immigrations were arrayed against each other in 1837, when though the United Empire Loyalists were victorious in the field, the political victory ultimately rested with the Reformers. United Empire Loyalism is still

strong in some districts, while in others the descendants of Royalist exiles are found in the ranks of the opposite party. But the whole party is now in the position of the Jacobites after the extinction of the House of Stuart. England has formally recognized the American Revolution, taken part in the celebration of its centenary, and through her ambassador saluted its flag. Anti-revolutionary sentiment ceases to have any meaning, and its death cannot be far off.

c. The influence of English immigrants, especially in the upper ranks of the professions, in the high places of commerce, and in the press. These men have retained a certain social ascendancy; they have valued themselves on their birth in the imperial country and the superior traditions which they supposed it to imply; they have personally cherished the political connection, and have inculcated fidelity to it with all their might. But their number is rapidly decreasing; as they die off natives take their places, and Canada will soon be in Canadian hands. Immigration generally is falling off; upper-class immigration is almost at an end, there being no longer a demand for anything but manual labor; and the influence of personal connection with England will cease to rule. The press is passing into the hands of natives, who are fast learning to hold their own against imported writing in literary skill, while they have an advantage in their knowledge of the country.

d. While the British troops remained in Canada, their officers formed a social aristocracy of the most powerful kind, and exercised a somewhat tyrannical influence over opinion. The traces of this influence still remain; but, with the excep-

tion of the reduced garrison of Halifax, the military occupation has ceased, and is not likely to be renewed.

*e.* The Anglican Church in Canada clings to its position as a branch of the great State Church of England, and, perhaps, a faint hope of re-establishment may linger in the breasts of the bishops, who still retain the title of "lords." We have already said that the roots of Anglicanism in Canada do not appear to be strong, and its chief source of reinforcement will be cut off by the discontinuance of upper-class emigration. It is rent in Canada, as in England, by the conflict between the Protestants and the Ritualists; and in Canada, there being no large endowments or legal system to clamp the hostile elements together, discord has already taken the form of disruption. As to the other churches, they have a connection with England, but not with England more than with the United States. The connection of Canadian Methodism with the United States is very close.

*f.* Orangeism is strong in British Canada, as indeed is every kind of association except the country. It retains its filial connection with its Irish parent, and is ultra-British on condition that Great Britain continues anti-papal. Old Irish quarrels are wonderfully tenacious of life, yet they must one day die, and Orangeism must follow them to the grave.

*g.* The social influence of English aristocracy and of the little court of Ottawa over colonists of the wealthier class. With this, to dismiss at once a theme more congenial to the social humorist than to the political observer, we may couple the influence of those crumbs of titular honor which English aristocracy sometimes allows to fall from its table into

colonial mouths. If such forces cannot be said to be transient, the tendencies of human nature being perpetual, they may at least be said to be secondary ; they do not affect the masses, and they do not affect the strong.

h. Antipathy to the Americans, bred by the old wars, and nursed by British influences, military and aristocratic, not without the assistance of the Americans themselves, who in the case of the Fenian raids, and in other cases, have vented on Canada their feelings against England. This antipathy, so far as it prevails, leads those who entertain it to cling to an anti-American connection. But generally speaking it is very hollow. It does not hinder young Canadians from going by hundreds to seek their fortunes in the United States. It does not hinder wealthy Americans who have settled in Canada from finding seats at once in the Canadian Parliament. It never, in fact, goes beyond talk. So far as it partakes of the nature of contempt it can hardly fail to be modified by the changed attitude of the British aristocracy, who have learned to exhibit something more than courtesy towards the victorious republic ; while the Americans, it may be reasonably presumed, now that the cause of irritation is removed, will not think it wise to make enemies of a people whose destinies are inextricably blended with their own.

i. The special attachment naturally felt by the politicians as a body to the system with reference to which their parties have been formed, and with which the personal ambition of most of them is bound up. Perhaps of all the forces which make for the present connection, this is the strongest ; it has proved strong enough, when combined with the timidity and

the want of independence which lifelong slavery to a faction always breeds, to prevent any Canadian politician from playing a resolute part in such efforts as there have been to make Canada a nation. In some cases it is intensified by commercial connections with England, or by social aspirations, more or less definite, which have England for their goal. In this respect the interest of the politicians, as a class, is distinct from, and is liable to clash with, the real interest of the community at large. So in the case of Scotland, it was the special interest of the politicians to resist the union, as, without special pressure and inducements, they would probably have persisted in doing : it was the interest of the people to accept the union, as the flood of prosperity which followed its acceptance clearly showed. In the case of Scotland the interest of the people triumphed at last ; and it will probably triumph at last in Canada.

Such, we say, are the chief forces that make for the existing connection ; and we repeat that they appear to be secondary and for the most part transient. United, all these strands may make a strong cable ; but one by one they will give way, and the cable will cease to hold. This conviction is quite consistent with the admission that the connectionist sentiment is now dominant, especially in Ontario ; that in Ontario it almost exclusively finds expression on the platform and in the press ; and that the existence of any other opinions can only be inferred from reticence, or discovered by private intercourse. A visitor may thus be led to believe and to report that the attachment of the whole population to the present system is unalterable, and that the connection must en-

ture for ever. Those who have opportunities of looking beneath the surface, may at the same time have grounds for thinking that, on economical subjects at least, the people have already entered on a train of thought which will lead them to a different goal.

What has been the uniform course of events down to the present time? Where are the American dependencies of Spain, Portugal, France, and Holland? Those on the continent, with unimportant exceptions, are gone, and those in the islands are going; for few suppose that Spain can keep Cuba very long. Of the English colonies on the continent, the mass, and those that have been long founded, have become independent; and every one now sees, what clear-sighted men saw at the time, that the separation was inevitable, and must soon have been brought about by natural forces apart from the accidental quarrel. If Canada has been retained, it is by the reduction of imperial supremacy to a form. Self-government is independence; perfect self-government is perfect independence; and all the questions that arise between Ottawa and Downing Street, including the recent question about appeals, are successively settled in favor of self-government. Diplomatic union between two countries in different hemispheres with totally different sets of external relations, common responsibility for each other's quarrels, and liability to be involved in each others's wars—these incidents of dependence remain, and these alone. Is it probable that this last leaf can continue to flutter on the bough for ever? Lord Derby some years ago said that everybody knew that Canada must soon be an independent nation. Now he thinks the tide of opinion

has turned in favor of imperialism, and he turns with the tide. But what he takes for the turn of the tide may be merely the receding wave ; and he forgets what the last wave swept away. It swept away the military occupation, with all its influences, political and social. Even since that time the commercial unity of the empire has been formally abandoned in the case of the Australian tariffs ; and now the marriage law of the colonies is clashing with that of the mother country in the British House of Commons.

It is, perhaps, partly the recoil of feeling from a severance felt to be imminent, as well as the temporary influence of Conservative reaction in England, that has led to the revival in certain quarters, with almost convulsive vehemence, of the plan of imperial confederation. Certainly if such a plan is ever to be carried into effect, this is the propitious hour. The spirit of aggrandisement is in the ascendant, and the colonies are all on good terms with the mother country. Yet of the statesmen who dally with the project and smile upon its advocates, not one ventures to take a practical step towards its fulfilment. On the contrary, they are accessory to fresh inroads upon imperial unity, both in the judicial and in the fiscal sphere. Colonial governors talk with impressive vagueness of some possible birth of the imperial future, as though the course of events, which has been hurrying the world through a series of rapid changes for the last century, would now stand still, and impracticable aspirations would become practicable by the mere operation of time ; but no colonial governor or imperial statesman has ventured to tell us, even in the most general way, to what it is that he looks forward,

how it is to be brought about, or even what dependencies the confederation is to include. It is therefore needless to rehearse all the arguments against the feasibility of such a scheme. The difficulties which beset union under the same parliamentary government of two countries in different parts of the world, with different foreign relations and differing internally in political spirit, would of course be multiplied in the case of a union of twenty or thirty countries scattered over the whole globe, bound together by no real tie of common interest, and ignorant of each other's concerns. The first meeting of such a conclave would, we may be sure, develop forces of disunion far stronger than the vague sentiment of union arising from a very partial community of descent and a very imperfect community of language, which would be the sole ground of the federation. Even to frame the agreement as to the terms of union with the shifting parties and ephemeral cabinets of a score of colonies under constitutional government would be no easy task. The two Parliaments, one National, the other Federal, which it is proposed to establish in order to keep the national affairs of England separate from those of the Imperial Federation, would be liable to be brought into fatal conflict and thrown into utter confusion by the ascendancy of different parties, say a war party and a peace party, in the National and the Federal House. The veriest Chinese puzzle in politics would be a practicable constitution, if you could only get the real forces to conduct themselves according to the programme. It was not in the programme of Canadian confederation that the provinces should form separate interests in the Federal



Parliament, and force the party leaders to bid against each other for their support ; though any one who had studied actual tendencies in connection with the system of party government might have pretty confidently predicted that such would be the result. That England would allow questions of foreign policy, of armaments, and of peace and war to be settled for her by any councils but her own, it is surely most chimerical to suppose. A swarm of other difficulties would probably arise out of the perpetual vicissitudes of the party struggle in each colony, the consequent inability of the delegates to answer for the real action of their own governments, and the estrangement of the delegates themselves from colonial interest and connections by their necessary residence in England. An essential condition of federation appears to be tolerable equality among the members, or freedom from the ascendancy of any overweening power ; but for a century to come at least the power of England in the Federal Council would be overweening ; and to obviate this difficulty some advocates of the scheme actually propose to repeal the union of England with Scotland and Ireland, so that she may be reduced to a manageable element of a Pan-britannic confederation. They have surely little right to call other people disunionists, if any opprobrious meaning attaches to that term.

Supposing such a confederation to be practicable, of what use, apart from the vague feeling of aggrandisement, would it be ? Where would be the advantage of taking from each of these young communities its political centre (which must also be, to some extent, its social and intellectual centre), and of accumulating them in the already overgrown capital of

England? Does experiences tell us that unlimited extension of territory is favorable to intensity of political life, or to anything which is a real element of happiness or of greatness? Does it not tell us that the reverse is the fact, and that the interest of history centres not in megalosaurian empires, but in states the body of which has not been out of proportion to the brain? Surely it would be well to have some distinct idea of the object to be attained before commencing this unparalleled struggle against geography and nature. It can hardly be military strength. Military strength is not gained by dispersion of forces, by presenting vulnerable points in every quarter of the globe, or by embracing and undertaking to defend communities which, whatever may be their fighting qualities, in their policy are thoroughly unmilitary, and unmilitary will remain. Mr. Forster, in fact, gives us to understand that the Pan-britannic empire is to present a beneficent contrast to the military empires; that it is to be an empire of peace. But in that case it must, like other Quaker institutions, depend for its safety on the morality and forbearance of the holders of real and compact power, which is very far from being the dream of the advocates of "a great game."

In all these projects of Pan-britannic empire there lurks the assumption of a boundless multiplication of the Anglo-Saxon race. What are the grounds for this assumption? Hitherto it has appeared that races, as they grow richer, more luxurious, more fearful of poverty, more amenable to the restraints of social pride, have become less prolific. There is reason to suppose that in the United States the Anglo-Saxon race is far less prolific than the Irish, who are even supplanting the

Anglo-Saxons in some districts of England, as the Home-Rule compliances of candidates for northern boroughs show. But the element is small compared with the vast reservoir of industrial population in China, which is now beginning to overflow, and seems as likely as the Anglo-Saxon race to inherit Australia where it has already a strong foothold, as well as the coast of the Pacific.

Canada, however, with regard to the problem of imperial confederation stands by herself, presenting, from her connection with the United States, difficulties from which in the case of the Australian colonies the problem is free. Of this some of the advocates of the policy of aggrandisement show themselves aware by frankly proposing to let Canada go.

It is taken for granted that political dependence is the natural state of all colonies, and that there is something unfilial and revolutionary in proposing that a colony should become a nation. But what is a colony? We happen to have derived the term from a very peculiar set of institutions, those Roman colonies which had no life of their own, but were merely the military and political outposts of the Imperial republic. With the Roman colonies may be classed the Athenian cleruchies and, substituting the commercial for the political object, the factories of Carthage. But colonies generally speaking are migrations, and, as a rule, they have been independent from the beginning. Independent from the beginning, so far as we know, were the Phœnician colonies, Carthage herself among the number. Independent from the beginning were those Greek colonies in Italy which rapidly outran their mother cities in the race of material greatness. Independent

from the beginning were the Saxon and Scandinavian colonies, and all those settlements of the Northern tribes which founded England herself with the other nations of modern Europe. So far as we can see, the original independence in each case was an essential condition of vigor and success. No Roman colony, Athenian cleruchy, or Carthaginian factory ever attained real greatness. New England, the germ and organizer of the American communities, was practically independent for a long time after her foundation, the attention of the English government being engrossed by troubles at home ; but she retained a slender thread of theoretic dependence by which she was afterwards drawn back into a noxious and disastrous subordination. That thread was the feudal tie of personal allegiance, a tie utterly irrational when carried beyond the feudal pale, and by the recent naturalization treaties now formally abolished ; yet probably the main cause of the continued subjection of the Transatlantic colonies, and of the calamities which flowed both to them and to the mother-country from that source.

It is natural that British statesmen should shrink from a formal act of separation, and that in their brief and precarious tenure of power they should be unwilling to take the burden and possible odium of such a measure upon themselves. But no one, we believe, ventures to say that the present system will be perpetual ; certainly not the advocates of imperial confederation, who warn us that unless England by a total change of system draws her colonies nearer to her they will soon drift further away.

Apart from lingering sentiment, it seems not easy to give

reasons, so far as Canada is concerned, for struggling to prolong the present system. The motives for acquiring and holding dependencies in former days were substantial if they were not good. Spain drew tribute directly from her dependencies. England thought she drew it indirectly through her commercial system. It was also felt that the military resources of the colonies were at the command of the mother country. When the commercial system was relinquished, and when self-government transferred to the colonies the control of their own resources, the financial and military motives ceased to exist. But the conservative imagination supplied their place with the notion of political tutelage, feigning—though, as we have seen, against all the evidence of history—that the colony, during the early stages of its existence, needed the political guidance of the mother country in order to fit it to become a nation. Such was the language of colonial statesmen generally till the present Conservative reaction again brought into fashion something like the old notion of aggrandisement, though for tribute and military contingents, the solid objects of the old policy, is now substituted “prestige.” That the political connection between England and Canada is a source of military security to either, nobody, we apprehend, maintains. The only vulnerable point which England presents to the United States is the defenceless frontier of Canada ; the only danger to which Canada is exposed is that of being involved in a quarrel between the aristocracy of England and the democracy of the United States. Defenceless, it is believed, the frontier of Upper Canada has been officially pronounced to be, and the chances

of a desperate resistance to the invader in the French province can scarcely be rated very high. It is said that the British fleet would bombard New York. If Canada were in the hands of the enemy, the bombardment of New York would hardly alleviate her condition. But the bombardment of New York might not be an easy matter. The force of floating coast defences seems now to be growing superior to that of ocean-going navies. Besides, America would choose the moment when England was at war with some other naval power. Soldiers and sailors, and of the best quality, England might no doubt find in Canada ; but she would have to pay for them more than she pays for soldiers and sailors recruited at home. Whether morality is embodied in Bismarck or not, modern policy is ; and Bismarck seems not to covet distant dependencies ; he prefers solid and concentrated power.

"Commerce follows the flag," is a saying which it seems can still be repeated by a statesman ; but, like the notion that dependencies are a source of military strength, it is a mere survival from a departed system. Commerce followed the flag when the flag was that of a power which enforced exclusive trading. But exclusive trading has given way, as an imperial principle, to free trade, and the colonies, in the exercise of their fiscal power of self-government, have dissolved the commercial unity of the empire. They frame their independent tariffs, laying, in some cases, heavy duties on English goods. It will hardly be contended that, apart from commercial legislation, colonial purchasers inquire whether goods were produced under the British flag. "The best customer," says Sir George Lewis, "which a nation can have is a thriving and in-

dustrious community, whether it be dependent or independent. The trade between England and the United States is probably far more profitable to the mother country than it would have been if they had remained in a state of dependence upon her." As to Canada, what she needs, and needs most urgently, is free access to the market of her own continent, from which, as a dependency of England, she is excluded by the customs line. With free access to the market of her own continent, she might become a great manufacturing country ; but manufactures are now highly specialized, and to produce with advantage you must produce on a large scale. Nor is the evil confined to manufactures ; the farm products of Canada are depreciated by exclusion from their natural market, and the lumber trade, which is her great industry, will be in serious jeopardy, since, by the fall of wages in the States, the production of lumber there has been rendered nearly as cheap as it is in Canada, while Canadian lumber is subject to a heavy duty. The projects for opening markets in Australia merely serve to show how severely Canada feels the want of a market close at hand. Cut off any belt of territory commercially from the continent to which it belongs, industry will be stunted, the inflow of capital will be checked, and impoverishment will follow isolation. The Canadians will find this out in time, and the discovery will be the first step towards a change of system.

It is true that Canada has drawn a good deal of British capital into works little remunerative to the investors, though, perhaps, not more than the United States and other countries, with which there was no political connection. But, if we

consider credit as well as cash, the gain must be pronounced doubtful, and it is balanced by such a work as the Intercolonial Railway, into which Canada has been led by imperial influence, and which, after costing more than four millions sterling, will, as some leading Canadian men of business think, hardly "pay for the grease upon the wheels." The Pacific Railway, and the indemnity which Canada is forced to pay to British Columbia for the non-performance of an impracticable treaty, are too likely, in the opinion of many, to furnish another illustration of the expensiveness of the imperial connection.

That emigration is favorably influenced by political dependency is another lingering belief which seems now to have no foundation in fact, though it had in the days when emigration was a government affair. The stream of emigration, in ordinary times, sets, as has often been proved, not towards Canada, but towards the United States; and of the emigrants who land in Canada a large proportion afterwards pass the line, while there is a constant exodus of French Canadians from their own poor and overpeopled country (overpeopled so long as it is merely agricultural) to the thriving industries and high wages of the States. Emigrants, whose object is to improve their material condition, are probably little influenced by political considerations; they go to the country which offers the best openings and the highest wages; but English peasants and artisans would be likely, if anything, to prefer the social elevation promised them in a land of equality to anything like a repetition of the social subjection in which they have lived at home, while by the Irishman escape from British rule is deemed escape from oppression.



Whether the tutelage of the mother country has ever been useful to a colony, even in its infancy, except where there was actual need of military protection, is a question to which the language of the adherents of the colonial system themselves, when reviewing the history of colonial government, seems to suggest a negative reply. "Hitherto," says Mr. Roebuck, "those of our possessions termed colonies have not been governed according to any settled rule or plan. Caprice and chance have decided generally everything connected with them ; and if success has in any case attended the attempts of the English people to establish colonies, that success has been obtained in spite of the mischievous intermeddling of the English government, not in consequence of its wise and provident assistance." Such is the refrain of almost all the works on the colonies, whether they treat of the general administration or of some special question, such as that of the Crown lands, which appears to have been solved by Downing Street in various ways, but always wrong. Not by government, but by fugitives from the tyranny of government, the great American colony was founded ; unaided and unregulated it grew, and laid the deep foundations of society in the New World. With tutelage came blundering, jobbery, mischief of all kinds, and at last a violent rupture, which, injurious as it was to the mother country, inflicted a still greater injury on the colony by launching it on the career of democracy with a violent revolutionary bias, whereas it needed a bias in favor of respect for authority. The presence of the British ambassador at the Centenary was not only the ratification of the revolt, but the condemnation of the colonial system. After

the American Revolution, the next step of the British government was to divert the stream of English emigration from America—where there was abundant room for it, and whither, the pioneer work having then been done, it would have been most profitably directed—to Australia, where the pioneer work had to be done over again, measures being at the same time taken to taint the new society with convict blood. To what good this scattering of English emigration has led, beyond the poetic conception of a boundless empire, it would seem difficult to say ; and Canada, before she expresses conventional joy at the annexation of Fiji, should ask herself whether a new colony is any thing more to her than a new competitor for the labor which is her prime need. In Canada herself, tutelage, while it was really exercised, led to every sort of evil. Government was jobbed by an oligarchy called the Family Compact, which Downing Street supported, not from bad motives, but from sheer ignorance of facts, till the misrule ended in the insurrection of 1837. Things have gone smoothly only since real tutelage has departed, and left nothing but an image of royalty which reigns with gracious speeches and hospitality, but does not govern. There has been no want of good intentions on the part of English statesmen, nor would it be reasonable to suppose that there has been any special want of wisdom ; probably no other statesmen would have done so well ; but the task imposed on them was hopeless. One tree might as well be set to regulate the growth of another tree, as one nation to regulate the growth of another nation ; and in this case the two trees are of different sorts and planted under different skies.

We can imagine the single mind of a despot moulding the political character of a colony, if not well, at least with adequate knowledge, with intelligence, and upon a definite plan. But England is not a single mind. England is the vast and motley mass of voters, including, since the Conservative Reform Bill, the most uneducated populace of the towns—people who, in politics, do not know their right hand from their left, who cannot tell the name of the leader of their own party, who vote for blue or yellow, and are led by senseless local cries, by bribery, or by beer. These are the political tutors of Canada, a country in which both wealth and education are more diffused than they are here. How much does the average Englishman, or even the educated Englishman, know about Canadian politics? As much as Canadians know about the politics of Tasmania or the Cape. In *Phineas Finn* the hero of the tale, being under-secretary for the colonies, goes on a message to Marylebone “to find what the people there think about the Canadas.” His report is, “Not one man in a thousand cares whether the Canadians prosper or fail to prosper. They care that Canada should not go to the States, because, though they don’t love the Canadians, they do hate the Americans. That’s about the feeling in Marylebone, and it’s astonishing how like the Maryleboners are to the rest of the world.” It will hardly be said that this is an unfair picture of a Londoner’s normal frame of mind with regard to Canadian questions, or that Dorsetshire and Tipperary are better informed than London. When did a Canadian question influence an English election? How often is Canada mentioned in an election address? Canadian journals are

never tired of exposing what they deem the scandalous ignorance of the leading journals of England on Canadian subjects, but they fail to draw the obvious moral. If the *Times* blunders, are the leaders of English opinion generally, and their constituents, likely to be better instructed and to decide aright? Burke, writing of the American Revolution, said that he could trace all the mischief "to the single source of not having had steadily before our eyes a general, comprehensive, and well-proportioned view of the whole of our dominions, and a just sense of their true bearings and relations." To say nothing of the ordinary holders of political power, in how many English statesmen, occupied as English statesmen are with home questions and party struggles, would Burke have found this comprehensive view; or the knowledge necessary for the formation of it? The Colonial Secretary himself is as often as not a man personally unacquainted with the colonies, not called to his post by special aptitude, but placed in it by party convenience. He must often depend for his information on such colonists as may find special access to Downing Street, or on the reports of governors, who, being images of royalty, are apt, like royalty, to be screened from truth. A peer he may be, but his peerage will not make him a Providence. The annexation of Manitoba and of British Columbia to Canada—with which the latter, at all events, has no geographical connection—is by some thought to have been a disastrous, by all allowed to have been a most critical, step: it was taken under the auspices of the late Lord Lytton, a brilliant and prolific novelist, brought into the government to make set speeches.

If any one supposes that the retention in Canada of the forms of monarchy excludes or mitigates any of the political evils, or even the coarseness to which democracy is liable in its crude condition, a year's residence in the country, a month's perusal of the party newspapers, or an hour's conversation with any Canadian man of business who has watched politics without taking part in them, will probably settle his opinion on that subject. That monarchical forms are no safeguard against corruption is a fact of which, unhappily, the colony has of late years had decisive proof. If the inquirer wishes to enlarge the basis of his induction, let him go through a file of Australian journals; he will there find a picture of public life, public character, and senatorial manners decidedly below the level of the better States of the Union. Canada has escaped the elective judiciary, but so has Massachusetts; and both that and the removable civil service were the work not of real Republicans, but of the Democratic party, that is, of the slave-owning oligarchy of the South using as its instruments the Northern mob. Her exemption from the civil war and its fiscal consequences Canada owes merely to her separation from the States; it would have been the same had she been an independent nation. Had the political connection with Great Britain never existed, and had the weight of Canada been early thrown into the scale of freedom, there might have been no civil war.

In the case of the Pacific Railway scandal, the Governor-General may be said to have formally avowed himself a *fainéant*. He decided that he was absolutely bound to follow the advice of his ministers, even when those ministers lay

under the heaviest charges of corruption, and even as to the mode in which the investigation into those charges should be conducted ; and his conduct was approved by the Home Government. He has, therefore, no authority, and of nothing nothing comes.

Most readers of the *Fortnightly* are probably prepared to regard with tolerance the proposition that figments and hypocrisies do no more good in politics than they do in general life. In Canadian politics they do much evil by blinding public men and the people generally to the real requirements of the situation. The hereditary principle was dead at its root ; its work was done, and its age had passed away in the more advanced portion of humanity when the communities of the New World were founded. It lingers on, as things do linger on, in its native soil ; but it can furnish no sound basis for government in the soil of reason and equality. The only conceivable basis for government in the New World is the national will ; and the political problem of the New World is how to build a strong, stable, enlightened, and impartial government on that foundation. That it is a very difficult problem, daily experience in Canada, as well as in the neighboring republic, shows, and to be successfully resolved it must be seen in its true bearings, which the ostensible retention of the hereditary principle as the security for good and stable government obscures. Canada, though adorned with the paraphernalia of eight constitutional monarchies (one central and seven provincial), is a democracy of the most pronounced kind ; the Governor-General was not wrong in saying that she is more democratic than the United States,

where the President is an elective king, and where the Senate, which though elective is conservative, possesses great power, whereas the nominated Senate of Canada is a cyphér. Demagogism and the other pests of democratic institutions are not to be conjured away by forms and phrases ; they can be repressed and prevented from ruining the State only by developing remedial forces of a really effective kind, and by adjusting the actual machinery of the constitution so as to meet the dangers which experience may reveal. The treason law of the Plantagenets with which, as well as with the Lord Chamberlain's code of precedence, Canada is endowed, is not of much use to her while she is left without any legal means of repressing her real cancer, political corruption. Loyalty to the fainéant deputy of a distant Crown may be in a certain sense real ; it may be felt by those who profess it ; but it probably does not often prompt to a good political action, and it certainly never restrains from a bad one. Among Canadians, as among American politicians, the most "truly loyal" are often the most unscrupulous and corrupt. They are often, through the whole course of their public lives, disloyal to everything that represents public honor and the public good. A provincial court adds flunkeyism to demagogism without making the demagogue less profligate, less dangerous, or less vile. It does not even make him less coarse. No refining influence can really be exercised by a few dinners and receptions even over the small circle which attends them ; while the social expenditure and display which are imposed on the Governor-General as the condition of his popularity in the colony, and of the maintenance of his repu-

tation at home, are anything but a wholesome example for colonial society, which on the contrary needs an example of hospitality and social enjoyment cultivated in an easy and inexpensive way.

At present the bane of Canada is party government without any question on which parties can be rationally or morally based. The last question of sufficient importance to form a rational and moral basis for a party was that of the Clergy Reserves and the Church Establishment, since the settlement of which there has been absolutely no dividing line between the parties or assignable ground for their existence, and they have become mere factions, striving to engross the prizes of office by the means which faction everywhere employs. The consequences are the increasing ascendancy of the worst men, and the political demoralization of a community, which, if a fair chance were given it, would furnish as sound a basis for good government as any community in the world. Of course England cannot be charged with introducing the party system into Canada ; but she does fling over it the glamor of British association, and beguile a country really abandoned to all the instability and all the degrading influences of government by faction with the ostensible stability and dignity of the hereditary Crown. Indeed, the provision in the draught of confederation that both the parties should be considered in the first nomination of senators is, perhaps, the only authoritative recognition which the party system has ever received. In common with the other colonies, Canada is deemed happy in being endowed with a counterpart of the British Constitution. The British Constitution, putting aside the legal forms



and phrases, is government by party ; and whatever government by party may be in England, where there are some party questions left, in Canada it is a most noxious absurdity, and is ruining the political character of the people.

When Canadian Nationalists say that patriotism is a good thing, they are told to keep their wisdom for the copy-books ; and the rebuke would be just if those who administer it would recognize the equally obvious truth, that there can be no patriotism without nationality. In a dependency there is no love of the country, no pride in the country ; if an appeal is made to the name of the country no heart responds as the heart of an Englishman responds when an appeal is made to the name of England. In a dependency every bond is stronger than that of country, every interest prevails over that of the country. The province, the sect, Orangeism, Fenianism, Freemasonry, Odd Fellowship are more to the ordinary Canadian than Canada. So it must be while the only antidote to sectionalism in a population with strongly marked differences of race and creed is the sentiment of allegiance to a distant throne. The young Canadian leaving his native country to seek his fortune in the States feels no greater wrench than a young Englishman would feel in leaving his county to seek his fortune in London. Want of nationality is attended, too, with a certain want of self-respect, not only political but social, as writers on colonial society and character have observed. Wealthy men in a dependency are inclined to look to the imperial country as their social centre and the goal of their social ambition, if not as their ultimate abode, and not

only their patriotic munificence but their political and social services are withdrawn from the country of their birth.

Mr. Trollope finds himself compelled to confess that in passing from the United States into Canada you pass "from a richer country into one that is poorer, from a greater country into one that is less." You pass from a country embracing in itself the resources of a continent, into one which is a narrow section of that continent cut off commercially from the rest; you pass from a country which is a nation into a country which is not a nation.

On the other hand, there were reasons which, not only to patriotic Canadians, but to patriotic Americans, if they took a comprehensive view of the interests of their country, seemed strong for wishing that Canada should remain politically separate from the United States. Democracy is a great experiment, which might be more safely carried on by two nations than by one. By emulation, mutual warning and correction, mutual supplementation of defects, they might have helped each other in the race and steadied each other's steps; a balance of opinion might have been established on the continent, though a balance of power cannot; and the wave of dominant sentiment which spreads over that vast democracy like the tide running in over a flat, might have been usefully restricted in its sweep by the dividing line. Nor was there any insurmountable obstacle in the way. Canada is wanting in unity of race; but not more so than Switzerland, whose three races have been thoroughly wedded together by the force of nationality. She is wanting in compactness of territory, but not more so, perhaps, than some other nations—Prussia

for instance—have been. In this latter respect, however, the situation has been seriously altered by the annexation of Manitoba and British Columbia, which in their present raw condition have no influence beyond that of distant possessions, but which, when peopled and awakened to commercial life, will be almost irresistibly attracted by the economical forces to the States which adjoin them on the south, and will thus endanger the cohesion of the whole confederacy. The very form of the Dominion indeed, drawn out and attenuated as it is by these unnatural additions, apart from the attractive influence of Minnesota and California, would seriously imperil its political unity, as will be seen, if, instead of taking Canada as it is presented by the political map, the boundary line is drawn between the habitable portion and that which belongs only to Arctic frosts. In the debate on confederation it was urged by the advocates of the measure that seven sticks, though separately weak, when bound together in a faggot would be strong. "Yes," was the reply, "but not so seven fishing rods tied together by the ends."

As to the expense of a national government, it would probably not be greater than that of the governor-generalship and the seven lieutenant-governorships is at present. Diplomacy in these days of rapid communication may be cheaply done, and Canada would not need much of it: she has no Eastern question.

The question of military security has reference solely to the danger to be apprehended on the side of the United States; and danger on the side of the United States, supposing Canada disentangled from English quarrels, we believe

there is none. The Americans, as has been repeatedly observed, have since the fall of slavery given every proof of an unambitious disposition. They disbanded their vast armaments immediately on the close of the civil war, without waiting even for the Alabama question to be settled ; they have refused to annex St. Domingo ; they have observed a policy of strict non-intervention in the case of Cuba, which they might have made their own with the greatest ease ; they have declined to take advantage of the pretexts furnished them in abundance, by border outrages, of conquering Mexico ; it is very doubtful whether they would even have purchased Alaska, if Mr. Seward had not drawn them by secret negotiations into a position from which they could not well retreat. Slavery wanted conquest for the creation of new slave states, but with slavery the spirit of aggression appears to have died. Welcome Canada into the Union, if she came of her own accord, the Americans no doubt would. They would be strangely wanting in wisdom if they did not ; for she would bring them as her dower not only complete immunity from attack and great economical advantages, but a political accession of the most valuable kind in the shape of a population, not like that of St. Domingo, Cuba, or Mexico, but trained to self-government, and capable of lending fresh strength and vitality to republican institutions. It is true that, slavery having been abolished, the urgent need of adding to the number of the Free States in order to counterbalance the extension of slavery in the councils of the Union no longer exists ; but there are still in the population of the United States large elements essentially non-republican—the Irish, the emigrants from Southern Germany, the negroes—to

which, perhaps, may be added a considerable portion of Southern society itself, which can hardly fail to retain something of its old character while it continues to be composed of a superior and inferior race. Against these non-republican elements, the really republican element still needs to be fortified by all the reinforcements which it can obtain. Welcome Canada therefore into the Union the Americans no doubt would. But that they have the slightest inclination to lay violent hands upon her, that such a thought ever enters their minds, no one who has lived among them, and heard the daily utterances of a by no means reticent people can believe. Apart from moral principle, they know that though a despotic government may simply annex, a republic must incorporate, and that to incorporate four millions of unwilling citizens would be to introduce into the republic a most dangerous mass of disaffection and disunion. That the Americans have of been litigious in their dealings with Canada is true ; but litigiousness is not piracy ; and as we have already said, the real object of their irritation has not been Canada, but England. The Monroe doctrine was held by Canning as well as by Monroe ; and, irrespectively of any desire of aggrandizement, the intrusion of an American power here would probably give as much umbrage to England as the intrusion of the English power in their own continent gives to the people of the United States. That the Americans would feel pride in behaving generously towards a weaker State, will appear credible only to those who have seen enough of them to know that, though supposed to care for nothing but the dollar, they have in reality a good deal of pride.

As an independent nation, Canada would, of course, be at liberty to negotiate freely for the removal of the customs line between herself and the United States, and for her admission to all the commercial advantages of her own continent. At present not only is she trammelled by imperial considerations, but it can hardly be expected that the American government will place itself on a lower international level than that of England by treating with a dependency as a nation, especially as there are constant intimations that the dependency is retained, and is being nursed up, with the view of making it a rival power to the United States, and thus introducing into the continent the germs of future jealousy, and possibly of war.

That Canada can ever be made a rival power to the United States—that, if she is only kept long enough in a state of dependence, there will be an indefinite increase in her population and her strength—seems to be little better than a rhetorical fancy. The barrier of slavery being removed, the set of population is likely to be, not towards the frozen north, where the winter, besides suspending labor and business, eats up the produce of the summer in the cost of fuel, but towards those countries in which warmth is provided by the sun, and work may be carried on during the whole year. The notion that the north is the natural seat of empire seems to have no more solid foundation. It is apparently a loose generalization from the success of the northern tribes which conquered the Roman empire. It is forgotten that those northern warriors had not only been hardened by exposure to the full severity of the northern climate, but picked by the most rig-

orous process of natural selection. Stove heat is not less enervating than the heat of the sun. But a nation Canada, so far as we can see, might have been, had the attempt been vigorously made at the propitious moment, when, owing to the effects of the civil war in the United States, the balance of prosperity was decidedly in her favor, when her financial condition appeared immensely superior to that of her neighbor, and when the spirit of her people had been stirred by confederation. That opportunity was allowed to pass, and, in all probability, it will never return.

A movement in favor of nationality there was—one which had a twofold claim to sympathy, because it was also a movement against faction and corruption, and which, though it has failed, has left honorable traces on public life. But it was not strong enough to make head against the influences which have their centre in the little court of Ottawa and the attacks of the lower class of politicians, who assailed it with the utmost ferocity, seeing clearly that the success of the higher impulse would not suit their game. Moreover, the French province interposed between the British provinces of the east and west, is a complete non-conductor, and prevents any pulsation from running through the whole body. It must further be owned that in industrial communities the economical motives are stronger than the political, and that the movement in favor of Canadian nationality had only political motives on its side. Perhaps the appearance of a great man might after all have turned the scale; but dependencies seldom produce great men.

Had the movement in favor of nationality succeeded, the

first step would have been a legislative union, which would in time have quelled sectionalism and made up for the deficiency of material size and force by moral solidity and unity of spirit. Canada, as was said before, is hardly a proper subject for federal government, which requires a more numerous group of states and greater equality between them. Confederation as it exists, we repeat, has done little more than develop the bad side of democratic government. A project is now on foot for a legislative union between Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward's Island ; but this will only make matters worse by reducing the number of important states to three (Manitoba and British Columbia being in the merest infancy), two of which will be always combining against the third. That there would have been opposition to a legislative union of the whole of Canada on the part of Quebec is more than probable ; but Quebec, if she had been handled with determination, would most likely have given way.

Canadian nationality being a lost cause, the ultimate union of Canada with the United States appears now to be morally certain ; so that nothing is left for Canadian patriotism but to provide that it shall be a union indeed, and not an annexation ; an equal and honorable alliance like that of Scotland with England, not a submission of the weaker to the stronger ; and at the same time that the political change shall involve no change of any other kind in the relations of Canada with her mother country. The filaments of union are spreading daily, though they may be more visible to the eye of one who sees Canada at intervals than to that of a constant resident. Intercourse has been increased by the extension of railways ;



the ownership and management of the railways themselves is forming an American interest in Canada ; New York is becoming the pleasure, and, to some extent, even the business, capital of Canadians ; American watering-places are becoming their summer resort ; the periodical literature of the States, which is conducted with extraordinary spirit and ability, is extending its circulation on the northern side of the line ; and the Canadians who settle in the States are multiplying the links of family connection between the two countries. To specify the time at which a political event will take place is hardly ever possible, however assured the event itself may be ; and in the present instance the occurrence depends not only on the circumstances of Canada, where, as we have seen, there is a great complication of secondary forces, but on the circumstances of the United States. If the commercial depression which at present prevails in Canada continues or recurs, if Canadian manufactures are seen to be dying under the pressure of the customs line ; if, owing to the depression or to overcostly undertakings, such as the Pacific Railway, financial difficulties arise ; if, meantime, the balance of prosperity, which is now turning, shall have turned decisively in favor of the United States, and the reduction of their debt shall have continued at the present rate—the critical moment may arrive, and the politicians, recognizing the voice of Destiny, may pass in a body to the side of Continental Union. It will be fortunate if a misunderstanding between the Canadian government and Downing Street about some question such as that respecting the pecuniary claims of British Columbia, which is now assuming such exaggerated proportions, does not supervene

to make the final dissolution of the political tie a quarrel instead of an amicable separation.

To Canada the economical advantages of continental union will be immense ; to the United States its general advantages will be not less so. To England it will be no menace, but the reverse : it will be the introduction into the councils of the United States, on all questions, commercial as well as diplomatic, of an element friendly to England, the influence of which will be worth far more to her than the faint and invidious chance of building up Canada as a rival to the United States. In case of war, her greatest danger will be removed. She will lose neither wealth nor strength ; probably she will gain a good deal of both. ) As to glory, we cannot do better than quote in conclusion the words of Palmerson's favorite colleague, and the man to whom he, as was generally supposed, wished to bequeath his power :—

“ There are supposed advantages flowing from the possession of dependencies, which are expressed in terms so general and vague, that they cannot be referred to any determinate head. Such, for example, is the glory which a country is supposed to derive from an extensive colonial empire. We will merely remark upon this imagined advantage, that a nation derives no true glory from any possession which produces no assignable advantage to itself or to other communities. If a country possesses a dependency from which it derives no public revenue, no military or naval strength, and no commercial advantages or facilities for emigration, which it would not equally enjoy though the dependency were independent, and if, moreover, the dependency suffers the evils which (as we shall show hereafter) are the almost inevitable consequences of its political condition, such a possession cannot justly be called glorious.”

# *PRUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.*<sup>1</sup>

A HISTORICAL RETROSPECT.

BY PROFESSOR J. T. BLACKIE.

THE history of Prussia during the present century naturally divides itself into five great periods : First, what I shall call the period of fall and humiliation, 1806—1812 ; then the period of rise and regeneration, 1813—1815 ; after that the period of reaction and red-tape, 1816—1830 ; then from 1830 to 1866, an epoch of tentative Liberalism and Constitutionalism ; and lastly, from 1866 to the present hour, the period of nationality and empire. The object of the present paper is shortly to sketch the character and significance of these five epochs in the great drama of European politics.

## I.

Among the many external consequences of the military preponderance of France which arose out of the French Revolution, not the least notable was the sudden breakdown of Prussia by the battle of Jena in 1806. Of the accidental causes that may have contributed to this unexpected result, it were of no use to discourse. The essential causes which it is instructive to note were—(1.) The military genius of

<sup>1</sup> THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, March, 1877.

Napoleon, coupled with the unity of action, energy, and complete organization, which arose out of his political position and the authority with which he was invested. (2.) The democratic inspiration of the French people, and the high spirit and military temper of the French army thence resulting. No doubt that democratic impulse, though strong, was far from pure, and became ever more impure the farther it proceeded from its well-head. But it was unquestionably there; and enabled the most absolute despot that modern history has seen to put himself forward on the great stage of European politics as "the armed apostle of a democratic movement" which there was nothing in Old Europe strong enough to resist. (3.) The political division of Germany, which prevented common action among its members; and specially the hereditary hostility betwixt Prussia and Austria, which had enabled the thundering Corsican to strike first one and then the other with a force that, in his hands, was irresistible. The eventful campaign of 1806-7, presenting, in some respects, an exact opposite to the recent campaign, which ended even more suddenly in the humiliation of France, was not a trial of strength between France and Germany; but the real antagonistic powers were France in alliance with one-third of Germany, and inspired by the genius of Napoleon, against one-third of Germany, without a great military head; while the other third—viz., Austria—remained neuter. (4.) The fourth cause that contributed largely to the sudden downfall of Prussia was the entire want of popular institutions and a popular spirit among the Prussian people. When the army did not happen to be commanded by a military-

genius like Frederick the Great, and once got a sound beating, there was nothing behind to break its fall : no people ; only pipeclay and facings ; red tape, long pedigrees, and petty privileges ; in a word, nobility without noblemen, and soldiership without citizenship.

So much for the first epoch of the fall.

## II.

The rise and regeneration of Prussia took place very soon after its fall, chiefly by the happy occasion of the Russian expedition of Napoleon in 1812, and the terrible precipitation which had followed at last as the necessary consequence of his own portentous pride and unblushing insolence ; but the real cause that enabled Prussia so triumphantly to shake off the hated yoke of Gaul is to be sought for in the great political and military reforms which were introduced mainly by the Baron von Stein. Stein was one of those strong and courageous, direct, decided, and altogether manly characters that cannot be present in any age, when there is a call for noble action, without putting their stamp on it. The great need does not always bring with it the great man ; but if the great man is there he can scarcely fail to show himself. The great idea which inspired Stein's statesmanship was to create what had hitherto not existed in Prussia, a free people ; and this he did by two bold measures, the one of which gave emancipation to the peasant by turning him into a proprietor, and the other created citizenship by restoring the free municipal constitutions which in the middle ages had given wealth and enterprise to the towns.

Along with these two great regenerative measures went the new organization of the army, under the masterly direction of Scharnhorst, one of those thorough-trained soldiers whose manly forms in the great public places of Berlin so significantly proclaim to the stranger the history of the country. Under his direction, instead of professional drill and pipeclay-dressing for a body of mere technical soldiers, the whole people were to wield arms in defence of a country in which they now rejoice to exercise the rights of full citizenship ; and there seems certainly to be no more important truth in political economics than this, that if a nation is to be saved from a weighty yoke of foreign oppression, it can only be as Greece and Rome were saved on the great occasions of their world-renowned heroism, by the effective soldiership of the whole people. This system of national arming, which was the main cause of the grand political regeneration of Prussia in 1713-14, as all the world knows, enabled that Power, in the recent Franco-German struggle, to bring into the field an embattled array of patriotic citizens, against which even the soldiers of the early French Revolution, under the guidance of the famous captain of those days, might have contended in vain ; and I, for one, am decidedly of opinion that a compulsory military drill of the whole people has not only been the salvation of Prussia on two great occasions during the present century, but is the best guarantee for the independence of all nations at all times and at all places, and not less certainly in commercial Britain than in military Prussia. I can have no doubt that the general adoption of the Prussian system in this country would not only afford a stronger bul-

wark of national liberty than we at present possess, but would work along with our national schools and our national Churches,—I do not mean the Established Churches alone, but all Christian Churches in the land,—in potentiating the patriotism, in improving the physical fibre, and in giving firmness to the reins of a healthy social discipline. But whatever people may think of the application of the system of compulsory soldiership to this native-seat of rank individualism and inorganic liberty, there can be no doubt that it is owing mainly, if not altogether, to this admirable system of national soldiership that Prussia—not two centuries ago a petty electorate on the extreme march of the least lovely part of Germany—is now that great Power to whose decision all other Powers naturally look, as controlling with firm hand the fortunes of the Present, and shaping by its bold and manly policy the destinies of no distant Future.

I now pass to the third epoch, which I have called the period of reaction and red-tape.

### III

The battles of Leipzig and Waterloo, which restored Prussia to her old position as a European power of high consideration, had been gained not only by gunpowder, and an accumulation of material forces, but mainly, as just indicated, by the creation of a popular spirit, and the raising of a national and truly German enthusiasm among the people. After the peace it was natural, and indeed necessary, that the fervid enthusiasm which had overthrown the French despotism should occupy itself further with the reconstruction of

popular citizenship, and the shaping forth of some sort of political unity for a free Germany. And the then King, Frederick William III.—who was a thoroughly honest man, and a most excellent private character—no doubt sincerely intended, as soon as possible after the blood had been washed from the hands of stern warriors and the tears wiped from the cheeks of weeping mothers, to inaugurate a system of social policy, which should in its silent features be exactly the reverse of that whose woful weakness had mainly caused the downfall of 1806–7. Accordingly, in the articles agreed to by the diplomatic gentlemen who, in 1816, were found assembled round a green table at Vienna, to attempt such a political reconstruction of Germany as seemed possible under the circumstances, we find one which distinctly states that there shall be introduced into all the States of the Fatherland a Constitutional Government, with freedom of the press. This, for internal liberty ; and to secure the common action of all the German States against any future encroachments of France, or other ambitious neighbor, the States were constituted into a Board, Diet, or Confederation, of which Austria was perpetual president. The presidency of Austria did not promise much for the cause of popular freedom ; and the action of a body composed as the Diet was, to those who could look beneath the surface, afforded no sure guarantee for the future existence of a strong and a united Germany ; but with goodwill on the part of the minor States, and a touch of manly decision on the part of Prussia, important movements, both in respect of social progress and political position, might rationally have been looked for.



But this touch of manly decision was just the very thing that was not found. It was not to be expected, indeed, that fair general promises of Liberalism and Constitutionalism, made at Vienna, under the wing of Prince Metternich, would be in any hurry to ripen into sweet fruits. On the contrary, the great law of reaction, of which the operation can be traced everywhere, omnipotent in the flow and ebb of social movements, set in almost immediately after the green table, round which the diplomatists had deliberated, was left vacant. The hopeful anticipations of a flaming enthusiasm were met by a host of obstinate old habits in a stout army of official people not to be abolished in a day. Behind and before, and all around the throne of the well-meaning old King, not the prophets of the future, but the office-bearers of the past, were encamped. And not the old men only were there, but the old machinery (for new machinery could not be made in an hour); and so public government in Prussia returned with perfect ease into its old grooves; and the old bureaucracy of red tape, whose motto was stolen from the magnificent French Louis of the seventeenth century, to do everything for the people and nothing by the people, began forthwith to display a most fussy activity in plugging up the vents of the great political volcano, and plastering the rents which the sudden military earthquake that had recently shaken the old foundations of things had left in their old smoothly appointed and trimly furnished domiciles. Bones, after all, are firmer than blood; and so, having the reins in their hands, they contrived with very little trouble at Berlin, and with nods of assenting approval from Vienna, to have things their own

way, to make the Liberal articles of the Congress of Vienna a dead letter, and to prove to the world once more that the promises of politicians, like the vows of lovers, are made only that Jove may laugh at them. The Liberal dog had indeed entered into the house ; but it was possible to pull out his teeth, to flog him when he barked loudly ; and if he dared to bite, strangle him outright. The pious old King also, who was not made for bold independent action, in the face both of old kingly traditions and a plausible amount of reputable proprieties, on reflection found that in an evil hour he had promised to raise the democratic devil ; and, after considering the whole affair seriously, came to the conclusion that it was more pious in this case to break his word than to keep it.

The existence of this pious weakness on the part of the King was soon publicly indicated by some events of a rather grotesque character, but of a very sad significance. An assembly of enthusiastic young students, fresh from the wars, assembled in the Wartburg, where Luther had made his translation of the Bible, and with the Imperial tricolor of gold, black, and crimson, floating about their caps, and bel-  
lowing forth patriotic songs about Hermann and Charlemagne, delivered over to the Moloch of a great jubilee-bonfire some odious manifestoes of pamphleteering literary police inspectors, in Berlin and Vienna. The popular dramatist Kotzebue, also, who had the character of being employed as a Russian spy, was, about the same time, foolishly shot by an excited young student named Sand ; and this was signal more than enough to throw all the bureaucrats of Berlin into a series of fits of Conservative activity, which issued in throwing some

of the finest spirits of Germany into the fortress of Spandau, in banishing others to Paris and New York, and in putting a violent extinguisher on all Liberal and Constitutional movements for an indefinite period. Of freedom of the press, of course, no more was heard ; and as for the unity of Germany it was soon discovered that the Diet was not a machinery in any way calculated to usher any such new political entity into existence. Practically, the Board did not, and, as political nature is constituted could not, represent Germany at all, but either Prussia or Austria ; and during this period of old wives, informers, policemen, and red tape, it practically represented Austria. For fifteen years, till 1830, the whole of that cumbersome and dilatory machine was twirled round the little finger of that arch-obscurantist Metternich, with a dexterity and a persistency that must command the admiration even of those who have the utmost abhorrence of the cause in which it was exercised ; for the children of this world, we read, are wiser in their generation than the children of light.

#### IV.

The French revolution of 1830 sent, as French revolutions generally do, an electric shock through the whole of Europe, and not least through Germany, where much combustible matter had been accumulated, and curses, not loud but deep, against princedom and policedom, were eager for a vent.

The first explosion of this popular discontent took place in the trim little metropolis of Brunswick, where Duke Charles, hastening home from the French capital, planted himself before his angry burghers with the air of a man who was

born to do something. But his calibre was by no means equal to his conceit. He no doubt doubled his body-guard, and planted sixteen pieces of cannon in front of his palace, with an attitude that looked heroic enough. But it was all in vain. The people rose in revolt; and the palace rose in flames; and the mighty Duke was carried off in the smoke like a scroll of paper, and wafted where the wind might carry him. He was a mere braggadocio with a crown—or whatever dukes wear—on his head; a declared incapable pilot in such tempestuous times; so that even Metternich, in whose school he had been trained, pulling the wires of the Diet at Frankfort, could not save him. A new Duke was elected, and a Constitution proclaimed in Brunswick on the 12th October, 1832.

In Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, and Hanover Liberal triumphs of a similar nature were achieved; but a foolish popular outbreak at Frankfort, in the spring of 1833, served no purpose but to give the wily Metternich a just text for preaching his favorite gospel, that all Liberalism means mob government, and mob government of course, means anarchy and ruin and chaos. In Prussia affairs remained quiet. Personally the King was much respected, and there were no abuses in the routine of government so glaring as to vex the eyes of the common spectators into open revolt. Only people felt a strong desire to move their own legs, and their own arms, and their own tongues freely, which under a "paternal Government" had hitherto been denied them. It was also a sad humiliation to intellectual and Protestant Prussia to be kept playing second fiddle to the great and proverbially stupid obscurantist people

of the South. It was not and it could not be right, that the independence and political unity of the German people, as represented in the Diet, should mean only the subordination of Prussia to Austria, and of both to the Pope. Some consolation for this sore affront was afforded by the regulations for freedom of trade among the German States, which Prussia introduced under the name of *Zoll-Verein*. A certain social and economical preponderance was thus given to Prussia, which under favorable circumstances, might lead to a thorough undermining of the political weight of Austria in the Diet.

In the year 1840 Frederick William III., the royal bearer of the great memories of 1813, died ; and with his successor, Frederick William IV., a new era was expected to be inaugurated. The long-promised Constitution, with freedom of the press, and other freedoms comprehended under the familiar term Liberalism, would now surely at last make its epiphany in Berlin. But the new King, though a man of uncommon accomplishments, and fitted to adorn either a throne or an arm-chair in quiet times, was not a man to put a commanding bit into the mouth of the stout Democracy of the nineteenth century. His ideas of Governmental power were borrowed rather from the middle ages than from any existing Government, whether in England or France. "No power on earth," he declared, "shall ever succeed in persuading me to change the natural relation between king and people into a conventional one ; and never more will I yield to the demand that, between our Lord God in Heaven and this country, a written paper shall interpose itself to take the place of the old sacred ties of loyalty by which people and prince are bound together."

So the piece of written paper, called the Acts of the Congress of Vienna, and the vows that accompanied it, were trampled under foot by a second Frederick William ; and the Prussian people were obliged to content themselves with the institution of provincial or local parliaments, and the shadow of a sort of National Assembly called *der Vereinigte Landtag*, instituted in 1847, all under the sacred thumb of the old military and bureaucratic absolutism.

But matters could not continue in this state. The air of Europe was electric with Liberalism ; even aristocratic old England had had her Reform Bill ; and grown-up men, rejoicing to stand on their own legs, would not be for ever treated as minors. In 1848 another French revolution broke out, accompanied with the usual portents of fugitive kings and floating coronets, and altogether in a much more startling and explosive style than in the previous affair of 1832. Then only a little Duke of Brunswick was blown into smoke ; but now the mighty Metternich himself was exploded, and from his firm seat in Vienna, where he had controlled the whole diplomacy of Europe for half-a-century, wafted over the seas to England, the general House of Refuge for the democratic and oligarchic destitute from all quarters. The sweet-blooded Viennese were fevered with a strange astonishment when they saw on one fine morning a mob of students flaming with wild notions, and troops of tatterdemalion artisans, marching through the streets, braying about liberty, and sitting on the seat of Government for a year and a day.

But it could not last long ; the firm front of Prince Windischgrätz's cannon, and the fair promise of a new Kaiser

on the 7th March, 1849, brought back the Liberal chaos into the old Conservative order. In Middle and Northern Germany outbreaks of the epidemic of democracy equally violent took place. At Baden, where German Liberalism had long had its chief seat, even before the outbreak of Republicanism in France, Basserman, a distinguished deputy of the Liberal party, had brought in a bill in the Chambers for summoning a general German Parliament in Frankfort, to consider the best means of breaking down the unkindly wall of partition that at present separated the people of Germany from the princes; and in obedience to this bold patriotic summons, the 18th of May saw three hundred and twenty deputies from all parts of Germany assembled in the Paul's Kirche at Frankfort, to deliberate on the political state of the Fatherland, and, out of the ruins of petty princedom, to re-create the splendid medieval empire of the Othos and the Barbaros-sas. And no doubt if mere German ideas and German patriotic talk could have produced a new German order of things, a German empire would have leapt into existence at the word of command in those days. But these things are not done by mere ideas, however just, and by mere debates, however eloquent. The Frankfort Chambers drew up a constitution for the new German Empire, appointed a chancellor, the Archduke John of Austria, for the nonce; but when the articles of the Constitution came to be realized it was found there was no power willing to enforce the decrees; and so the stentorian giant of German Liberalism stood powerless in the old imperial city, a helpless trunk, without either legs to stand on or arms to strike with. The Frankfort Parliament, after

oceans of wise talk, dwindled into a rump, and the rump, true to the destiny of all rumps, was dispersed into a nonentity by a Stuttgart minister named Roemer, who had a head hard enough and a hand firm enough to do it.

Meanwhile, at Berlin, a notable tragi-comedy had been enacted. Mobs of people had started up before the Palace in the Schlossplatz, brandishing knives and ropes in red revolutionary fashion ; barricades were erected in the *Königs-Strasse* and grape shot had been set to rake the citizens. Then suddenly repentance seized the heart of the monarch ; and he was seen riding up the Linden with the imperial tricolor of black, red, and gold, and proclaiming with a loud voice, " Von jetzt an geht Preussen in Deutschland auf " (From this moment Prussia is swallowed up in Germany). But this was a rhetorical phrase which any word-monger, actor, or poet, or master of elocution, could use ; to do the thing at that moment was possible only to a real king of men ; and such Frederick William IV. was not. In the face of this grand speech, he afterwards (28th March, 1849) refused to accept of the imperial crown, when offered to him by the men of the Paul's Kirche in Frankfort.

Nevertheless, the Berlin insurrection remained not without fruit. A Constitution, based on the Democratic principle, was granted on the 3d December, 1848 ; and since that period, Prussia ranks now historically—not, indeed, after John Bull's present ideal, but still in the eye of political philosophy *de facto*—as one of the great limited monarchies, whose existence forms one of the distinctive contrasts between the social organization of ancient and modern times.



V.

We now wind up this great political drama by a short sketch of the fifth Act, which we have designated "Nationality and Empire."

Frederick William IV., with all his fine speeches and romantic sentiments, died in the year 1861 ; and his successor, the present King William, being a soldier to the backbone, according to old Prussian traditions soon fell into a position of painful conflict with his Parliament, about the period of military service, and the equipment thereto belonging. According to his view of what the defence of the country required he could not yield ; and according to their view of what liberal policy and economical retrenchment required, they could not yield. So affairs came to a dead lock ; and the King in 1862, found himself in the same position that, about two centuries before, had cost England a civil war and the loss of a king's head. But Prussia was not England ; and, at the very moment when the plot of the political drama seemed most perplexed, a god appeared on the scene, worthy in every way to untie the knot. This god was Bismarck, who, with a firm will and a strong hand, and the aid of favoring circumstances, piloted his sovereign triumphantly through the troubled seas of Parliamentary conflict, carrying on the government of the country on the budget of the previous years, without asking Parliament for an annual vote. Bismarck boldly sketched out a line of policy, the success of which will be accepted as the best guarantee of its wisdom. It may be shortly summed in the following five points :—(1) to destroy

Austrian predominance in the Diet as prejudicial to the interests of Germany, and antagonistic to the spirit of social progress in the nineteenth century ; (2) to kick the Diet from off the political stage altogether as an encumbrance and a sham ; (3) to give political unity to Germany in the only practical way, by throwing the political and military guidance of the whole German people into the hands of Prussia—a great Germany could be made only by a strong Prussia ; (4) to give to Prussia a strong and well-defensible boundary, wherever possible, by the absorption of the petty principalities ; (5) to keep a sharp eye on the machinations and a strong arm ready to strike against the ambitious encroachments of France. And all these points he had made up his mind to carry out, if not in the most scrupulous, certainly in the shortest and most effective way, not by talking or by the votes of majorities, according to the now fashionable Democratic style, but by a firm will, a shrewd policy, and, when necessary, by “ blood and iron.”

And here as in many similar cases, the old adage found itself true, that “ Fortune favors the brave.” The policy of blood and iron effected more for the German cause in half-a-dozen years than any amount of talk and convocation would have done in as many centuries. The detachment of Holstein from the Danish monarchy, which followed naturally by the law of succession, just as Hanover fell off from England, to prevent which Denmark drew the sword, and Great Britain the pen, afforded Bismarck the desired opportunity at once of humbling Austria, strengthening the boundaries of Prussia, and blowing the Diet into smoke. Schleswig-Holstein was taken posses-

sion of jointly in the name of the German Diet by Austria and Prussia ; but here the formal right ended and despotic expediency commenced. What any man, acquainted with the traditional policy of Prussia and the maxims of politicians generally, might have predicted, took place. Holstein was not given to its rightful Duke, in whose interest the war was ostensibly carried on ; but Austria and Prussia, finding their interests in that quarter irreconcilable, quarrelled about the plunder, divided the whole of Germany into two parties, and went to war. This was exactly what Bismarck wanted, and wisely wanted, as absolutely necessary for the double purpose of diverting the mind of the Prussian people from the stiff struggle betwixt the Crown and the Parliament, and as the only feasible way of at once abolishing the cumbrous machinery of the Bund, and placing Austria altogether outside of the great German game. This splendid double stroke Bismarck delivered in the campaign which ended with the battle of Sadowa, 3d February, and the peace of Prague, 23d August, 1866,—a campaign made possible, next to his own bold design and firm will, by the military genius of Count Moltke on the one side, and on the other by the inactivity of the Emperor of France, whose energy had already begun to be lamed by the difficulties which never fail, sooner or later, to grow up in the path of an usurper.

Austria was now humbled, and Prussian pride, in the matter of national position in the Fatherland, gratified to the full. But there remained still the internal difficulty of coming to a compromise with the Parliament, whose beard Bismarck had plucked so rudely, not to mention the soothing of

the thousands of fretful spirits in the provinces which the red hand of war had so rudely appropriated in the affair of 1866. Out of these difficulties Bismarck and the King were triumphantly helped by the folly of the French, who, with a display of vaporing gasconade unexampled in recent history, insisted on dictating to Germany in a matter of Spanish concern with which they had nothing to do. This insolent dictation arose naturally out of the national vanity of the French people, fostered by the ambition of the great Napoleon, and the soreness which they felt at the territorial aggrandisement of Prussia, as fixed by the peace of Prague. The breach with France, however, was so manifestly in the interest of Bismarck, and so much in harmony with his declared policy of "blood and iron," that French partizans were not slow to endeavor to lay on his shoulders the guilt of the bloody struggle. But it was not so. Bismarck knew that the ambition of the French Emperor, the irritation of French politicians, and the vanity of the French people, equally pointed to a war with Germany, for the realization of their favorite dream of the Rhine boundary. He knew well, also, that a war with France, if successful, would tell in his favor with even more force than his recent triumph over Austria ; but he was too wise a politician, and I believe, also, too good a man, to throw himself rashly into the risk of so terrible a struggle. The main points of his German policy had been already achieved ; and, so far as France was concerned, his only duty was to keep out a habit-and-repute burglar from the German home. Though not, however, seeking war, he was always prepared for it ; and in the moment of alarm he

pounced upon the burglar in a style which astonished Europe, and himself too, we may well imagine, not a little. For there are always chances in war : and though Bismarck knew France and the Emperor well, he never could have predicted that the splendid edifice of Napoleonic ambition would have fallen to pieces, like a castle of cards, so suddenly. But it did fall ; and though the chapter of accidents may have been largely in favor of the Germans, yet the main causes of the wonderful campaign, which turned what might have been a bloody defence into a brilliant invasion, were the physical, intellectual, and moral forces on the German side, which, with wise accumulation, did not fail to reap their natural reward.

The completed Prusso-French war of 1870-1 stands now before the world as at once the most brilliant and solid achievement of modern history. Prussia has stoutly asserted herself as the natural head of Germany ; German unity has been achieved after centuries of unhappy division by the willing submission to a Prussian hegemony ; and Germany now stands firmly in the centre of the European political system, a massive bulwark against the encroachments of Russia on the east, and the aggression of France on the west. And this mighty change will be recorded for posterity, as the fruit indirectly of the regenerative policy of the Baron von Stein, but directly of the far-sighted intelligence, manly purpose, firm will, strong hand, and astute management of Prince von Bismarck.



## *THE FUTURE OF EGYPT.*<sup>1</sup>

BY EDWARD DICEY.

THE article on "Our Route to India" which I was kindly allowed to publish in the June number of this Review has met with a more favorable reception, in as far as public opinion is concerned, than I could reasonably have expected. The gist of that article may be briefly summed up in the following series of propositions:—The impending dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the Turko-Russian war must inevitably expose our right of way to India through the Suez Canal to new and increased risks of interruption. Under the altered conditions of the East the absolute control of the Suez Canal is essential to our hold on India. Such a control can, from the nature of the case, be only exercised by the Power which is dominant in the Delta. Therefore the virtual occupation of Lower Egypt has become a matter of necessity for England. In other words, my article was, and was understood to be, a plea for the immediate occupation of the Isthmus in order to secure our communications with India. The response which the article in question has elicited was due not to any great novelty in the conclusion, or in the arguments by which it was enforced, but to the circumstance that it expressed a truth which it was well, and was felt to be

<sup>1</sup> THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, August, 1877.

well, should be spoken plainly. The objections which have been raised to my proposals have been rather matters of detail than of principle. Indeed, there seems to be a general acknowledgment, both at home and abroad, that the occupation of Egypt by England is only a matter of time ; and the point on which my critics mainly disagree with me is that they do not recognize as fully as I do the urgent necessity for immediate action in order to accelerate what they regard as a foregone conclusion.

Of the objections which are or might be raised to the proposed intervention, there are some few on which I should like to dwell a little more at length than the limits of space permitted of my doing in my last article. I am told, then, by partisans of the Turkish cause, that, even admitting the force of my views, England could not act upon them at this moment without supplying Russia with an excuse for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and thereby hastening the downfall of Turkey at the very time when she is fighting gallantly for sheer life or death. My answer to this is twofold. In the first place, I regard it as an error to introduce considerations of sympathy or antipathy, or of the respective merits of Turkey and Russia, into the question of England and Egypt. Indeed, to my mind, the most painful aspect of this whole Eastern controversy is the extent to which the interests of England are overlooked by Englishmen in comparison with collateral considerations which, however deserving of attention, cannot, and ought not to, decide the imperial policy of this country. Whether we regard the Turks as the victims of unprovoked aggression, or whether we hold that we ought



to wish God-speed to Russia in a noble and righteous work—whether we sympathize with Bulgarian Christians or with Circassian Mohammedans—the course of England must still be determined by hard facts, not by sentimental theories. Now, as a matter of fact, we have hitherto allied ourselves with Turkey, not because we held her to be in the right, still less because we approved of her system of government, but because we believed that the maintenance of her independence was conducive to our own power and safety. If it appears certain that this independence can be maintained no longer, then the same motives which formerly induced us to support Turkey should induce us to seek elsewhere for the safeguards she has ceased to be able supply. But, in the second place, the mischief, if mischief there is, has been done already. Before the war broke out there would have been considerable force in the argument that, however advantageous the occupation of Egypt might be to England, we could not undertake it without affording Russia an excuse for the dismemberment of Turkey. As things are, the excuse is no longer needed. Russia has invaded the Ottoman Empire, in Asia as well as in Europe, with the avowed object of settling the Eastern Question by force; and to suppose that, in the event of the invasion proving successful, Russia will not venture to undertake the partition of Turkey unless she can obtain some sort of moral sanction for so doing by our conduct towards Egypt, appears to me the wildest and most childish of delusions.

If Russia after the war can obtain possession of Armenia, or Bulgaria, or Roumelia, or Constantinople itself, and deems

it for her interest to do so, she will most assuredly not be restrained by any lack of a precedent for annexation after conquest. There is not a great Power in existence in whose annals she could not find ample justification, if she required it, and assuredly no reasonable exception could be taken to her appropriation of the fruits of victory by the Power which holds Gibraltar, Malta, and India. Moreover, there is absolutely no reason why the occupation of Egypt should not be undertaken with the sanction and consent of Turkey itself. The Turks, to do them justice, care little or nothing about moral force or international precedents. What they want is material aid, and short of armed assistance, which we are not prepared to give, the service they would most value would be pecuniary assistance. At the present crisis money is the most urgent need of Turkey, and there is ground to think that the Porte would gladly transfer its suzerain rights over Egypt to England, if we would purchase the capitalized value of the reversion of the Egyptian tribute. This tribute in round numbers amounts to 700,000*l.* a year, and at thirty years' purchase its value would be twenty-one millions. As the tribute, however, is already mortgaged for the payment of the loans 1854 and 1871, amounting to close upon nine millions, its saleable value cannot be estimated at more than twelve millions. For a sum of half this amount paid down in cash, the Porte would be willing enough to cede to England the suzerainty of Egypt. If I am told that to give money to Turkey at this moment would be detrimental to the cause of Russia, I can only say that what we have to consider are not the interests of Russia any more than those of Turkey, but the interests of England.

Another and somewhat similar objection has been raised to our taking possession of Egypt on the ground that we ought not to set an example of high-handed violence. I have endeavored to show in my previous article that there is no necessity for violence of any kind, and I need not repeat the arguments I have already used. As a matter of fact, our occupation of Egypt would be hailed by the vast majority of the inhabitants as a deliverance from intolerable oppression. But even if this were otherwise, I own frankly I should still advocate occupation as essential to our own imperial welfare. The question of international ethics is far too wide a one for me to enter upon. This much, however, I may fairly say, that if we are not to secure our position in Egypt because we could not prove any technical justification for our action before a tribunal of international jurists, we should have to unwrite our own history. Whether any nation is ever justified in extending its own territories to the possible detriment of another is a fit subject of speculative discussion. But unless we are prepared to initiate a new era of international morality, to forego all claim to rank among the empires of the world, and to abandon Ireland as well as India, we cannot plead tenderness of conscience as a ground for refusing to secure our route to India at the possible expense of Egypt. Idealists may believe in the advent of a better age, when all the nations of the earth shall study each other's interests in preference to their own. But that time has not come yet, nor, so far as I can see, is there any likelihood of its coming. For the present we must go on as we have begun. There is too much truth in the French proverb that *il faut hurler*

*avec les loups.* We could wish sincerely there were no wolves about, and no necessity for us to howl with them. A very strong argument may be shown against the abstract morality of trade, and I for one should find it difficult to reconcile the principle of buying cheap and selling dear with the creed we all profess to hold. But if you are in business and do not want to go into the *Gazette*, you cannot conduct your trade in accordance with the dogmas of primitive Christianity; and England is not only in business, but has not the power, even if she had the will, to retire into private life.

So much for sentimental objections. One of far more weight, to my mind, is to be found in the assertion that an occupation of the Isthmus on the part of England, even though it might be effected without opposition, would give such mortal offence to France as would involve the certainty of a collision between the two countries whenever the latter was in a position to reassert its claims. Even if this assertion were true, the question whether the possible risk of a war with France was a greater evil than the certainty of our communications with India being rendered insecure, is one on which there would be much to be said. But I see no cause to admit the truth of the theory that France would resent English intervention in Egypt as an outrage upon her interests or her dignity. The question mooted in my previous article has been very widely discussed in the leading French papers, and, in as far as I can learn, no serious outcry has been raised to the effect that England was taking advantage of the prostration of France in order to deprive her of the foot-

ing that French enterprise and French capital had established in Egypt. The Suez Canal was constructed with French money and by French enterprise, and the French shareholders have undoubtedly a moral as well as a legal right to most ample compensation in case any detriment should be inflicted upon their property. Nor can it fairly be denied that the property in question would, from a French point of view, lose in political, though, not in pecuniary value, supposing it to be placed under the protectorate of England. On the other hand, the Suez Canal shareholders must be very unlike the run of French *actionnaires* if they are indifferent to pecuniary considerations. I do not deny for one moment that a genuine desire to promote an enterprise deemed certain to enhance the grandeur of France was one of the motives which induced the small proprietors under the Second Empire to invest their savings in M. de Lesseps' scheme. But this was by no means the sole, still less the principal, motive by which the original purchasers of the canal shares were influenced. The main motive was a belief that the investment involved no practical risk, and held out a prospect of fabulous profits. Nor was this belief an unreasonable one at the time. The credit of the Imperial dynasty was so closely associated with the success of the canal that, so long as Napoleon the Third remained on the throne, the shareholders had a virtual guarantee against any discreditable collapse of the enterprise as a financial undertaking; while if the Isthmus route, as M. de Lesseps calculated, had proved available for ships as well as for steamers, and if the course of trade between East and West had, as he also anticipated, been forthwith diverted from

Liverpool to Marseilles, the receipts of the canal dues would have sufficed to pay a very high dividend. But though the canal, from an engineering point of view, has proved a complete success, it has, financially speaking, been a failure. No probable increase of the traffic can suffice to raise the dividends materially, while, under a number of many possible contingencies, the whole receipts might be swallowed up by the expenses. Under these circumstances, I believe a proposal on the part of the British Government to take over the canal on condition of guaranteeing a minimum dividend of five per cent., with the prospect of a bonus in the event of the profit on the undertaking ever sufficing to pay more than the above percentage on the nominal capital, would be hailed with satisfaction by the shareholders, who know that since the downfall of the Empire they have no longer the French Government at their back.

Nor do I believe that the cession of the canal to England would be really unpopular in France. It is at once the strength and the weakness of the French nation, that its whole attention is concentrated upon itself. The acquisition of outlying empires or the loss of colonies does not come home to French national sentiment. The desire to establish French supremacy in the Levant, or to turn Egypt into another Algeria, was a tradition of professional French statesmanship, not the outcome of any popular instinct of empire such as that which established our rule in India. The same semi-religious semi-political sentiments which made the occupation of Rome on behalf of the Papacy popular, in reality if not in name, with all parties in France, would doubtless lead

the French public to endorse any policy by which France could assert the supremacy of the Latin Church in the Levant. If the choice between the possession of Egypt and the protectorate of Palestine could be offered respectively to France and England, ninety-nine Frenchmen out of a hundred, if they cared for either, would prefer the latter, while out of the same number of Englishmen a well-nigh unanimous vote would be given in favor of the former. After all, the commercial interests of France in Egypt, as well as in the lands to which the Isthmus is the highway, are utterly insignificant compared with those of England. If you put aside French speculators in Egyptian securities, the mercantile connection between France and Egypt is extremely limited. There are, or rather were, numbers of Frenchmen in the Khedive's service, while the retail shops in Cairo and Alexandria which cater for European custom are largely in French hands. But, leaving the canal out of consideration, I knew of no important industrial undertaking in Egypt supported by French capital or managed by Frenchmen. If I am told that, allowing all this, the French *point d'honneur* is somehow identified with the supremacy of French influence in Egypt, my answer would be that France, after all, is in her own way eminently practical, and that, as the one pre-eminent and absorbing idea of all Frenchmen at the present crisis is the protection of France from further aggression at the hands of Germany, the action of England with regard to Egypt would simply be judged in France by its possible bearing on the relations between herself and Germany. For various reasons, which I have not space to enter on, French politicians hold, whether with or without reason,

that an English occupation of Egypt would render the alliance of France more essential to Great Britain than it would be otherwise ; and, holding this, they are ready to acquiesce in any policy which might strengthen England's interests in the Isthmus of Suez.

The above objections seem to me to be the only ones of a general kind which require any specific answer. I observe, however, that many people who agree in principle with the views I have expressed as to the expediency of direct intervention in Egypt are alarmed at the supposed cost and embarrassments which such an intervention must entail. Now it would be absurd to deny the possibility of serious embarrassments arising out of any distinct assertion of British supremacy on the Delta. If we placed a corporal's guard at Port Said, we should be compelled, if need be, to defend that guard with the whole force of the Empire. And if, taking into account the extent of our present Imperial liabilities, we were able to dispense with the additional responsibility of having to defend our route to India across the Isthmus, I for one should deprecate the aggrandizement of our already unwieldy Empire. But, as I endeavored to show in my previous article, we have to choose between strengthening our hold on Egypt and weakening our hold on India. Assuming, as I do, that the result of the present war will be to overthrow the protection which the Ottoman Empire has hitherto afforded to Egypt, we cannot be content to rely on the forbearance of other Powers for the security of the passage between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

If we are not to take Egypt because, under certain possible



contingencies, we might have to fight for its possession, we ought, not only in logic but in common sense, to give up Gibraltar, Malta, and India itself, for any one of which we are liable to be called upon to fight under various by no means impossible eventualities. But my contention is that, apart from the general responsibility which the possession of any new territory entails of necessity, there is nothing in the conditions of Egypt to justify the apprehensions expressed as to the burdens which its occupation might entail upon us. It is idle to argue from the analogy of India, or to say that, because we find the task of governing the three Presidencies a work of difficulty, we should only add to our troubles by having to rule the Isthmus as well. In Egypt there are, practically speaking, no varieties of race, or faith, or language. With the solitary exception of the Khedive, there are no native princes, no great landowners, no powerful chiefs to thwart or embarrass our action. No conquest would be required, no popular resistance would have to be overcome. The fellaheen, who form ninety-five per cent of the whole population of Egypt, would hail our arrival as a deliverance from intolerable oppression. Old Mehemet Ali used to say in his confidential moments, "Si le fellah pouvait vomir, il vomirait un Turc," and the saying expressed faithfully enough the ordinary sentiments of the Egyptian bondsman towards his Turkish taskmaster. During the centuries throughout which Egypt was ruled directly from Constantinople, the dependancy was treated much as Sicily was by Roman proconsuls of the Verres type. The pasha was, as a rule, the favorite eunuch of the seraglio, who was sent to Egypt as a reward for service in the

harem, and who, knowing that he was liable to be recalled at any moment by caprice or intrigue, thought of nothing except extracting the utmost amount of money he could from the province during his pashaship. This state of things was brought to a close by Mehemet Ali's successful insurrection, and then, for the first time since its conquest by the Turks, Egypt was placed under rulers who had some sort of interest in her welfare and prosperity. It would be an utter delusion to suppose that the founder of the reigning dynasty had any idea of creating an Egyptian nationality, or any wish to ameliorate the lot of his people on humanitarian grounds. The only change effected in Egypt by the pashaship being made hereditary was similar to that effected in a slave plantation when the estate is administered by the owner instead of by hired overseers. Still the change was one for the better, and the Fellahs have seldom been so well off as they were under Mehemet Ali and his immediate successors. Under the present reign, however, the burden of the enormous debt contracted by the Khedive has compelled a resumption of the old system of extortion. The Khedive, to do him only justice, is by disposition a humane and intelligent ruler, but, in order to meet the pressing needs of constant pecuniary embarrassments, he has to sacrifice every other consideration to that of raising money. The extent to which the oppression of the fellahs is carried may be best estimated by the fact that in many districts they are selling their land to escape payment of the taxes. The passion of the French peasant for his field is feeble compared with that of the fellah for his plot of ground. "Lack-land" is about the most opprobrious term one fellah can apply to

another, and yet in hundreds of instances within the last few years the small proprietors of the Delta have sold for a song the land which they and their fathers have owned for centuries, simply and solely because their lot had become too grievous to be borne. All they ask or hope is to be allowed to live upon their labor. That the profit of their toil should be taken by their masters seems to them the natural order of the universe, and any government which afforded them a certainty of enjoying in peace the margin of their crops left after payment of all dues, taxes, imposts, and fees, would be welcomed by them as the most beneficent of administrations. Still, even if this were otherwise, if the reigning dynasty were personally beloved in Egypt, and if the fellahs had no desire for change of any kind, the government of the Khedive might be overthrown without the remotest prospect of any popular resistance being offered. From time immemorial the Egyptians have been used to bondage, and the time has not yet come, if it ever will come, when they can have either voice or part in the determination of their own destiny.

Given the conditions of Egypt and the relations between the population and the ruling dynasty, England, or, for that matter, any European Power, might establish her dominion over the country without any fear of internal opposition. Nor need there be any difficulty as to the administration of the country if we are content to govern it in accordance with its existing institutions. The whole theory of Egyptian administration rests upon the supremacy of the sheik. In every village, however small, the community is governed by a head man, who acts as the medium of communication between the

village and the State. The Sheik occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of an English squire, supposing the squire to collect and apportion all rates and taxes, to administer the affairs of the villagers, and to represent them on all public occasions. As a common rule, the sheik is the wealthiest man in the community; but whether this is the effect or the cause of his sheikship it would be hard to say. The office goes to the head of the family according to Mohammedan law; and the central government has nothing to do with the appointment to the post, which is regulated, like the headship of a tribe, on a certain sort of "survival of the fittest" principle. Thus the sheik may be called the unit of all Egyptian administration. The Khedive decrees that a tax shall be levied or a public work performed. Upon that orders are sent from Cairo to the Mudirs or prefects of the different provinces, who are officials appointed by the Khedive, to the effect that the province must furnish so much money or so many laborers. The Mudir then apportions to each sheik the share of money or labor each village has to contribute; and he is left to allot the contributions amidst the villagers. So long as the requisite supplies are forthcoming, no question is asked, and no particulars are demanded. It might be thought that this system would give rise to gross individual extortion; but, as a matter of fact, the oppression the fellah suffers from comes from the Government, not from the sheik. Why this should be it is not very easy to explain. Like many other institutions in the East, all you can say about the sheik system is that it is because it always has been so. The sheik is not a Government official, but a local head man, amen-

able to the public opinion of the community, and regarding himself as the champion of its interests and rights. In as far as the outer world is concerned, the sheik is the community. It is the same even in the towns. If property is stolen by a Cairo donkey-boy, it is the sheik of the donkey-boys who has to make good the loss. If a jeweller sells silver below the standard mark, it is the sheik of the jewellers to whom the defrauded purchaser looks for redress. In fact, the whole internal administration of Egypt is based on the principle that the State does not deal directly with the individual but exercises its authority over the individual by the agency of the sheik. And as between the sheik and the individual, the arbitrary power of the former is circumscribed by the authority of the *cadi*, who administers the law of the Koran, and who, holding his office in virtue of his ecclesiastical position, is to a very great extent independent of what we should call the civil government. I am not sure how far my definitions of the sheik and *cadi* are technically correct. Of all the many points in Oriental matters difficult for a foreigner to comprehend, the most difficult is the exact degree of power possessed by the various conflicting authorities which administer the affairs of the State after their own fashion. But still I think no one acquainted with Egypt will contradict me in saying that any system of government, to be acceptable to the instincts of the country, must be based upon the principle of leaving the actual execution of the laws to the sheik and the *cadi*.

I have dwelt upon this point because I hear it said that if we occupied Egypt we should have to import an army of

British officials, and to introduce English laws, customs, and institutions. Nothing of the kind is necessary. Once given the power of controlling the head of the State, and the whole work of administration might go on as at present, conducted by native agency upon native principles. What I—in common, I think, with all those who know the country—desire is not to convert Egypt into a province ruled by British officials, but into a native state under the authority and protection of England. Slavery by law does not exist in Egypt, and under vigilant British supervision it would soon become extinct. The slave trade would be suppressed at once, if the pashas of the Khedive's court found that they could no longer purchase slaves with immunity. Putting aside slavery, there are no other of the peculiar institutions of Egypt with which we should be called in any way to interfere. If we once secure the fellaheen immunity from *corvées*, the right to labor in their own fields, and to keep the fruit of their own toil, we may leave them to live out their lives after their own fashion. We are not bound, even if we were able to do so, to convert the fellah to Christianity, or to impress him with an abstract preference for monogamy, or to show him the advantage of sanitary reform. All these things must come much later if they come at all. For the moment we shall have done our full duty towards him if we protect him from torture, extortion, and virtual slavery; and this we can do at once if we only take the steps we are bound, as I hold, to take in our own defence. It has not seemed to me honest to base my plea for occupation on the ground of the benefit we should confer thereby on the fellaheen. I hold that we ought to occupy

the Isthmus because the command of the canal is essential to the safety of our route to India, and because the canal can only be commanded by the Power which occupies the Isthmus ; and holding this view, it is mere hypocrisy to pretend that our main object is to improve the condition of the fellah. But, to my mind, it is no slight recommendation to the course demanded by our own most vital interests that incidentally it would involve the practical emancipation of the fellaheen from most cruel oppression and wrong. Since the abolition of West Indian slavery, no single act of our Government could do so much to lessen the sum of human misery and suffering as the establishment of a British protectorate in the Isthmus.

There are various ways by which this end could be accomplished without difficulty. As I have explained in my previous article, no great display of military force, no permanent establishment of a large garrison in the Isthmus, is required to secure the command of the canal. For the present, the mere hoisting of our flag at Port Said and Suez would suffice to show the world that the Isthmus, if needs be, would be defended by the whole power of the British Empire, and would thus guarantee us against any possible interference with the canal. For the future, the erection of a few forts on the Syrian side of the Isthmus, the presence of a small British garrison at Alexandria, and the stationing of an ironclad at Port Said would amply suffice for our protection. But besides this, or rather in order to accomplish this, as I have explained elsewhere, we must exercise supreme authority in Cairo. It is not necessary, nor, as I think, desirable, that we should undertake the administration of the Isthmus. On the con-

trary, it would be better if the country were administered in the name of the Khedive by officials holding their posts directly from him. But what is necessary if we are to obtain any effective command of the canal is that we should have a general control and right of veto on the external and internal proceedings of the Egyptian government in as far as the Isthmus is concerned. Strictly speaking, all we should require for our safety as the holders of the Isthmus would be a right of garrisoning certain points, and a general authority over the railroads, canals, and irrigation works of the Delta, so as to insure our military position suffering no detriment. But, as a matter of fact, we could not possibly allow a State occupied by our troops, and taken under our protection, to have independent relations with foreign and possibly hostile Powers, or to rule its subjects in such a manner as to outrage every principle not only of humanity, but of common prudence. And this being so, we must, if we are to do anything at all, place the Khedive under some form of restraint. This might be done either by having a British Resident at Cairo, or by inducing the Khedive to entrust the management of his affairs to an Administrator, who would be appointed with the consent of our Government, and who could not be dismissed without our sanction. For my own part, I see little difference in reality between the two schemes. But persons intimately acquainted with Egypt assure me that the Khedive would much prefer the latter arrangement, and that it would give us a more effective control than could be secured by the mere presence of a Resident at Cairo. Still, whatever might be the name or position of the representative of British au-



thority, his duties would be confined to three points : He would have to see that nothing was done to impair our military position, that the country was not ruined by over-taxation, and that the population was not subjected to gross and intolerable oppression. When once he had secured these objects, he should, as I deem, interfere as little as possible with the details of administration. Of course, as long as an Oriental country is administered by Oriental officials, there will be isolated cases of extortion and ill-usage. But the Egyptians, like all subject races, are quick enough in seeing where the real mastery lies ; and if there were a British Resident or Administrator at Cairo, no general or permanent system of oppression could be carried on without appeal being made to his authority ; and the mere knowledge that this was so would suffice to prevent the perpetration of gross outrages such as those of which the fellaheen are now the constant victims.

The limits of space forbid my entering on the details of the process by which occupation might, according to my view, be effected with the smallest encroachment on the Khedive's authority and the least interference with Eastern customs and modes of life. Still, it would be dishonest, even if it were possible, to ignore the truth that any process which would satisfy the requirements of the case would amount to occupation. A protectorate over a native State must involve the possibility, if not the probability, of ultimate occupation. If I am told that under no possible circumstances would it be wise or lawful for England to occupy the Isthmus, then further argument is useless. But if the possibility of such an occupation is once admitted, as it is by the immense majority

of Englishmen, then I am entitled once more to urge the advantages of immediate action. Since I last wrote, the impending downfall of the Ottoman Empire has become more and more imminent. Just at this moment a fortuitous concurrence of circumstances has enabled us to possess ourselves of the Isthmus, and to do so without fear of a foreign war, without cost, without the possibility of resistance, and without the violation of any international equity. Personally, I have never been able to join in the outcry against Muscovite greed of conquest. Speaking impartially, the Russians have as good a right to extend their dominions in Central Asia as we have in the Indian peninsula ; they are as much or as little entitled to seize the Dardanelles as we are to hold the Straits of Gibraltar. They are only following out their manifest destiny as we have followed ours—as every master nation has done, and will do to the end of time. As a matter, however, of precedent, there is little or no analogy between the partition of the Ottoman Empire as now being carried out by Russia, and such an occupation of Egypt as I have proposed. We should occupy the Isthmus in self-defence, not as an act of aggression. We could do so, as I believe, with the consent of the Porte, with the acquiescence of the Khedive, and with the sanction of the great European Powers. We should confiscate no territory, expel no population from their homes, and interfere violently with no question of creed or race. We should improve the position of everybody who has property on the Isthmus, and we should be welcomed as deliverers by the people of Egypt. If Russia really requires precedents for seizing by violence on the Sick Man's inheritance, she may

find them far more easily in our own past annals than in an occupation of the Isthmus for the avowed object of protecting our route to India.

As I have said before, my views are, I believe, shared by the great majority of Englishmen. Indeed, there is a tendency amongst the public to regard the occupation of Egypt as a mere question of time, and to assume, therefore, that there is no need for prompt action, as we can always take the Isthmus whenever we think fit. The whist-player's maxim that "the cards never forgive" is based upon experience of the fact that when you have got the game in your own hands and throw the lead away, the peculiar combination under which success was possible is not likely to recur again. For the moment a most exceptional combination of circumstances has enabled us to take possession of the Isthmus without opposition, and without risk of international difficulties. If we wait till the war is over, the combination is at once dispersed. When first the Eastern question was reopened by the insurrection in the Herzegovina, one of the most far-sighted of living statesmen, who was well acquainted with Egypt, said to a British minister: "You English have, whether you like it or not, to establish your supremacy in Egypt. You can do it now without disturbing the peace of Europe and without cost to yourselves; but if you do not act now the only difference will be that a few years hence you will have to seize Egypt at the close of a general war and at the cost of millions." How far this forecast is justified, the near future will have to show.



## *THE SLAVEOWNER AND THE TURK.<sup>1</sup>*

BY PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH.

THE question between the friends of Turkey and the friends of Russia has taken the oblique form of a discussion as to the similarity or dissimilarity of the present war to the Civil War in America. In an eminent Turkophilist journal we have had an article maintaining with great earnestness that no real parallel could be traced between the American struggle and "the Russian crusade." Probably the parallel itself would not be offensive ; at least we can hardly imagine any one with a throat so capricious as to strain at the Slaveowner and swallow the Turk. But the omen, no doubt, is unwelcome.

To call the present war a "Russian crusade" is to beg both the question as to the parallel and the main question at issue. If the real object of Russia were the propagation of her religion by the extirpation of Mahometanism, not only would there be no likeness between this struggle and the purely political and social struggle in the United States, but Russia would never have enlisted the sympathy of the great mass of those who, as it is, are her well-wishers in this country. The Ritualist clergy, from their ecclesiastical predilections, might still have been on her side, but the Liberals would not. That there is a religious element in the sympathy of the Russian

<sup>1</sup> THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, November, 1877.

people for the Bulgarians may be conceded ; but it is not in the proper and only pertinent sense of the term a crusading element. It is accessory and subordinate to the sentiment of race. The Russian religion, as the readers of Mr. Wallace—that is, all the world—must now know, is intensely national, or rather Slavonic ; it expects every Russian to be Orthodox, and regards secession as treason. In that respect it is intolerant ; but, like other strictly national or tribal religions it is far from being strongly propagandist. Numbers of Mahometans live under Russian rule, not only in the perfectly free exercise of their religion, but unmolested by any attempt at proselytism. Mahometans, with other dissidents from the Orthodox faith, are serving in the armies of the Czar. If Russia is sometimes propagandist, as in the Baltic provinces, or even persecuting, as in Poland, it is not so much for the purpose of spiritual conversion as for that of political assimilation. That there was a sufficient *casus belli* without reference to religion is a fact established by the concurrent judgment of the European Powers, representing among themselves a wide diversity of religions, which, at the Conference of Constantinople pronounced that Turkish misrule had become insufferable, and that the hour for tutelary intervention on behalf of the oppressed Christians had arrived. That judgment remains valid, though the duty of executing it has been abandoned by the Powers less connected with the Rayah to his nearest of kin.

The persistent assertion that the body of English Liberals who are on the Russian side, or rather against the Turk, are sympathizing with a crusade, is unjust, not to say petulant.

They are on the Russian side simply because, all things considered, and without the slightest general bias in favor of Russia, much less of despotism or of bigotry, they happen to be convinced that the cause of humanity, which has sometimes to put up with rather questionable quarters, is on the present occasion in the camp of the Czar. Even in the case of the American Civil War there was too great a tendency on the part of the English friends of the South to represent the Liberals who took the side of the Union as fanatical Negrophilists, when in fact they were far from being anything of the kind, and were actuated merely by sympathy with political freedom and industrial justice against the great power of iniquity and barbarism which sought their overthrow.

Political analogies are never quite exact. No doubt there are important points of difference between the Civil War in America and the present war. Still, there may be points of likeness equally or even more important, both as elements for our moral judgment and as indications of the probable result.

The Union was a republic; Russia is a despotism. This is one very obvious point of difference. It is instructive to see it dwelt on as adverse to Russia, by English Conservatives. Our minds are carried back to the time of the American struggle, when we were daily called upon to listen to demonstrations of the inherent weakness of republics, and of the certainty that, if the conflict went on, the American Republic would succumb, would break up, would become bankrupt, would fall into anarchy, would pass from anarchy into military despotism. National enthusiasm, however, when strongly aroused, may to a great extent, cancel for the time the vices

of a despotism. The uprising of the nations against Napoleon cancelled to a great extent for the time the vices of despotism in Germany, Austria, and Russia herself. It seems that on the present occasion the war was made by the nation ; that the Autocrat yielded to the national impulse, and that both in the way of stimulus and of criticism, the action of public opinion in Russia is powerful, and the despotism has for the time assumed much of the character and of the peculiar force of a republic.

It is commonly said that Russia is not only despotic but a propaganda of despotism. She was so under Nicholas ; it was the only scintilla of reason on our part for going into the Crimean war. But Alexander is not Nicholas ; the emancipator of the serfs has not given the world the slightest pretext for accusing him of a desire to interfere with human progress in any direction ; while in the centres of Russian intelligence a movement has commenced which, so far from tending to the propagation of despotism, seems likely, if it ever reaches maturity, to satisfy the passionate yearnings of British Conservatives for social equality and political freedom. Poland has been coerced with a ruthless hand ; but, as Prince Albert said, the Poles are the Irish of the Continent, and to coerce an Ireland is not wholly incompatible with general respect for liberty. Even to Nicholas a certain measure of justice is due, since it has become apparent that the patriotism of the Magyar is the patriotism of an oligarch ; that his liberty is liberty to trample on his own Slav, and that Russian intervention was nearly as welcome to the subject as it was unwelcome to the dominant race.



If Russia is a despotism, so is Turkey, while the South was a slaveowning republic of the Greek type politically, though not in other respects Athenian. Turkey is worse than a despotism: she is an oligarchy of satraps. To do her justice, we may no doubt say of her, as we have of Russia, that the special vices of her government are to a considerable extent cancelled for the purposes of this war, by the zeal of the dominant race for the maintenance of its own privileges and by the awakened enthusiasm of Islam.

Were Turkey really an independent state, the analogy between this war and the American Civil War would fail in a most important respect. But the contrary was distinctly implied in the recent action of the Powers. Russia has, by European law, as clear a right to succor the Christians in Turkey as the Union had to succor the negro; the execution of the common judgment having been cast on her alone. The Turk, by defying European tutelage, has, like the Slaveowner, become a rebel, liable to coercion by the authority which, after repeatedly recognizing it, he has set at naught.

Between the relations of the Slaveowner to the negroes and those of the Turk to the Rayahs, there is a difference, not, in a military point of view, to the advantage of the Turk. The Turk can wring more money and supplies out of the Rayah than the Slaveowner could out of the negro, who had nothing of his own and ceased to produce when his taskmaster had gone off to the war. But, on the other hand, the hostility of the negro to his master, when it existed, was, as a rule merely passive; that of the Rayah to the Turk is active. The negro regiments raised by the North, though most gallantly

led by enthusiastic Northern officers, such as Colonel Shaw, never, we believe, had much more than a sentimental value. But the Bulgarian Rayah fought heroically in the Shipka Pass, while his kinsman and confederate, the Roumanian, has proved himself well able to cope in the field with the soldiery of a race which has the barbarous advantage of knowing no trade but war.

These and other points of unlikeness there are, irrespective of those connected with the strategical features of the scene of action. On the other hand, that there must be a fundamental likeness between the two cases, in a moral and political point of view, we should be at once led to surmise, by observing the remarkable identity of the dividing line of English sympathy on this occasion with its dividing line on the occasion of the American Civil War. The friends of the North, as a rule, are the friends of Russia ; the friends of the Slaveowner, as a rule, are the friends of the Turk. The Liberals of the Clubs and of the Stock Exchange are for the most part Turk ; they were also for the most part Secessionist. Turk or semi-Turk is a special group of Liberals too much occupied with the abstruse lore of that paradise of diplomatic cabalists—the Eastern Question—to be able to pay much attention to the more obvious interests of mankind. Another special group is detached by antagonism to the Christian sentiment which it supposes to be arrayed on the side of Russia, and which it always styles fanaticism, though we may surely, without fanaticism or any regard for dogma, prefer a monogamic and industrial to a polygamic and predatory system. But the rank and file of the Liberal

party, the bulk of the working men, especially in the manufacturing districts, the Nonconformists almost to a man, with the journals which are the regular organs of Liberal opinion, are united in opposition to the Turk, as they were united in opposition to Slavery. On the same side are Mr. Gladstone, whom, notwithstanding his abdication, the people still regard as the Liberal leader, and the Duke of Argyll, true to the sympathies which made him the most conspicuous among the few members of the higher aristocracy who took the side of the American Republic. The local distribution of opinion remains much the same: London is very Turkish, but at Birmingham you enter a different zone. In the ranks of the Conservative party we miss a section of the High Church clergy, drawn, no doubt, to the Russian side, chiefly by its affinity to the Orthodox Church, in which Anglicans seek an ally and a counterpoise to Rome; though, considering the character of the men, it is but fair to suppose that with this sectarian attraction are mingled the influences of a more comprehensive Christianity and of a natural sense of justice. With this exception, the Conservative party, its regular clerical auxiliaries, and its press, support the Turk with the same unanimity and vehemence with which they supported the Slaveowner. The Stafford House Committee represents the same classes which contributed to the Confederate Loan and launched the *Alabama*. On the former occasion the party was out of power, and it could carry on the war only by means of *Alabamas* and other devices of an irregular kind. It is now in power, and though restrained from open intervention in favor of Turkey by the strength of the Liberal Opposition

and the pacific tendencies of commerce, it can write acrimonious despatches, send fleets to Besika Bay, survey Gallipoli, bully Greece, and place a representative of its sympathies in the guise of a British Ambassador at Constantinople. Possibly its policy, as it is identical in general character with that which it pursued before, may again produce the same effects. It may lure the Ottoman as it lured the Southerner to his doom by feeding him with deceitful hopes of aid ; and it may prepare for the lips of England some bitter draught of humiliation such as she drank under the treaty of Washington.

The principal motives for the sympathy of each party remain the same. Liberals are carried by the spirit of their creed to the side of the more industrial, the more civilized, and the liberating Power. Their sympathy for her is limited in different degrees, without being reversed, by diplomatic apprehensions which are not necessarily absent from minds in which they are not allowed to supersede the plain dictates of justice and the great interests of mankind. The Ottoman, a conqueror and a master, represents privilege, exclusiveness, a reign of force, a defiance of philanthropy, an antagonism to popular enlightenment and to the intellectual element of civilization. He is Reaction in its most pronounced and stolid form. In this he is the counterpart or rather the exaggeration, of the Slaveowner, and he has a similar attraction for the same minds and for the same classes.

In the case of the Slaveowner, a certain moral uneasiness, lurking in the breasts of his British adherents, led them to deny that slavery was the cause of secession and of the war. At the commencement of the struggle an elaborate

work was published in this country to prove that slavery had nothing to do with the quarrel, and that the real issue was that between Protection and Free Trade. The theory was admirably adapted to the British market and was accepted by no less an authority than the *Times*, though it may pretty safely be said that the issue between Protection and Free Trade was never present as the motive of action to the mind of any combatant on either side. There was more truth in the allegation that the Federals were fighting for the unity of the Republic, and in that sense, for territorial greatness, which the censors, preachers themselves of British aggrandizement without limit, seemed to think a shockingly selfish and immoral aim. Yet no fact in history is more certain than that slavery after all was the real cause of the conflict, as the abolition of slavery was its one great result. The collision between those two antagonistic systems of society founded, one on slavery, the other on Free Labor, had been long foreseen and foretold by all competent observers ; every circumstance of the secession, geographical or social, squared with this account of its origin, none squared with any other account ; and the Slaveowner flaunted his flag in the face of humanity as openly as the boldest buccaneer. Now again, consciences a little troubled it may be by the doings and the history of the Ottoman, perhaps also in some instances by the memory of Christian professions, which may reasonably be supposed to haunt the supporters of a church Establishment, quiet their misgivings with a very convenient theory of motives. It is all Russian ambition. Russia is carrying into effect the will of Peter the Great, that document which

is supposed to possess the unique power of swaying the councils of exceedingly shrewd and unimaginative statesmen, not a few of them foreigners, through successive generations. Any other pretext is hypocrisy, like the pretence of the North that it was fighting to emancipate the negro. Yet Europe has pronounced that the kingsmen and co-religionists of the Russians under the Turkish rule are intolerably oppressed ; and the judgment of Europe received an appalling confirmation in the Bulgarian massacre of last autumn. We were rebuked for thinking that the members of the English Cabinet could fail to be deeply moved by that massacre, though the language of the Prime Minister, the attitude of the Government, and the tone of its organs furnished some excuse for our mistake ; and why should we not suppose that the emotion extended to the Czar and his people ?

The sympathy of the Russians with their brethren, be it reasonable or be it unreasonable, is surely the obvious cause of the war ; it is a perfectly sufficient cause, similar appeals to their feelings having, before now, led nations to take arms ; it extends to other members of the Slav race, who can hardly be supposed to be affected by the will of Peter the Great. No doubt among the politicians and the soldiers, it is mixed up with other motives, with political and military ambition, and, as we are more especially concerned to note, with the desire of avenging the Crimean war. Still it is the immediate and the predominant cause ; and this being so, the conflict becomes a moral conflict ; to determine which is the right side we must face the moral question ; and the right side, whichever it is, has the moral forces in its favor, and all the

assurance which their presence carries with it of ultimate success.

At the time of the American Civil War, the British partisans of the Slaveowner tried to quash our objections to their cause by representing the question as one of British interests, and making a somewhat peremptory appeal to our patriotism on that ground. The Americans, we were told, having conquered the South, would certainly proceed to annex Canada ; and a fearful phantasmagoria of Republican ambition was displayed to our terrified imaginations by political seers, who, when the Americans, after abolishing slavery and restoring the Union, quietly laid down their arms, must for a moment have found the privacy of the inner chamber more congenial than the publicity of the platform. With these reasoners to be Secessionist was to be a loyal Englishman, to be on the side of the Union was to be a traitor. And if there was not much of courtesy or liberality in the argument, there was at least this much of reason, that the Americans, stung by the taunts of our Conservative Press, and by the bearing of our Government in the *Trent* affair, had uttered menaces against Canada, to which, when victorious, with half a million of men in arms and the frontier perfectly open, they were unquestionably able to give effect. Their forbearance was a signal rebuke to the prevalent theory, tendered as the basis for our foreign policy and for our military expenditure, that our neighbors, though as civilized as ourselves and equally within the pale of morality, will, as a matter of course, do us mischief whenever they have the power ; and this even though they would be doing themselves a greater mischief at the same

time, as the good sense of the Americans told them that they would in incorporating Canada with their Union against her will. And now again we are told that this war between Turkey and Russia is the touchstone of our patriotism, and that it has shown who among Englishmen are faithful to the national interest and who are not. The plea of invincible ignorance is not allowed to the misbelievers, who are assumed to be conspiring against their country, notwithstanding their apparent stake in its welfare. The three British interests supposed to be involved, as we have now the official authority of Lord Derby for saying, are the security of the Suez Canal, the restriction on the passage of the Dardanelles, and the exclusion of Russia from Constantinople. As to a Russian invasion of India, the peril of which once figured in the list, it is a bugbear of which, by this time, all but pundits must be ashamed ; while a more real danger may possibly arise from the appeals made to the religious feeling of the Mahometans in India on behalf of Turkey.

The security of the Suez Canal is threatened by no human being ; it is safe, if we will only be quiet and neighborly, under the guardianship of universal commerce ; and the touch-me-not manifestoes about it are gratuitous displays of "spirit." That free access to the Mediterranean can for ever be denied to Russia is a position publicly maintained by Lord Derby, but privately abandoned, not to say derided, by the more rational members of his party. The question as to Constantinople is more serious, though its gravity has been a good deal exaggerated by the fancy which inflates the actual importance of the place up to the measure of its historical re-



noun. A similar illusion prevailed about Rome, the occupation of which by the Italian Government was looked forward to as an event pregnant with momentous consequences, but when it actually took place would scarcely have stirred the world had it not been for the presence of the august prisoner of the Vatican and his inspired lamentations. Constantinople, as the capital of a second-rate or third-rate power, would still be the Eastern Rome of history ; but it is difficult to see why she would be much more formidable than the Western Rome to the world in general or to England in particular. And the capital of a second-rate or third-rate power she might have been, had the British Government loyally and with singleness of mind done its duty to England and to Europe, instead of angling for popularity by an ostentatious investment in the Suez Canal, and by the series of empty demonstrations styled a spirited foreign policy. The war with all its horrors might then have been averted, and the process of conferring self-government on the provinces which the Turk cannot govern might have advanced a step without violence or convulsions. The mercenary intriguer of Constantinople is not, like the rural Turk, a desperate fanatic ; he would have listened to proposals firmly urged by those who had power to enforce them rather than risk the loss of his place and his opportunities of peculation. As it is, with the prospect of a prolonged war, ending perhaps with a defeat of the Turks under the walls of their capital, the destiny of Constantinople is no doubt a matter for reasonable anxiety ; though not more so, for anything that we can see, to England than to those other nations whose Governments, in-

stead of perpetually displaying their irritability and spleen, quietly observe in the spirit as well in the letter the neutrality to which they have pledged themselves, show a decent recollection of the judgment delivered by themselves at the Conference, and await with dignity and calmness the season for a renewed attempt to effect a settlement of the Eastern Question. But Liberals, admitting that there is this ground for apprehension and vigilance, and utterly abjuring any disposition to favor Russian aggrandisement (which, in truth, it would be preposterous to ascribe to them), feel, as they did in the case of the war between Free Labor and Slavery, that the question of right is paramount, and that no less worthy object can be permitted to warp their judgment or misdirect their sympathies in presence of the great interests of civilization. The deliverance of a large and fruitful portion of the common heritage of man, with the promising races which inhabit it, from a foul and blighting tyranny, is the first consideration even in a commercial point of view ; diplomatic arrangements, though important, are secondary in importance as well as more remote. Our national interests are our immediate care, and to guard them is the special duty of English statesmen ; but the interest of England cannot be severed from that of the community of nations. Nothing which is good for that community can be really bad for any member of it. It cannot be too plainly stated that there are people who avowedly take this ground, who firmly believe that the opinion of the world is moving in this direction, and who receive imputations of "pseudo-philanthropy," "fanaticism," "want of patriotism," "treason," and all the angry vocabulary

of Chauvinism with the calmest resignation. Chauvinism has not so prospered in its native France, nor done such things for her, that it can well demand unquestioning allegiance here.

Indifference to the honor of the country does not necessarily go with the dislike of a selfish and narrow separatism in the pursuit of English interests. Indifference to the honor of the country will hardly be laid to the charge of those who strove to save England from the humiliation which was the inevitable consequence of sending out *Alabamas*; and we hardly see why it should be laid to the charge of those who would have put upon the Turk the pressure necessary to make him redeem his pledges to us, and our pledges to the Christians, instead of allowing him to send the representative of England with contumely away. If the epithet treasonable had been applied to the ministerial journals which did their best to fortify the Turk in his resistance to the demands of Lord Salisbury, and which exulted over the failure of the Ambassador, they might perhaps have passed it on to the Government, but they could hardly have convinced us that it was wholly out of place. Not that Lord Salisbury personally deserved much commiseration. Posterity will be apt to ask what business he had in that galley? When he had given the world to understand, over and over again, that he thought certain people not trustworthy, why did he help to make them masters of the destinies of his country and commit his own honor as a statesman to their hands? He will have reason, we suspect, before he comes to the end of this affair, to acknowledge that for him, as well as for humbler men, the plainest and most obvious course of action is the best.

So long as slavery was the reproach of the American Republic, the enemies of the Republic in this country were never tired of pointing the finger of righteous indignation against slavery. But no sooner did the Republic try to rid itself of slavery, and slavery to destroy the Republic, than a total change of sentiment took place ; it was discovered that the evils of slavery had been grossly overstated by fanatics and pseudo-philanthropists ; that great misconceptions had prevailed about it, that it was only "a peculiar mode of hiring," and in fact rather a patriarchal and beneficent institution. We have something like a parallel to this in the sudden appreciation of the virtues of the Mahometan, and of the vices of those who are the victims of his oppression. But there are two points of difference between the cases. Not even the most fervent hater of American slavery, not Mr. Wendell Phillips himself, would say that the vices or crimes of the Slaveowner had ever equalled the vices or crimes of the Turk. Nor did there stand recorded against the Slaveowner a judgment of such overwhelming authority, and furnishing so decisive a warrant for the suppression of the tyranny by any one who would undertake the task, as that judgment passed by the combined Governments of Europe on Turkish misgovernment, which cannot be too often recalled to our minds. Talk of secret societies and Panslavic agitations ! What instigation to rebellion have the subject races received from any quarter so strong as the solemn declaration of England and the other powers that they were denied the common rights of men ?

Sympathy with the weak is pleaded in the case of the Turk, as it was pleaded in the case of the Slaveowner, by way

of giving a chivalrous aspect to what might perhaps be felt in itself to be rather a questionable predilection. Sympathy with the weak is infinitely to be commended ; but we should have thought that the weak in the former case were the slaves, and in the present the Christian subjects of the Turk.

The respective conduct of the belligerents, in point of humanity and observance of the laws of civilized war, is again the subject of bitter controversy ; and careless readers of the charges and countercharges, unwilling to examine the evidence and confused by the angry din, are apt now, as on the former occasion, to seek repose in the conclusion that one side is as bad as the other. But one side was not as bad as the other in the American war. Andersonville was a hideous reality : it has been proved by incontestable evidence to have been so ; while we speak as eyewitnesses in saying that the Confederate soldiers in the prison camps and prison hospitals of the North were treated with perfect humanity, and suffered no hardship not inseparable from the condition of prisoners of war ; though at the very time of our visit, the partisans of the South in this country were describing the Confederate prisoners as dying in heaps under maltreatment, and were calling for subscriptions to save them from starvation. We will venture to say that few English peasants were enjoying such "starvation" as the Confederate soldiers in the prison camp at Chicago and in the prison hospital at Baltimore. The testimony of the English and German officers at the seat of war, even of those who, being in the Turkish camp, may be supposed to regard things rather from the Turkish point of view sufficiently proves to all who have not closed their ears

against the proof, that, though war is always ferocious and always heart-rending, the soldiers of Russia maintain, by their comparative humanity, the claim of their country to a superior civilization. It is certain that they habitually give quarter, and respect the general laws of war ; while Europe has had to remonstrate with the Turks on their flagrant breaches of the Geneva Convention, and the challenge addressed to them, if they give quarter, to state the number of prisoners in their hands, remains unanswered. As to the Bashi-Bazouks (who it must be remembered are ordinary Turks) and the Circassians, we may presume that they have no apologists in a community where, though moral sentiment has of late shown some unpleasant symptoms of conformity to political objects, there can hardly yet be any feeling but that of reprobation towards the most fiendish cruelty combined with the foulest lust. The importation of the Circassians into Bulgaria, for the purpose of holding down the people by the terror of their presence, is in itself enough to stamp the character of the Turkish Government as the actual and almost avowed enemy of the Christians over whom it rules. Suppose in the days when French Canada was discontented, the British Government had imported into it half-a-dozen tribes of Indians, and upon an alarm of disaffection, had given them the signal of massacre and devastation. We do the Indians injustice in comparing them to the Circassians, though when the character of the Circassian was impugned, the Prime Minister improvised an idyllic description of their industrial habits, gentle temper, activity in housebuilding, and happy relations with their neighbors.

The Turks have been called by the same authority a historic people ; they can hardly retort the charge, but a historic people they are ; and considering that they have been four centuries settled in Europe and in contact with European civilization, their history may safely be said to be without a parallel as a prolonged and unchanging exhibition of the vices of barbarism, and, above all, of barbarian cruelty. A fiend the Turk, when his fanatical or tyrannical passions were excited, has always been, and he has always been a valiant fiend. The Ottomans who added some of the most hideous pages to the sickening annals of massacre and torture were just as conspicuous for physical courage as those for whom our respect is now claimed on that account. But if our respect is due to the warlike qualities of the Ottoman, in the same measure must our gratitude be due to those who confront so formidable a tiger in the service of humanity.

It is childish for civilians to speculate on military probabilities, of which soldiers alone can judge. But so far as the moral forces are likely to govern the result, the precedent of the American Civil War seems not to be devoid of instruction. For three years the Federals sustained a series of reverses more serious in themselves and less compensated by successes than those which have led our Turkophilists to speak of the Russian cause as utterly lost : after Chancellorsville, even friends of the North despaired ; yet the Federal victory was complete. The strength of the resistance, though unexpected, was not surprising : the Southerners were a less industrial and more military people ; as a dominant race, threatened with a change which would reduce them to the

level of their slaves, they were fighting for objects which exalted their valor to the pitch of fanaticism ; their country presented difficulties to an invader which were hardly appreciated by English critics of the war ; and the improvement in fire-arms had already begun to give the defence a marked advantage over the attack. But a Slave-power, while it has plenty of muscle, is apt to be wanting in stamina : as the struggle went on that deficiency appeared ; symptoms of exhaustion begun to be visible ; there were armies, and still formidable armies, on the frontier, but there was no nation behind them ; and at last the Confederacy was reduced to a shell which, when broken through by the daring of Sherman, sank into final ruin. Russia has had to confront even greater military difficulties. The Turk is more warlike than the Southerner ; taking his valor, his endurance, and his fanaticism together, he may be said to be about the best soldier in the world ; he would be so, at least, if to his fighting and marching qualities he added any portion of the science by which, even in war, the world is being redeemed from the absolute ascendancy of brute force. He has equal advantages with the Southerner in the obstacles opposed by his country to the invader, both on the side of Armenia and on that of the Balkan. He has an advantage which the Southerner had not, in the command of the sea, given him by a fleet built with a part of the money stolen from his creditors, while the greater part of it was squandered on the brutish, and worse than brutish luxury of the Pachas ; and he is thus enabled, in spite of his comparative lack of railways, roads, and civilized means of transport, to con-



centrate his forces and those of his Egyptian dependency on the scene of decisive conflict. He has the further advantage over the Southerner of being provided with a weapon which has increased the superiority of the defence over the attack to such an extent that an army in a good position is a fortress with an immense garrison, to be reduced only by siege operations, and the superiority of the more highly trained army in manœuvring is of little avail. Fanaticism, with forced loans and contributions, partly supplies the place of finance. But want of money in the end must tell. The Turkish troops need not be paid, but they must be clothed and fed ; munitions of war and means of transport must be supplied ; provision must be made against the wear and tear of military gear of every kind. The Turk, like the Southerner, is pretty much confined to his own resources ; he is not, like the armies of revolutionary France, overrunning other countries and using their resources as his own. We have already noticed the fact that, unlike the Southerner, he has struggling masses of disaffected subjects to hold down ; and the discontented provinces, even if they fail to compel any great diversion of his military force, must be struck off both from his muster-roll and from the catalogue of his tributaries. The Mahometans of Turkey are more numerous than the Southern whites ; still the carnage must be telling on them heavily, and they cannot venture to arm a Rayah. Russia disposes of an immense population, which railroads have made far more available than it was in the Crimean War ; and if her financial condition is to be estimated by the price of her securities, she is better off now than the Federals were at

the critical period of their struggle. The weakness belonging to her despotic form of government we fully acknowledge ; but, as we have already said, national enthusiasm, if it be really awakened, may give her much of the force of a Republic. The probability (and we can only speak of probabilities) seems to be that if she perseveres as the North did, she will, like the North, succeed.

Her motives for persevering in point of interest are not so strong ; she is not, like the North, fighting for the integrity of her own territory, and almost for political existence ; but, in point of honor, she is more deeply committed than ever the North was. If she gives up the struggle while hope is left, the blood of Bulgarians of every age and sex, massacred, tortured, and outraged by the Turk for welcoming deliverance, will cry to Heaven against her forever. It is not impossible that in closing against Russia, by the butchery of Bulgarians, the door of honorable retreat, the Turk may have sealed his own doom. The Turk's sympathetic advisers, especially the British ambassador, would do well to remember that indignation has still its seat in human breasts, and that it sometimes leads to practical results.

Had Bull-Run been a Northern victory, or had early successes attended the Northern arms, there would probably have been a compromise with slavery ; and had there been a compromise, slavery, by its political compactness and force, would very likely have won back the lost ground, and reasserted its influence over the councils of the Union. It was the protraction of the struggle which, by compelling the Federals as a war measure to emancipate the

negro, and at the same time convincing them of the internecine character of the conflict, led to the total extirpation of slavery. The early victories of the South were curses in disguise. A battle gained by the Russians immediately after the passage of the Danube, in the mood in which both the Czar and the Sultan then were, would probably have been followed by the emancipation of Bulgaria and the close of the war. As it is, the result may possibly be the total overthrow of the Mahometan power in Europe. Victorious or vanquished, we can feel no doubt that, from Liberals and friends of human progress, Russia will have earned a large meed of gratitude, or that history will number among the martyrs of humanity the Russian peasants whose valor and devotion have been shown on these dreadful fields. Great are the horrors of war ; accursed and infamous is the statesman who, having power to save mankind from them, allows any petty thought of self or of party to stay his hand. But the horrors of peace are sometimes even greater than the horrors of war. So it was said when the peace was the peace of American slavery : so it may be said, with still greater truth, when the peace is the peace of Turkish rule.

The union of the Tory party in England and the French Empire in support of Secession would, in itself, have sufficed to warn all who did not consider their interests represented by the Tory party or the French Empire that the cause of Secession was not theirs. The union of the Tory party with its clerical allies and its residuum (which is all Turk), of the Vatican and the Synagogue in support of Islam, is an equally clear indication that Russia, her autocracy notwithstanding,

is in this war practically the champion of progress ; besides illustrating in a remarkable manner the ascendancy of fundamental affinities over less fundamental divergences, however strong in appearance the divergences may be. A victory gained over such a confederacy must be a victory of progress even though it be gained under the flag of the Czar.

Nor in truth is the flag of the Czar the last under which we should expect a victory in the cause of progress to be won. The Russian Government is not an alien domination repressing a struggling nationality like that of Austria in Italy, or that of the Turk in Bulgaria. It is not a reactionary tyranny repressing the efforts of a nation to rise to a higher political and social state, like that of the Bonapartes in France. It is not the sort of despotism which the Tory views with favor and which the Liberal abhors. It is an autocracy indeed, but eminently national ; it is legitimate and not the offspring of usurping violence ; it is probably the only Government which the Russian people, in their present stage of civilization, can bear, though under its training they may become fitted for higher things hereafter. Under the present Czar it has been the beneficent organ of a progress, social, economical, administrative, and judicial, at least as rapid as the circumstances of the country would permit or any reflecting Liberal would desire. Perhaps in some things it is rather open to the charge of being utopian than of being reactionary. No rational friend of progress imagines that all communities can move abreast, or that the same organization suits every stage of political existence. There is not a

statesman in Europe whom, on the whole, and having due regard to the exigencies of his position, rational Liberals may more justly claim as their own, or whose career they can regard with more satisfaction than Alexander II. He has not only done much, but he has risked much for humanity; he has risked everything which vulgar and selfish despots prize, and to which vulgar and selfish despots cling. Almost alone in this calamitous imbroglio, he has behaved like a man of honor. There was not the slightest reason for doubting the sincerity of the assurances of moderation which he gave the English Government, and the treatment which those assurances received from the English Minister was in perfect accordance with the whole of that Minister's public life. As we write our closing words, the sun of victory, long overclouded, once more shines on Alexander's arms. His personal moderation and disinterestedness are strong pledges that the power which success may give him will not be selfishly abused. But it is to be hoped that, after all the sacrifices which he has had to call upon his people to make, he will resolutely complete his work, and not leave mankind exposed to the danger of being ever afflicted and depraved by a repetition of this hideous war.

Perhaps if Russia is victorious, chivalrous sympathy will once more wait upon success. It will be as difficult to find a Turkophilist in the clubs and drawing-rooms of London as it was to find a Secessionist after the surrender of Lee; and the homage which is now being paid by all England, including the most aristocratic classes, to the conqueror of slavery, may be paid with equal warmth and unanimity to the conqueror of the Turk.



## THE STABILITY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.<sup>1</sup>

BY PROFESSOR SIDNEY JAMES OWEN.

Οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀκοντας ἀρχομένους, οἱ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν χαρίζησθε βλαπτόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀκροῶνται ὑμῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐκείνων εὐνοίᾳ περιγένησθε.—THUCYDIDES, iii. 37.

THE British Empire in India stands alone in history. Its sudden and apparently casual rise, out of the struggle of a commercial Company to maintain a footing in the country ; its rapid development, still mainly undesigned, and in the process of self-defence ; its escape from a series of extraordinary perils, which from time to time made its subversion appear imminent ; its commanding attitude and transforming influence at present, in spite of the comparatively small number of the dominant race, in a land where they must ever continue little more than fleeting strangers, with whom the very elements wage constant war :—these and other circumstances are well calculated to excite astonishment, and to provoke inquiry as to the stability of so unique a political fabric. Such an inquiry, if honestly conducted, can hardly be an unprofitable, though it may well seem a thankless task ; especially when attempted by one, who may be insensibly

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biased by the terrible reminiscences of life in India during the awful crisis, when the fountains of the great deep of disaffection were opened, and the pillars of our imperial structure rocked to their base. In such an investigation, optimism and pessimism are alike out of place. A practical and commercial nation should be prepared to take stock calmly of the actual outcome and ulterior tendency of its greatest trading venture, its most costly military investment, its most arduous political achievement.

The rule of the foreign conqueror must always be precarious. In this case, indeed, among a large part of the population, there is less aversion than in many others to the mere fact of the government being in the hands of strangers ; for independently of the merits of the English administration, and the long-confirmed habit of subjection to foreign sway, there is, as far as we can judge, a strange indifference to the question, whose rule it is, so that the rule be tolerable, and compatible with the enjoyment of certain civil rights, traditional usages, and religious practices.

But, on the other hand, there are obviously many special circumstances, which, in spite of the undisputed ascendancy of the ruling race, contribute to impair its influence, and threaten the stability of its sway. The remoteness of England may seem a mere military disadvantage, much mitigated by our possession of intermediate stations. But it is more than this, and closely connected with our most serious danger. The tropical climate ; the impossibility of transmitting to an Indian-born posterity the vigor of the European constitution,—of promoting general intermarriage between the



conqueror and the conquered,—of propagating Christianity to any, politically speaking, considerable extent ; the social estrangement between the European and the native, inevitable not only from Hindoo caste and food regulations, but from the conventional and rigid seclusion of women among almost all classes of Asiatics ; the want of sympathy, not to say the mutual repulsion, between a large portion of the ephemeral immigrants and the bulk of those, who present to the casual observer so much that is unattractive, and have too often very slight temptation to overcome their own dislike of the *Feringhee* and exhibit their latent good qualities ; the Englishman's constant thought of returning home, the native's habit of regarding him as a mere bird of passage ; the perpetual non-residence of the Sovereign, and the rapid succession of Viceroy and their subordinates ;—all combine to make the British Empire in India little more in reality than a gigantic, vigorous, and admirable bureaucracy, guarded in the discharge of its multifarious functions by a strong army, European and native.

In vain, in this respect, was the Company's trading monopoly destroyed. The Anglo-Indian merchant goes home "for good" far sooner than the civilian. The civilian himself is now, very commonly, unconnected by family antecedents with the service. And he visits England oftener than of old, and has his heart far less than formerly in India, and in native associations. Railways and steam-vessels enable him to mix more freely with his own countrymen, and to be much less of a *junglewallah* than Munro, or even than John Jacob, could have been. In vain the cry for colonization was

at last granted. The planter cannot become a genuine colonist. He cannot plant a sturdy and abiding family tree. The army is even less identified with the country and the people than in old days. For good or for evil, the "Company's Europeans" have become general service corps. The improved *morale* of sepoy officers, the formation of the Staff Corps, and the cessation of frequent hostilities, have together relaxed the close bonds of sympathy which once made the European officer's regiment his home for life. The very bishops are more transitory than of old. In short, the English are *in* India, but not *of* India—more numerous, more generally diffused, more powerful than in days gone by; but less even than then a component part of the permanent population; and as absolutely debarred as ever from completing their conquest by fusion with the conquered, and the harmonious adjustment of the rival pretensions and ideas, that must ever conflict so perilously until such a fusion can be effected.

The anomalous and perplexing structure of our Government, however compatible at present with working order, involves the potential elements of much discord and commotion, which the sensitiveness and ambition of native Princes, the self-confidence and energetic political propagandism of the educated class of our native subjects, the sinister influence of the seditious in India, the lively remembrance there of old political arrangements, and the half-informed dogmatism and rash speculations of politicians in England, may one day develop into dangerous activity.

Our government at home, and in most of the colonies, is

strictly constitutional. But the government of India, however wise and benevolent, is still despotic, and irresponsible to the people in our own territories ; while our influence is hardly less masterful, on critical points, over our avowed dependents and nominal allies, whatever amount of self-government they may be permitted to exercise in an ordinary way. Thus we have a combination somewhat resembling what would have been presented, had the Doge of Venice been elected Emperor at Constantinople, on the so-called Latin conquest ; though British rule in India is as much in advance of the limited control which a Venetian Emperor would have been able to maintain in the Byzantine dominions, as English monarchical constitutionalism is in advance of the dark and grim aristocratic republicanism of the Bride of the Sea.

Whether it is not expedient to recognize in our imperial nomenclature the “ un-English ” fact of this despotic authority — *τυραννίδα ἔχουσιν τὴν ἀρχήν*—and on what account, will be considered later. And if so, it will appear why we are exposed to inconvenience and possible danger from the strong manifestations in England against any such recognition. And as talking, or even dreaming, of constitutionalism in the East, may not be a very desirable proceeding at home : so, it may be added, such experiments as the late trial of the Guikwar are not very encouraging examples of the result of playing at it on the spot.

The character of our Indian government involves other dangers. The Viceroy, if he is to command the respect and prompt obedience which are essential to our security, must

wield great powers and be entrusted with a large discretion. His relations to the Secretary of State for India are the more delicate, because he does not follow the fortunes of the Ministry which appointed him. Though this is no new difficulty, and though it is apt perhaps to be exaggerated, the telegraph has undoubtedly raised it in a new and more serious form, whatever compensating advantages may attend the introduction of that economizer of time and space. It is not necessary to dwell on the mischief that might arise from the clashing of such high authorities. And though the immediate remedy may seem very obvious, and both general regulations and personal tact on both sides may reduce such discord to a minimum, there must nevertheless be always a certain amount of risk, that either the Government may be weakened by glaring differences of opinion, or that good measures may be sacrificed to a spirit of compromise and a desire for peace.

Another and more serious risk is the danger of rash parliamentary interference, and the crude and violent suggestions of popular sentiment, influenced by agitation. At present, indeed, the proverbial apathy and stupendous ignorance, so prevalent both in and out of Parliament, on almost every subject relating to our greatest and most critical dependency, may seem to offer a solid bulwark against this danger. The Secretary of State for India is left much to himself—and his Council ; and the House narrowly escaped, on a late occasion, being counted out while the Indian Budget was being expounded. But how long will this state of things continue ? Many circumstances contribute to alter it, and to portend, on the part of the public, not a deliberate resolution to enter

upon a serious and practical study of Eastern affairs, but a growing disposition to take (if we may say so) a fussy interest in them, to form offhand and vehement opinions about them, and to press those opinions imperiously upon our rulers. Should this inclination greatly increase and become chronic, it would be hard to say how much irremediable mischief might not, with the best intentions, be summarily accomplished; or how far our complex political mechanism could bear the strain of such inexpert and hasty handling. Enlightened public opinion is invaluable. But John Bull's empirical "glimpses of the obvious" will no more avail to keep his Indian house in order, than a child's meddlesome curiosity to regulate a chronometer. In no case is it more true, that a little learning is a dangerous thing. And it is to be hoped rather than confidently anticipated, that the public may not seek to expiate its long trance of *insouciance* and obscurantism by a feverish and hysterical exercise of half-awakened intelligence.

The superficial character of our relations to the inhabitants of India, the inchoate stage of our conquest, the perils incident to its imperfect consolidation, are forcibly announced in a question, which is daily becoming more pressing. Under previous Governments the natives of the country were not eclipsed and depressed as they are by us. On the one hand, the capricious favoritism of the Sovereign, and the constant warfare in one quarter or another of the land, provided, even for men of low station but of adventurous temper, ingratiating manners, or useful or popular accomplishments, a wide field of ambition and great prizes in the way of employment. On the

other hand, well-established claims to ancient lineage were much revered ; and the Rajput nobility, throughout the whole period of Mogul rule, presented a close resemblance to feudal barons in the middle ages, and to Highland chieftains in later times ; while the sacrosanct character, social consideration, and (in Hindoo States especially) the political influence of the Brahminical order rivalled those of mediæval clergy and of the Jesuits in Europe. The Dewan, or Prime Minister, in a Mussulman State, was often a Hindoo. And even the intolerant and suspicious Aurungzib gave the independent command of large army corps, destined to operate against Hindoos, to Rajput generals. The imperial palace was guarded by the same gallant race, under their hereditary tribal chiefs ; and the emperors themselves intermarried with some of those chiefs, though Oudipoor was too proud to consign his daughters even to the imperial *zenana*. In the decline of the empire, the Mahratta and the Jat shared its highest honors, and became its political functionaries ; and still later, Tippoo, fanatical Mussulman, persecutor of Hindoos, and supplanter of a Hindoo dynasty as he was, retained the Brahmin Poornea, to the last, as his Dewan.

But we have changed all that. Our rule tends to disparage the social distinctions of our Oriental subjects ; to confound classes ; to baffle the ambition of individuals ; and to stamp the proudest native—as a native—with the badge of inferiority to members of the “Christian caste,” as a Hindoo acquaintance of curs once expressed it. Both the fact and the sense of our superiority have blighted the face of Asiatic society. Native majesty and nobility pale their ineffectual

fires—native ability is to a great extent paralyzed—in the presence of a system which implicitly asserts, and explicitly enforces, an exclusiveness on the part of the dominant race equally incompatible with social fellowship and political equality.

The native States that still remain are organized in some measure on the old model, and give a certain scope to the old tendencies. But though they retain troops, the career of military ambition is closed by our pacifying “mission.” And British regulative and sustaining influence has both precluded internal commotion, which formerly raised so many new men to high station, and has much abridged the advantages of civil office by restraining tyranny, and providing better safeguards against peculation. The importance both of the Prince and his people is impaired by the general impression that the imperious Englishman holds them and their assumptions very cheap, or by the fear that he may be meditating their eventual subjection to his own immediate control.

If such is the case in States which still retain a vestige of independence, what is the present, as opposed to the past, condition of the native in our own territories? We began our career in the humble capacity of allies—or subordinates—of the Country Powers. And we paid great deference in those early days to the Prince, his ministers, and his magnates. But the progress of conquest and annexation, the gradual transference of European skilled agency from commercial to political functions, actual or assumed State necessity, and the indirect influence of our social code and estimate of native ways and character, have, over the larger part of

India, degraded the higher classes in a way and to an extent that may well seem appalling, if not intolerable, to those who recall the older state of things. The noble may display, at the Viceroy's Durbar, the familiar finery, and wrangle for precedence with his rivals in rank, and brothers in blood and color. But he knows too well that he is a cipher in English estimation, and of less political 'account than many a young civilian. The Brahmin may still be regarded with reverence, though with very far diminished reverence, by the diminishing class of orthodox Hindoos ; he may still engage in petty political jobs ; he may enter our subordinate service, either civil or military. But our ascendancy is fatal to all the old objects of his higher ambition. The native gentleman may enrol himself in a Silidar corps, and affect the external form and deportment of the old "free lance" service in which his ancestors distinguished themselves. But what opportunities is he likely to enjoy for the serious exercise of his vocation, except in riding down insignificant border plunderers ? And what rank can he hope to attain ? The sepoy is a man of worship among his people. But no native can aspire even to command a regiment. The civil service has been thrown open to natives ; but are they likely to be preferred to very eminent posts in it ? And the necessity for competing for entrance to it *in England* is, in the case of Hindoos, almost prohibitive. Thus on all sides, and in every station of life, the predominance and exclusiveness of the English are constantly and disagreeably forced on the attention of men quite capable of appreciating and resenting the fact.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The following prophetic passage is worth attention, the rather as coming not from a Hindoo, but a Mussulman, and published at Ryde,



For this exclusion from the higher offices of the State no reason can be given, which is likely to prove satisfactory to a native, or well calculated to propitiate him to us and our rule. "India for the English" would be an impudently selfish provocative of disaffection. That we cannot trust the native in important stations, lest he should abuse his opportunities of turning against us, is both a national vote of want of confidence in him, and an implied confession that he has substantial reasons for risking great personal advantages in the attempt to throw off our obnoxious yoke. That he is not fit to fulfil the duties of such a station, *he* will be slow to admit, and *we* might, in many cases, find difficult to prove—at least prior to experience. "You Elphinstone Professors," a thoughtful Brahmin once said to the writer, "are always recommending to us a social revolution, but you never advocate a political one." And he proceeded to explain, that to educate their women, and give them more freedom, seemed to him a very Isle of Wight, in 1848, in a pamphlet entitled, "Notes and Opinions of a Native on the present state of India and the feelings of its People :"—

"India has, for a long period, been governed by foreigners. The Hindoos were not so jealous of the Mahomedan rule as they are now of the English, because, under the former, they were not excluded from a share of power in the management of their own country, nor were they so heavily taxed in several shapes; but, if they continue depressed as they are, it will not be surprising if, in self-defence, they may some day or other rise to rescue themselves from the starvation and thralldom to which they are now exposed, and when the dry materials have once caught fire, it will be difficult to arrest the rapid progress of the flame. They are certainly treated as contemptuously by many of their European masters as the animals of the forest. The natives have become proverbial among the English for all sorts of vices in the world, although the accusers will not be found, on a fair trial, with very few exceptions, to be free from so serious a charge. For any bad act, it is generally in the mouth of an officer, 'How like a native!'"

inadequate measure of reform, unless accompanied or followed by the restoration to the natives of the government of their own country.

Thus the cry for "Home Rule" in India may be seriously raised before many years are over ; and if raised at an inconvenient crisis, and aided by other influences, might become extremely embarrassing.

The want of sympathy, or rather the positive estrangement, amounting too often to strong antipathy, between our countrymen and the natives, is an evil of long standing, and likely, it is to be feared, to increase rather than diminish. To explain it fully would require more space than can here be spared, as well as very delicate handling, and at the same time very plain speaking, by no means altogether complimentary to either party concerned. But some hints may be given, which will at least serve to show that there is room for much improvement on our side ; and that, unless that improvement take place, our position in the country must be proportionately insecure.

The average Englishman is not very fond of foreigners, nor much given to appreciate fairly either their good or their bad qualities. The Oriental complexion is itself a shock to him ; and he is too ready to connect it with an idea of essential inferiority, which exhales not unfrequently in the elegant, complimentary, and correct epithet—*nigger*. Nursed at home in the bosom of a society which, whatever its other claims to intelligence and mental activity, systematically taboos the subject of India as a nuisance, and attaches no discredit to the grossest and most ludicrous ignorance of almost everything

relating to that great country, except its field sports ; proudly conscious that he is a member of the conquering and ruling race ; perplexed by the peculiarity, and kept at arm's-length by the social reserve, of the native manners ; inquisitive, credulous, hasty in his inferences, confident and sweeping in his conclusions ; finding too readily much to condemn ; unsuited by temperament as by training to make due allowances, to see below the surface of a character anything but transparent, and to evoke latent good qualities by the electric affinity of an easy manner, and a considerate mode of dealing with strangers ; confirmed betimes in his innate prejudices and unfavorable first impressions by the adverse and severe judgment of the dinner-table, the mess-room, the ball-room, in a word, the general tone of society at the Presidency,—the ordinary Englishman is almost foredoomed, on landing in India, to entertain unreasonable and extravagant anti-native sentiments ; and so to demean himself as by no means to excite reciprocal good-will.

To such an observer the intellectual and moral aspects of the native races are alike forbidding. While fretting daily at their bad points, he has hardly eyes for their good ones. The faults of children, and the voices of hardened and unscrupulous men of the world ; the irrational impulsiveness of unsophisticated savagery, and the effeminate corruption of a decaying civilization ; the gloomy and unsocial temperament of the votary of abject superstition or wild fanaticism, and the frank audacity of the man who has swallowed most moral formulas ; a manner alternating between fawning and curt insolence ; puerile yet irritating attempts at deception ; whimsical and

absolutely inexplicable caprices of conduct, but an unmistakable and seemingly instinctive and irresistible love of crooked ways ; vanity almost sublime in its egotism ; vindictiveness almost diabolical in its intensity and persistence ; apathy where an expression of feeling would be most appropriate ; womanish demonstrativeness where self-respect would prescribe reserve ; a ridiculously obstinate adherence to senseless practices and clumsy methods, and a not less ridiculous affectation of unsuitable European fashions ; a general unaccountableness and uncanniness, inspiring at once contempt, abhorrence, and fear : such is the rough estimate of the sort of damnatory impression likely to be produced on our *soi-disant* critic by what he is pleased to call his experience of natives and their ways.

That there is another and very different side to the picture which, if he who runs may not read, yet is discernible enough to the patient, sympathetic, and high-minded student, who fairly lays himself out (as so very many have done and continue to do) to decipher it, we need not say, nor pause now to trace it. Nor is it necessary to discuss how far this hideous caricature is, after all, but an exaggerated reflection of much that the native may fancy he observes in the white—especially in the increasing class of *mean* white—men.

Thus, to take a single feature, a Mussulman, while the charge of treachery and falsehood was being illustrated by the events of the Mutiny, and insisted upon in the daily papers at Bombay, said to the writer, “When I was in England, I did go into Yorkshire ; I did go to a horse-fair. They did not all speak truth, although they were English !”

But such an impression, once formed, is in too many instances not likely to be greatly altered for the better. The eye sees only that which it brings with it the power of seeing. And an Anglo-Indian life, as spent by too many of our countrymen (especially of the military class), and of our countrywomen, is not generally very favorable to the development of the latent power of mental vision and moral appreciation in such a subject matter. Exceptions, of course, are admitted in favor of individual natives, but only as pearls upon the Ethiop's arm, or rather as white hairs on the black camel's back. And when to the results of superficial observation are added those of religious antagonism, traditional scandal, and dark historical reminiscences, from the Black Hole and Tippoo's wholesale murder of prisoners to the well of Cawnpore, the general effect is sombre indeed.

It is less easy to say what the native really thinks and feels about the Englishman. He may appreciate our merits in maintaining good order, ruling, on the whole, justly and beneficently, and promoting material prosperity. But if he remembers the oppression, extortion, and anarchy from which we rescued the Peninsula, he remembers also the price at which that deliverance was obtained, and may sigh after the vanished glories of native Courts, and the field of enterprise now closed against him by our predominance. He is not unaware how much money is drained out of the country by our costly European establishments. He undoubtedly dislikes many of our regulations, as the former refusal to recognize the right of adoption, and the consequent extinction of many principalities ; our Enam Commission, and its unsettlement

of proprietary rights ; our free dealings with waste lands ; our salt-tax and opium monopoly ; our abortive income-tax ; our judicial oaths ; our vaccination. The trigonometrical survey even, at one time, excited alarm, as a device to cast a spell over the land. And though we profess, and try to practise, religious toleration, our higher morality has compelled us to interfere with matters more or less associated with religion. *Thuggee* is not likely to be fondly remembered, save by its surviving and incarcerated practitioners. But the suppression of *suttee* and infanticide shocked strong native prejudices ; as did the permission accorded to Hindoo widows to remarry, and the proposal to require the appearance of women in courts of justice. Though our educational system is popular with the younger generation, it excites, or certainly did some years ago, serious misgivings and great dislike among the older and more conservative classes. The Christian missionary would probably be more unpopular, if he were more successful. And though the lower classes gain by our rule, not only do the higher lose or seem to lose by it, but the general tendency of our influence to innovate upon and disturb native institutions, practices, ideas, to break down caste, and impair the typical form of native life, is probably a deeper-seated though a rather vague cause of dissatisfaction and distrust. What is the world coming to ? What will become of us in the hands of these restless, inquisitorial, dogmatic strangers ?

And what manner of men do we appear to the native, and how far justified by our general character and conduct in thus turning his world upside down ? Whatever our political

or even our personal merits may be, we are Nehushtan to both Hindoos and Mussulmans—impurer than the very Pariah, eaters of beef and of swine's flesh, with no veneration for the Brahmin or the cow, for Mahomet or the Koran. Much as we may condemn them, it is very doubtful whether we do not, on this account alone, provoke in the breast of the orthodox Hindoo and the genuine Mussulman a much stronger feeling of contempt and loathing. Hindoo heterodoxy and Mussulman laxity may have much assuaged, but have certainly not removed, this religious antipathy, which may long survive, as in analogous cases, the personal retention, in its integrity, of the faith which generated it.

The effects of the Mutiny and its suppression, upon the native opinion of us, have no doubt been complex. But perhaps they may be summarily expressed in the statement, that we are regarded with more fear, but also (although the annexation policy has been abandoned) with more disfavor than before. It is very doubtful, however, whether the irregularities and cruelties committed by our officers and soldiers, and which have been so much reprobated in England, were not trifling in their influence, compared to two other points which have been less dwelt upon.

Previously to that awful episode we were, so to speak, associates, though leaders, of the native States and peoples, in most of our warlike enterprises. Even the last Mahratta war was connected with the popular object of putting down the Pindaries. And we became involved in hostilities with the Peishwa as avengers of the murder of the Guikwar's envoy, whose safety we had guaranteed. Thus, except in our first

and last wars with the French, which were really Oriental diversions in great European contests, and in some provincial affairs, such as the reduction of Sind, we never fought directly and exclusively for the establishment of English rule. We were, so to speak, co-conquerors with our native allies, for the general good of India, or of a considerable portion of India. Native self-respect was thus so far saved, and a sort of mutual polite understanding assumed, that we were confederates in a *quasi*-national struggle. But on the last occasion the blow was aimed singly against English ascendancy, and, though aided by native allies, we emerged from the contest asserters simply of that ascendancy; chastisers, certainly, of a military revolt, but of one that took the form of a popular revolution on behalf of the resuscitated phantoms of Mogul and Mahratta sovereignty. It was a direct issue between the British and native *raj*. Thenceforth there could be no mistake, no amiable fiction: we re-conquered a large part of India by the sword, and directly on our own account; our largely increased European army is the best proof how little we ourselves believe in the sentimental phrases about a grateful people gladly submitting to our beneficent authority.

But how is this fact likely to impress the native mind? The people of India forget assuredly neither the nature of our triumph, nor the crisis which preceded it. That England rules explicitly in defiance of native titles to dominion, is a fact in which they are probably disposed to acquiesce in proportion to its inevitableness, and to the extent to which we succeed in identifying ourselves with the forms, associations, and—*mutatis mutandis*—the nomenclature of the system



which we have superseded. Therefore it is that the title of Empress, as the English equivalent of the Mogul Padisha, appears most suitable under the circumstances. It may be sneeringly called a "Brummagem decoration ;" but if the *nation boutiquière* will and must assume the functions of imperialism, an emblematic device with the English trademark as exactly represents the actual state of the case, as Persian equivalents for out-dated Sanskrit terms of supremacy denoted the authority of the Mogul—an authority in which the Hindoo long acquiesced as readily as the Mussulman. Thus the new contrivance, if strange and startling, seems also appropriate and politic. It counteracts the old claim by absorbing it. So far it would appear to be a step in the right direction. Still, on the other hand, we must lay our account, even now, for the possibility of that old claim having its lingering attractions in the minds of the natives ; and the more so in proportion as we fail to diminish the breadth of the gulf which divides us from them, and unlike the Moguls, who entered into such intimate relations with them, trusted and employed them so freely in high office, and became so much assimilated to them, stand out sharply and jealously defined as a stereotyped tribe of aliens, superimposed, not commingled with the inhabitants of the country, distrustful, resentful, contemptuous of them.

This leads to the second consequence above referred to, as resulting from the Mutiny to our disfavor. No one who, like the writer, was at the time not only resident in India, but in daily, friendly, and confidential communication with educated natives, from various parts of the country, can ever forget the

extraordinary and lamentable effect produced on their minds by the unmeasured terms of vituperation, insult, and scorn, so profusely lavished both in England and on the spot upon the native character, and so indiscriminately applied to all classes. They were cut to the heart, and exasperated beyond measure, by censures which they felt were not only undeserved, but which the events both of previous history and of the time utterly disproved, and which seemed to imply not only the grossest, most inexcusable, and simply invincible ignorance, but malice prepense, a determination to draw in the darkest colors an indictment against a whole people, a Pharisaic sense of our own righteousness, with the equally Pharisaic conclusion, that this people who knew not the Christian law were cursed, and a predisposition to sanction and applaud the most undistinguishing severity in our future coercion of such a mass of odious and benighted reprobates. In vain it was pointed out, that such language was not to be taken literally, or as the expression of our general and habitual sentiments ; that the English nation was raving in a paroxysm of sudden resentment, horror, and fear. In vain such analogies were urged as were offered by similar manifestations of feeling on occasions of the Morisco revolt in Spain, the Irish Rebellion on the eve of our great Civil War, and the Popish Plot. Englishmen, it was replied, if they were what they professed to be—a practical, just, and enlightened nation—should know better how to control themselves, and not do their utmost to make all friendly relations between themselves and their Indian fellow-subjects thenceforth almost impossible.

Lapse of time, the recovery of the national senses at home, and the conciliatory influences of good government, education, the Royal Proclamation, the Queen's personal expressions of sympathy with her distant subjects, the Star of India, the Prince of Wales's visit, and other circumstances, have (it may be hoped) much mitigated the dangerous impression produced by the ephemeral utterances of our frenzy. But though the wound may be scarred over, is it healed? Can it well be so until, as a nation, we take more trouble to gain exact knowledge of the natives, their ways, and their character, and thus qualify ourselves for judging them more intelligently and justly and inclining them, in turn, to think better of us?

The impression they are likely to form of our national character from experience is obviously liable to the same sort of misconceptions which prevail in our conventional estimate of them. Our faults and vices are far too prominent; our virtues hidden from those who see and really know so little of our inner life. And the tendency to generalize hastily, to conclude confidently and sweepingly on inadequate *data*, and to epitomize in one confused caricature the various infirmities and bad qualities of many different descriptions of people is not confined to us. It would not be difficult to give such a description of ourselves from a native point of view. But it might be thought a fancy picture of my own painting. And it would certainly tend to aggravate bad feelings which are already too active among us. It seems better, therefore, to suppress it. But those who are inclined to deem natives very Shylocks will do well to study Shylock's impassioned denunciation of his Christian neighbours, on the ground of a com-

mon humanity. Our natural coldness of manner—or *fiercé*, as the French put it—is not conciliatory. Our idle, minute, and obtrusive curiosity, as distinct from real and benevolent sympathy, irritates Orientals, who are tenacious of their peculiarities, and very resentful of ridicule. Our persistent endeavours to convert them to a religion, the fundamental principles of which seem to be still in question among ourselves, probably amuses more than it annoys them. Our haste to be gone, when we have compassed our personal ends in the country, and secured an adequate share of its wealth, does not promote a sense of brotherhood, or a keen desire to improve acquaintance into intimacy. Our jaunty and patronizing airs are not pleasant to those who regard us as intrusive upstarts, and themselves as the real children of the soil, in some cases as the offspring of the sun and moon. The flattering description of “nigger” can only be paralleled by certain emphatic but unquotable references to our immediate ancestry, which such a description, if fully understood, would be very apt to elicit. On the whole, we fear it must be said, that in drawing comprehensive pictures of national character, they are quite capable of rivalling our worst style, and of showing that there is little love lost between us.

Such being the relations of the Europeans and the natives, and the estimate which they are too commonly inclined to form of each other, so broad, impassable, and (it is to be feared) widening a gulf subsisting between them, the question naturally arises: Is our political security thereby seriously endangered, and if so, to what extent? On the one hand, it may be said, the very fact of our acquisition of such an Empire, and

our preservation of it amidst so many and such great perils ; the vigour and promptitude with which we suppressed the great Mutiny of 1857 ; the quiescence at the time of the great bulk of the population ; the active assistance of many native allies on that occasion ; and our undisputed authority and progressive organization since, are the best indications that our dominion is secure, at least as long as we continue to rule well. On the other hand, it may be argued, that some of our original advantages we have lost, or are liable to lose ; that we are already confronted by new dangers ; that popular disaffection is more to be dreaded than of old ; that a general combination against us may become more feasible, in proportion as our influence and institutions tend to break down the old barriers between races and classes, and to diffuse a literature which is instinct with the spirit of liberty, the glorification of patriotism, the reprobation of arbitrary government ; that Princes and chiefs far more considerable and respectable than Nana Sahib and the Ranee of Jhansi have their serious and cherished grievances against our Government ; and that the remoteness, the size, the climate, the geographical features of the country, may make it impossible to sustain the waste of European energy and life in a prolonged contest, especially if coincident with extensive warfare elsewhere ; that if we could find the men, we might be unable to find the money for such a war, and might be thus, in one way or other, starved into the abandonment of our Indian Empire, as the indispensable condition of saving the Empire at home ; lastly, that our present European peace establishment in the East both explains our tranquil ascendancy, and illustrates the precariousness of its duration.

Assuming a pretty general and resolute disposition to dislodge us, there can be no doubt that our situation would be far from an enviable one. The elements of military resistance are rife in the country. Our own native army is still large ; and though we may entrust the artillery exclusively to Europeans, that arm could be supplied by the native Princes. Their subsidiary forces, contingents, and other troops are very numerous and well disciplined. Then there is both in their territories and in our own a vast host of *sebundies*, *peons* armed police, and others of the semi-military class, who would, to say the least, rapidly develop into very effective *Findaries*. And the wild hill races, whom we have in some instances reclaimed to a thoroughly peaceful life, in others coerced with more or less difficulty, would, in a time of general disorder in the lowlands, readily relapse into turbulent and predatory habits, and make the confusion worse confounded. The *ex-silidar*, the retired sepoy, even the man who has never been an actual soldier, but has learned many soldierly lessons in the pursuit of wild beasts, would swell the ranks of our opponents. And no people are so expert as those of India in concealing their provisions and grain, to the great incommodity of a hostile army.

But it will be scornfully objected, Could such a native force, however numerous, withstand in the field a considerable English army, respectably commanded? Under ordinary circumstances, certainly not. But two contingencies are possible which, especially if coincident in their operation, might make a considerable difference to our disadvantage—the advent of a native hero, and the pressure of a great Euro-

pean war. It is quite conceivable that a man of political and military genius, like Hyder Ally, might arise among the inhabitants of the country, and might turn to good account the lessons which he had received in our service ; that he might find many others, inferior to himself, but, being selected with care and forethought, very superior to the extemporized incapables who misled the operations against us during the Mutiny ; that, like Hyder, he might import skilful and experienced officers from abroad, Orientals, Europeans, or Americans ; and that he might thus be in a far better condition than we are wont to assume for confronting us even on the battlefield. In spite of the diplomatic exclusion of Europeans and Americans of unfriendly tendency from the native service ; in spite of the vigilance of our cruisers and of our police ; we might find too late that we had failed to prevent even a numerous body of such skilful foreign officers stealing by degrees into the country, and supplying one great desideratum of our antagonists ; especially as the State with which we were at war would have an obvious interest in thus fostering so formidable a diversion against us.

But it will again be scornfully retorted, Assuming all this, what could native troops, without a sustaining nucleus of European soldiers, effect, in a stricken field, against a large European army ? It would scatter them, like chaff before the wind. Even this point does not seem quite certain. Hyder had few European *soldiers* in his service. But by his skilful dispositions, his careful preparation of the ground, his selection of the best sites for masked batteries, he annihilated, at Perambaukum, an army large for those days, and well sup-

plied with Europeans. On the same ground, he made head, during a long, desperate, and very doubtful contest against Sir Eyre Coote himself ; and retired at last in good order and unpursued. At Porto Novo also he stoutly resisted the same able general ; changed his front during the action, to obviate Coote's stratagem of a flank march, under cover of the sand hills ; and was worsted in the end by the casual intervention of an armed schooner, whose broadside was fatal to the leader of a great cavalry charge, destined to carry the key of the position. On other occasions he did much more than enough to prove the hastiness of the above assumption. And even though defeated frequently in battle, he was never conquered by us in war. Lake in Hindostan, and Wellington in the Dekkan, bore frank and emphatic testimony to the obstinate and telling, if in the end unsuccessful exertions of the native corps in the Mahratta service, though deserted by their French officers, and unsupported by European troops. Gough was very nearly defeated by the Sikhs, though the lion of the Punjab was no longer among them. And Wyndham gained no laurels against the mutineers, whose incompetent generalship might be set off against his own. It would be well to lay to heart such lessons, and not to discount too liberally our military superiority even in a pitched battle.

It is, however, a very vulgar and superficial view of warfare which takes account only of pitched battles, regular operations, and indeed of mere fighting of any kind. The history of every country, and of no country more than India, testifies, that extensive and powerful military Empires are liable to extraordinary and sudden collapse, from the direct



and indirect operation of disturbing forces apparently contemptible, and quite inadequate to produce such momentous effects.

The Mogul Empire is a case in point. At the accession of Aurungzib it was a majestic fabric of dominion, rooted in the soil in a manner unattainable by us, mighty in military reputation and resources, tolerably organized, and, in spite of periodical disturbances and the recent internecine war of succession, commanding general reverence and a fair amount of obedience. At the close of the same Emperor's reign, it was enfeebled, incurably distracted, impoverished, discredited, practically almost dissolved. To what are we to ascribe a change so rapid, complete, and fatal? Making every allowance for Aurungzib's intolerance, and for his injudicious destruction of the kingdoms of Bijapoor and Golconda (with results not unworthy of the attention of annexationists in the present day); admitting even, what can hardly be proved, that the Moguls had degenerated to an extent at all commensurate with the suddenness of the catastrophe; there can be no doubt that the ruin of the Empire was principally due, both directly and indirectly, to "the Mountain Rat" and his followers. Sivaji's Mahrattas were originally as unable to cope with the Moguls in the field, as a native army would now be to encounter an English one. And this continued to be the case for many years after his death, and until the work of imperial disintegration was far advanced. But in guerilla warfare they were unrivalled. Thirty years of incessant and assiduous efforts to suppress them, efforts directed by the indefatigable and martial Emperor in person, only sufficed to

prove them irrepressible and progressively more formidable. Evading, until the later years of the contest, the shock of battle, they outstripped the Imperial cavalry, cut off detachments, intercepted supplies and treasure, rendered every line of communication insecure, made profitable descents on towns, systematically plundered the country and "peeled it to the bones," or levied black-mail freely as the price of their forbearance, and compelled the inhabitants to pay so much to themselves, that little was left for the Imperial treasury. The peasant found it a more profitable game to join them, than to submit at once to their exactions and to those of the Government. Thus the area of devastation and the forces of the insurgents grew together, and by the same means. Even the Government officers themselves were fain to come to an understanding with the rebels, became often their secret allies as well as their tributaries, and withheld their payments from the exchequer on the plausible ground, that the disturbed state of the country prevented the collection of the revenue. The lesson of insubordination, meanwhile, was not lost on those more remote from the immediate theatre of the war; and *amateur* looting probably prevailed even more extensively than history has recorded. Thus the moral authority of the Empire was forfeited; its military pretensions became a laughing-stock; its administrative system was hopelessly disorganized, its exchequer verged on bankruptcy; its lieges waxed more and more independent, the whole fabric tottered to its fall, and Nadir Shah only consummated its ruin after an interval of spasmodic efforts at reconstruction.

It would be absurd to attempt to establish a parallel be-

tween our own case and that of the Moguls. Our circumstances differ from theirs to such an extent that even to contrast them may seem idle. But their fate may yet serve to point a moral to us, and not the less forcibly, though our government is so much better than theirs ever was. The merits of the Mogul *régime* are not very patent to most Englishmen. And though they were considerable, especially when the clime, the age, the race, and religion of the rulers are taken into account, it is unnecessary now to enumerate them. But putting them at the highest, they can challenge no comparison with the favorable aspects of our elaborate, orderly, compact, searching, progressive, law-worthy administration. And the faults of native government, as of native character, are salient enough.

On the one hand we see a Sovereign generally vigorous and beneficent as a personal ruler, but trammelled by the necessities of his position, the immaturity of the art of government, the low and selfish tone of public opinion, and a prudent fear of putting his theoretical absolutism to too severe a test; a ministry among whom personal character or court favor is of more account than the well-ascertained limits of departmental functions; a hierarchy of Subahdars, Nawabs, and their deputies, too desirous and too capable of turning their local power against each other, and against the Sovereign himself, *jaghiredars* and *zemin-dars*, like mediæval beneficiaries, too apt to convert a precarious leasehold into property, and to constitute themselves political potentates and social oppressors; inveterate drunkenness in the royal family; judicial corruption; fre-

quent rebellions and malversation in the regular provinces ; a turbulent independence in the wilder and more mountainous districts, even in the immediate neighborhood of the capital ; the public roads far from secure to travellers ; a royal progress disastrous, as in feudal times, to the country through which it was made ; law, in spite of old Hindoo codes, the Koran, and later expositors, still retaining in the Imperial mandates too much resemblance to the casual *θέμιστες* of patriarchal times : on the whole, little progress even under an able and mild ruler.

On the other side is a government, the foundations of which were laid in feats of heroism with which the world still rings ; which has been maintained by military, and moulded by civil abilities of a high order ; which has struck down every enemy that ventured to oppose it ; which has risen victorious over a military revolt alike sudden, insidious, widespread, and perilously timed ; which has made the vast and long-distracted area of the Peninsula as peaceful as the soil of England ; which, in its calm consciousness of strength, can afford to enlist under its banners the kinsmen of the men so lately in deadly hostility to itself, and to allow the descendants of the chiefs whom it subdued to retain large armies in their service ; which has reclaimed, and employed in the conservation of order, the wild tribes who were ever a perplexity and often a danger to the Mogul ; which has compelled its former enemies, its allies, its dependent chiefs, to spend a considerable part of their revenues in defraying the cost of the force which constrains them to keep the peace, and conform to the will of the Paramount Power ; which has organized a service of perma-

ment civilians and picked soldiers, unrivalled in history for subordination, purity, humanity, intelligence, versatility, in a word, for efficiency ; which has enforced a higher practical morality by suppressing with a firm but gentle hand cruel rites, inhuman customs, harsh social restrictions, however deeply rooted in the habits and sentiments of the people ; which in successive land-settlements has uniformly sought justice, and increasingly attained equity ; which has recently remitted to rich natives a tax still imposed on poor and struggling Englishmen at home ; which has protected industry, fostered trade and manufactures, facilitated communication—not as a matter of favor, or in a grandiose spirit of ostentation, but as a matter of enlightened policy, and of right ; which, while Christian itself, and allowing free scope to Christian missionary labors, is as tolerant as it can possibly be to other religions ; which is constructing abiding monuments of its wisdom and justice in codes that put to shame the unsystematic and frequently haphazard legislation of the Imperial Parliament ; which in the intricate and argumentative mechanism of its records shows a decided disposition to ascertain thoroughly and settle dispassionately the merits of the perplexing problems submitted to its decision ; which encourages discussion, invites criticism, and has long ago unfettered the native press ; which has actively diffused popular education, and instituted Universities for higher culture ;—which, in short, has, in spite of infirmities, mistakes, abuses, even occasional crimes, well sustained, on the whole, the part of an enlightened and beneficent despot, and established a strong moral claim to reciprocal allegiance.

If then our Government is so much stronger and better organized, and so much more efficient, than that of the Moguls, and if our army is so much better disciplined, and our officers are more highly trained in the art of war than theirs, why cite the fall of the house of Baber as relevant to a speculation on our own prospects? Because it appears desirable to note the following facts:—1. The catastrophe, through proximately military, was essentially financial. 2. The military blow was struck within, not from without, the Peninsula. 3. The military resistance was not a regular, but a guerilla war, predatory expeditions, irregular, but not the less effectual and decomposing pressure applied to the non-military subjects of the Empire. 4. The character and extent of the resistance seemed at first contemptible, and was despised accordingly. And had the rebel leader been an ordinary man, it would have been presently stamped out. But, 5. The individuality of Sivaji worked wonders, baffled all calculation, ran counter to experience, and belied its familiar and positive conclusions.

Are we exposed to similar risks? No! it will be confidently answered, for we should nip the evil in the bud. In ordinary times, and in dealing with ordinary antagonists, this would no doubt be the case. But (as we have already said) it behoves us to take into account the contingency of extraordinary circumstances, and the possible emergence of an extraordinary man, such as Sivaji, Hyder Ally, or even Runjit Singh. If such a man, during a period of general embarrassment, as when we were involved in a great European war, could contrive to disseminate extensive dis-

order, and (as Hyder did) maintain it for several years, we should find our Indian finances, already so limited, very deficient indeed, and our credit would decline in proportion : we should, in the dearth of European soldiers, be compelled to rely most on native levies, when least able to pay them regularly (and regularity of payment has always been our strongest security for their fidelity) ; many of our friends would grow cold in our support, our enemies would be encouraged to strike in against us ; the natural facilities and temptations which the country and the character of the people present for looting and licence would aggravate the evil ; piracy would probably revive, and threaten our commerce, perhaps, as French privateering did in Wellesley's day, for a time (and time in war, particularly in such a war, is everything) seriously injure it ; and even if undefeated in the field, we might, like Aurungzib, be brought to the verge of bankruptcy, with ulterior consequences which may readily be conceived.

At this point it may be well to glance at our fortunes in earlier days, however different may be our actual circumstances, and remembering that the difference is not uniformly in our favor at present. Not to go further back, Warren Hastings only provided the means for saving our Indian Empire, and retrieving our ruined reputation in America, by the very rigors which laid him open to impeachment, and left a memorable warning against the abuse of authority even for such a purpose, which no future Viceroy is likely to forget. Cornwallis was fain to devote the China investment to defraying the extraordinary cost of the Mysore War. The

financial embarrassments caused by Wellesley's wars produced a general consternation, and were the plea for the adoption of a policy in every sense of the word illiberal, and which occasioned profuse expenditure later. Lord Hastings found in the King of Oude a seasonable—we had almost said an indispensable—paymaster, when Sir George Barlow's impecunious timidity had brought forth in the fulness of time its natural fruit, by emboldening the Nipalese to force us into a critical contest, and the Mahrattas to resume their plans for our expulsion. And in our own time all went well in Afghanistan, until the *baksheesh* began to fail. Then we quickly realized the hollowness and onerousness of the notable expedient of barricading our frontier against Russia with money-bags. And though we may not repeat the occupation, we may experience afresh the inconvenience of either paying or withholding *douceurs* in a country, where the daughters of the horseleech are so many.

The actual condition and prospects of Indian finance are not very encouraging. Whatever uncertainties may beset the subject, the following points seem pretty clear. We cannot reasonably count on any great surplus, even in quiet times. The revenue gives little hope of elasticity in proportion to our wants ; and if it changes in amount, the change will too probably be for the worse. The income-tax is (we may presume) a condemned precedent. The import duties on British goods provoke much dissatisfaction in Manchester and elsewhere ; and the increasing difficulty of finding other markets is not likely to abate that dissatisfaction. There is a steady set of public opinion at home against the opium



trade ; and interference with that trade would affect unfavorably the revenue derived from the opium monopoly. The extraordinary expenditure on public works tends more surely to increase the debt than to become promptly remunerative. And though the progress of education and other causes may gradually raise the standard of living among the lower classes, and discourage much idle outlay ; and native ingenuity and enterprise, under English guidance, may make more available the teeming natural resources of the country ; several causes\* render it far more difficult than at home for the State to appropriate its fair share of the advantages thus accruing to individuals. And the progress in this direction must be slow, while public needs are apt to become suddenly and vastly importunate. The Indian debt is already large ; and our very effort to rule well, and to recognize the claims suggested by our more sensitive ideas of social obligation in the present day, can hardly fail to swell it still further. To take a single, but a colossal instance. Thrice, within little more than a decade, has famine assailed the land ; and each time there has been a more imperious demand to spare no expense in mitigating or preventing, as far as possible, the sufferings thereby caused to the helpless and unthrifty *ryots*. And though a humane and Christian Government could not do otherwise, is there no reason to fear, that both the preservation of so many who must otherwise have perished, and the experience of our conduct as a *Deus ex machinâ* to them in their extremity, may tend to increase the successive demands on our benevolence, and the consequent burdens on our Indian exchequer ? If *their* habits and institutions disin-

cline them to adopt the "preventive checks to population," and *our* charitable contributions, medical skill, sanitary arrangements, pacific policy, and prohibition of infanticide and other conventionally approved forms of murder, arrest the progress of the "positive" ones ; is the consequent rapid increase of a population averse to emigrate, and more inclined to continue feckless and impoverished than to rise at all rapidly in the scale of intelligence and prudence, likely to help us to keep the debt within moderate or even manageable bounds ?

But it may be thought that, in a case of emergency, there are two reserve funds, upon which the Indian exchequer might, for the time at least, be able to draw—the Imperial treasury, or rather credit, and the voluntary subvention of the large class of natives who have amassed great wealth under the ægis of our protection. Neither of these sources, we fear, promises substantial aid in such a case. The rich native is often very liberal of his money ; and the more so, because there is not among his people the same regard to primogeniture, and the founding of a family, that operates so strongly with us in the case of a *novus homo*. And though this, like other native sentiments, is probably in course of change, hereditary English distinctions, such as a baronetcy, suggesting an approach, in the disposal of property, to the English method, yet large donations for public objects by wealthy natives will probably continue to form a distinctive feature of Indian society. *Quasi-patriotic* contributions for the succor of the endangered government, which guarantees the security of life and property, might perhaps be coaxed

or squeezed out of those who could really be convinced in time, not only that the public danger, but also their own ruin, was imminent. But there is much difference between defraying the cost of a monument that shall perpetuate the liberality and public spirit of the founder, and sinking money in the indiscriminate gulf of war-expenditure. The native, moreover, knows too well that his country has been, and is being, very heavily mulcted for the purpose of maintaining public tranquillity. He considers that he has a prescriptive right to that security, which the English Government is bound to afford "for value received." And he would not probably be very ready to open his purse to meet the extraordinary demands of a polity, whose only plea for existence in his eyes is its success, and which he would be inclined to consider had already broken faith with him, and could not fairly expect him (so to speak) to throw good money after bad. Again, we have so often been in great danger, that he would be slow to believe, and probably would not believe until too late, that the peril was so extreme as it was represented to be ; while the very representation would be not only a confession of weakness, a humiliating *argumentum ad misericordiam*, but a fruitful cause of further weakness and decline—ruinous alike to our military reputation and commercial credit. And while such contributions as could be thus obtained would go but a little way towards meeting the expenses of such a war as we have supposed, the class of rich natives would suffer much by the destruction of property that it would involve. Would not many of them also be strongly inclined to "hedge," and make friends betimes of

our enemies, that they might not lose all if we were overthrown? Thus we should suffer doubly: we should get less, and our foes more. Other difficulties might be raised; but perhaps enough has been said to show how little confidence can be placed in such a device for averting the evil day.

The proposal to strain the Imperial credit for the salvation of our Indian Empire is not likely to find much favor in England at any time. And at such a time as I have described, it would not only be most unpopular, but most dangerous. Burdened as we already are with so enormous a national debt, taxed so heavily to pay the interest of that debt, threatened with a continuance of the decline of our commercial and manufacturing prosperity, alive to the lavish cost of a *grand guerre* at the present day, spending as we feel obliged to do immense sums on experimental armaments and provisional munitions of war, which are promptly superseded by others equally costly, accustomed to a style of living which has a constant tendency to become more expensive;—we should find the stress of a great European war sufficiently perplexing in itself; and an attempt to add to all these sources of embarrassment a large subvention for India, and to pledge us to an indefinite outlay for such a contest there as the one in question, would be the surest way of producing formidable discontent and disturbance at home, and thus multiplying our political and military difficulties, and endangering our national credit, not to say the very existence of the Empire. Thus this resource seems quite unavailable.

What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? We have, it would appear, too good cause for grave anxiety, but

none for panic fear. Though many of the unfavorable circumstances which have been noticed are undeniable, some of them are remediable ; others have always existed, and our triumph over them hitherto may inspire us with confidence that they are in practice less formidable than they appear on paper ; and it will be obvious that the state of things in which their combined action would be likely to prove so dangerous may never take place ; though it is not the less allowable, even desirable, calmly to forecast such a possible combination. To do so may better enable us to see our way to conclusions of practical importance.

If we intend to keep India—and such is our present and firm determination—we should be very careful not to act, speak, think, or feel in such a manner as to increase the difficulty of administering its affairs or prepare the way for a dangerous crisis. On the one hand, to ignore it systematically, as far as possible, which most people do ; to acquiesce, if not almost to glory, in ignorance of its history, geography, political and social condition ; and to excuse such ignorance on the pretext of want of leisure, while time is readily found for much less interesting and much more frivolous studies, is not only discreditable, but it is the abundant source of much of that prejudice, arrogance, and misconduct on the part of the ruling race in India, which contribute seriously to our insecurity. On the other hand, generous and well-meant, but rash and inapposite statements on the part of those who either habitually or occasionally do interest themselves in the natives and our government of them, are very mischievous, in so far as they foster hopes which we have no serious intention of

fulfilling, and give currency to grievances which, in the first instance mainly of English conception and manufacture, may be readily adopted and exaggerated by ambitious and disaffected persons in the East, and become efficient instruments of disloyalty and disturbance.

Again, if what has been said is in the main correct, it will be clear that British interests, and the security of our Indian Empire, are little likely to be furthered, but very certain to be endangered, by the very process which is too often recommended for their vindication. Whatever our dangers in Asia may be, we may best hope to avoid them so long as we continue at peace in Europe. And so long as the seaboard of India is in our hands, and our nautical communications are secure, "out-posts of India," in the shape of new territories on the intervening mainland, would seem to be immaterial; while the additional demands which the necessity of defending them would make on our small available soldier class must *pro tanto* weaken our military position in India. But to plunge into an extensive and desperate European contest, in order to secure in the scramble such intervening territories, would surely be doubly unwise, as tending to precipitate the possible crisis which is most to be deprecated, and as risking so much to gain—not strength in the end, but harm and loss.

Once more. The policy of annexation has been renounced: indeed steps have been taken in the opposite direction, to the great satisfaction of the natives. The Oude Terai has been ceded to Nipal, in acknowledgment of assistance rendered to us during the Sepoy war. Many *sunnuds* have been granted

on similar grounds to chiefs in and around the scene of disturbance. Mysore has been, so to speak, disgorged, when half-devoured by the Paramount Power. Though the Guikwar has been deposed, his dominions have been transferred to a kinsman. Rajputana and other countries have assumed a tolerably permanent form of Indo-Britannic incorporation as non-regulation provinces, and still exhibit much of their primitive aspect under *legati* of the Viceroy. The progress of Travancore while administered by Sir Madhava Rao, of the Nizam's territories under Sir Salar Jung, and of Sindia's State under Sir Dinkur Rao, is the best justification of our abrupt *volte face* since the Mutiny ; and together with other facts may point to a solution of some of our most serious difficulties, which, however distasteful and visionary it may appear now, may one day turn out to be expedient if not palatable.

However frequently and confidently it may be asserted, that lust of conquest and personal ambition were the creative causes of our Indian Empire ; whatever crimes may have been committed in early days ; how indefensible soever may have been such acts as led to the conquest of Sinde ; however prevalent may have been the passion, however inadequate the pretexts, for annexation under Dalhousie ; the fact remains, that from Clive's time to the close of lord Hastings' administration we fought, conquered, and acquired territory principally in self-defence. The French, Suraja Dowlah, Tippoo, and the Mahrattas successively committed us to strife, in which we had no option but to conquer, or to be despised for our timidity, discredited in native eyes, combined

against, and driven out of the country. As traders, the Company sincerely disliked, dreaded, and condemned warfare. But as rulers, the wiser and more far-sighted Governors-General felt constrained to fight ; and those who refused to admit the obligation only imposed it the more strictly on their successors. And for this there were, at the time, special reasons. Dupleix's policy was essentially aggressive and anti-English. Suraja Dowlah's cupidity, pride, cruelty, and faithlessness left us no option in Bengal ; though the completion of our conquest there was due immediately to most scandalous misconduct and abuse of superior power on our part. With Tippoo our quarrel was as inevitable and irreconcilable as that of the Romans with Hannibal. And though our early wars with the Mahrattas, in Warren Hastings' time, may be justly condemned as the result of self-interested and rash intervention in the domestic disputes of that people, our great conquests from them were not made then, but in the later campaigns, which the duke of Wellington as well as his brother Marquis Wellesley considered to be defensive and quite unavoidable. The same may be said of the Marquis of Hastings' final struggle with the same people, of his war with the Goorkhas, and in our day of the wars with the Sikhs.

But not only were we provoked to fight, and thus compelled to conquer, on particular occasions, but the general state of the country, which on the decline of the Mogul Empire became the prey of ambitious and lawless adventurers, and the universal hunting-ground of the Mahratta marauders, made it impossible for Englishmen, being what they were, to endure such a state of things, so offensive to their better na-



ture, so provocative of their combative temper, and their characteristic unwillingness to go to the wall—or be pushed into the sea. *Venimus, vidimus, vicimus*. We dominated the elements of confusion, and appeased the angry storm. We disarmed the combatants, and enforced the *Pax Britannica*. But in so doing we were further and further entangled in the interior; and while some dreaded the consequences of our advance, others thought it a pity that we should not complete a process which seemed so beneficial in its operation on native India, and which promised such advantages to ourselves. Thus we were beguiled into indefinite annexation. And what the sword had begun, the pen continued, until we were suddenly awakened *en sursaut* to the formidable issues of our summary proceedings. Then we sang a loud palinode, which at least must prove that the English Government is open to conviction, and may yet be brought to see the desirableness of a further departure from principles once assumed as axioms in determining our relations to the people and States of India.

We cannot abandon the country if we would. But if our difficulties there should increase and become so obviously menacing as to incline us to seek some remedy short of that desperate measure, is there no middle course which the very facts of the case may suggest to us? Consider the original object of our connection with the country, our constant character as an essentially nautical people, our immediate ownership of almost the whole of the coast regions and control of the rest, our command of the great rivers Indus, Jumna, and Ganges, and the comparative antiquity of our rule in the most

fertile provinces, as Bengal, Behar, and Tanjore. Consider also that in the year 1800 General J. Stuart, in a remarkable paper (which will be found in the Wellesley Despatches), strongly recommended that we should confine ourselves as much as possible to the coast and its neighborhood ; that internal dangers prevented this at the time, and immersed us in the interior ; that we did our work there vigorously, conquered our rivals, repressed anarchy, and annexed territory ; —but that, on the other hand, we have preserved, in some cases aggrandized, and even reconstructed native States, which still occupy a considerable part of the interior. And we have done more than this. Under the shadow of our power, those States have become venerable, peaceable, progressive. They have produced not only highly-educated men, but able and high-minded statesmen, capable of appreciating many of our better political principles, of administering their masters' territories in an enlightened manner, and of preferring the gainful rivalry of civil improvement to the precarious advantages of aggressive warfare. That the people of India are adapted for representative government, after our model, it is hard indeed to believe. But that the Princes of India, aided by wise native Dewans, delivered by us from the bad habit of constantly fighting and preying on each other, and formed by us on a more peaceful model, may become equal to a moderate amount of rational self-government and mutual forbearance, does not seem a very wild vision of the future.

If so, might it not be possible, some day, for us to escape from many of our difficulties by a friendly arrangement with

these native States ; by which, as their fitness for self-government became more decided, and other circumstances more propitious, we should withdraw gradually from the great central plateau of the Peninsula ; easing our finances by disposing to the native Princes of territories on that upland which they would covet, and we could well afford to abandon ; retaining, by the convenient fiction of the imperial title, a general suzerainty over them, and a reasonable tribute in lieu of what we conceded (a tribute which they could better afford to pay, when relieved of the enormous cost of the double military establishment which several of them maintain, on our behalf and on their own) ; retaining also the coast districts, the great river areas of Hindostan Proper, and the northern regions, and thus commanding the same external frontiers as at present, and the resources of some of the most productive parts of the country as well as the harbors, and the facilities for foreign commerce and internal land and water traffic along the valleys of the Ganges, the Jumna, and the Indus ?

Thus our responsibilities would be lessened : we should no longer vex the souls of the natives by our visible and invidious predominance everywhere : our influence would be felt more for good and less for evil, in proportion as it was more unobtrusive, though not less available in the last resort ; and on the other hand, we might strengthen the hands of the native rulers by showing ourselves less jealous of their employing Europeans, when they chose to do so, on their own account, and in their own interest.

We need hardly fear, in such a state of things, any general combination against us ; for there would be less motive for it than now ; and we could avert it by diplomacy, by the

fear of our arms, or if necessary by actual war ; and no single State could withstand us in the first instance. And we should have ample warning if any such State threatened to become dangerously predominant ; and the rest would have a common interest in combining with us to prevent betimes such a disturbance of the balance of power in the interior.

The military objection, that we should be reduced to depend for our defence on a vast extent of exterior lines, would be less serious, considering how rapid are modern communications by sea and land, and how speedily we could concentrate our forces on any threatened point, while fortresses, dépôts, &c., could be established *en permanence* all along our line ; also how much more vulnerable such improved native States would be, than the rude and wasted territories in which we made war above the Ghats of old.

The many other objections to such a process of retrogression it will be time to discuss, when a political dream, which is far enough from any prospect of speedy fulfilment, shall find favor with any influential class of politicians. But as a conceivable choice of evils, at least, its suggestion here may perhaps be condoned.

Meanwhile, a more pressing question demands solution. Is it possible to strengthen our hold over the country, by engaging in the service of Government, both civil and military, the higher classes of natives ? To this effect some well-considered suggestions have been made by Colonel George Chesney, in his important and most instructive volume on "Indian Polity ;" a volume which, in conclusion, we strongly commend to the attention of English statesmen, and especially of Mr. John Bright.

# *THE RELATION OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE TO THE RUSSO- TURKISH WAR.<sup>1</sup>*

BY EDWARD A. FREEMAN, D.C.L.

SINCE I last opened my mouth on Eastern matters in the *Contemporary Review*, a new and important chapter of the history of Europe has opened. The war has begun. The championship of right from which the rest of Europe shrank has been taken up by one European nation single-handed. And because the rest of Europe shrank from that championship, that one nation has necessarily taken up the work in arms. Because the powers of Europe, above all because the present rulers of England, decreed beforehand that the Conference of last December should be a mockery, therefore the work which those powers together might have done in the way of peace has now to be done by one of them in the way of warfare. The result is to be deplored. It is not for the good of Europe, it is not for the honor of England, it is not for the highest good of the South-Eastern lands themselves, that their fate should be fixed or even that their deliverance should be brought about, by Russia only. Their deliverance

<sup>1</sup> THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August, 1877.

should have been the work of Europe ; it should specially have been the work of England. But whose is the fault that it is otherwise ? It is assuredly not the fault of the enslaved nations themselves. They look to free England rather than to despotic Russia as the deliverer for whom they long. But if free England stands aloof and despotic Russia comes to their help, who shall blame them for accepting the only help which is offered to them ? And who can blame the one power which has gone forth to their help, the one power which, when all others have shrunk from the common duty, has stood forth to do it alone ? Does Russia go forth alone to do the work which England and Russia should have gone forth side by side to do ? The blame lies not with Russia ; it lies with the feeble policy which declared, before the Conference began, that, come what might, England would only talk and not act. Does Russia go forth to do in arms what England and Russia together, what certainly all Europe together, might have done without arms ? Again, the blame does not rest with Russia ; it rests with the feeble policy which encouraged the barbarian to resistance when a few firm words would have brought him to his knees. It was thought to be part of the miraculous wisdom of Lord Derby to warn the Turk that England would do nothing for him ; but it was also part of the same miraculous wisdom to assure the Turk that England would do nothing against him. The moment that assurance was given—the moment the barbarian was allowed to sit in judgment on himself—the moment Savvet and the rest of the gang were treated as Highnesses and Excellencies instead of as guilty wretches brought up to re-

ceive their sentence—from that moment it was fixed that Conferences and Protocols and every other form of diplomatic foolery should be all prate and chatter, and that the sword alone could decide the quarrel. Lord Derby's assurance of English inaction stirred up the Turk to resist, and made the Conference fruitless. But a fruitless Conference meant an appeal to the sword. The Ministers of England might sit down tamely under the insults of the Turk ; the people of Russia had a higher spirit. Pledged, as the first act of their renewed national life, to the deliverance of their oppressed brethren, they could not draw back. If the object was not to be had by Conferences, it must be had by war. Lord Derby arranged beforehand that all Conferences, all diplomacy, should be fruitless. In so doing he made war a necessity. The elaborate and vigorous doing of nothing has brought about the very thing which of all others it was supposed to be trying to hinder.

It is now needful before all things that the people of England should know fully and clearly what the struggle which is now raging really is, what are the objects, who are the combatants. On this subject the Mahometan press of England is of course busy in spreading misrepresentations of every kind. That every stale and shameless charge is brought up against Russia shows that there must unluckily be a large class with whom such stale and shameless charges tell. The falsehood of many of these tales, the irrelevancy of all, has been shown over and over again ; but the lips of the slanderers are not stopped. The most shameless cry of all is the cry of "Poland," which is now found convenient by the very party which

once snubbed and sneered at Polish freedom, as it now snubs and sneers at Greek and Bulgarian freedom. Those who have sunk so low as this we shall not bring to a better mind. But we may warn the unwary against them. Because Russia, like England, France, or any other nation, has done some evil deeds in past times, therefore Russia is to be made the object of a system of suspicion and slander of which no other nation would be made the object. That is to say, the evil deeds—so far as there is some truth among much exaggeration and falsehood—of Russian despots in past times are laid to the charge of the Russian people now. For the present war is emphatically the war of the Russian people. It is the high resolve of a nation, now for the first time for ages capable of acting as a nation, to step in and do a mighty work of right. The peace-loving Emperor is unable to withstand the overwhelming impulse of the people whom he has called into a new life. Whatever it may have been in past wars, it is now the Russian people which has gone forth to the noblest of crusades. We may feel shame and sorrow that we are not, as a nation, going forth alongside of them in their glorious work. We may feel shame and sorrow that those who represent England in the eyes of foreign nations could find no language but that of paltry and insolent carping with which to greet the opening of the mighty struggle. These things degrade us among nations as a nation. That Englishmen are found at home to slander and misrepresent every action of the champions of right—that Englishmen are found abroad ready to sell their souls for the pay of the champions of wrong—these things are matters for sorrow, but not for



shame. Other nations know us well enough to measure such base slanderers and renegades at their true value. They know that the fashionable press of London does not speak the voice of England. They know that England is not to be deemed guilty of the infamy of men whose names have been struck off from the roll of her army and her navy.

As throughout this whole history, the common forms of speech to which we are used in other cases are apt to mislead us in this case. The phrases which we use every day with perfect accuracy when speaking of the affairs of Western Europe become inaccurate, and much worse than inaccurate, when they are applied to the affairs of Eastern Europe. It needs some degree of effort to avoid using such phrases as "war between Russia and Turkey" and the like. Seven years ago we spoke with perfect accuracy of a war between Germany and France; so we are now tempted to speak of a war between Russia and Turkey. But there is in truth no war between Russia and Turkey. The war is really a war waged by Russia and European Turkey against the Turks. By France we mean a certain part of the earth's surface and its inhabitants; by Germany we mean another part of the earth's surface and its inhabitants. When France and Germany were at war, every inhabitant of France was on the French side, every inhabitant of Germany was on the German side. There was no fear of any Frenchman helping the Germans or of any German helping the French. The war was really a war between two nations, between the people of Germany and the people of France. But he would be grievously mistaken who should think that there is now any war between

Russia and Turkey in this sense. If by Turkey we mean the lands and nations which are under the Turkish power, such as Bulgaria, Bosnia, and the still enslaved parts of Greece, those lands and their inhabitants are not at war with the Russian ; they are at war with the Turk. They welcome Russian aid to free their country from the Turkish intruder. Those who have read the account of the entrance of the deliverer into Trnovo will hardly believe that the people of "Turkey" look on the Russians as enemies. The Stafford House Committee—the Committee for patching up murderers, thieves, and ravishers, that they may do it again <sup>1</sup>—talk big about the Turks fighting in "the most sacred of causes, the defence of their own country ;" they tell us how the same Turks wage war "for no abstruse political object," but "for their own homes." The Duke who acts as the mouthpiece of the Stafford House people is either so ignorant of the plainest facts, or else he presumed so daringly on the ignorance of others, as to say, at the moment when the barbarians were being beaten back from the

<sup>1</sup> This question must be looked fully in the face. A great crime is being done under the guise of humanity. If a man finds a sick or wounded Turk by the roadside, it is as much a matter of humanity and Christian duty to help him as if he were a Greek or a Bulgarian. But to give help to a Turkish army, as a Turkish army, is to do exactly what I say in the text ; it is patching them up that they may begin their crimes over again. A Turkish army should be looked on as what in truth it is, an organized gang of brigands. A sick or wounded brigand, as a human creature, is a proper object of humane treatment in any shape which will not encourage him in his brigandage. But no one would send food or medicine to a brigand's cave in order to make the brigands fitter for the work of brigandage. This is exactly what the Stafford House people are doing. Compared with the holy work of Miss Irby and Dr. Sandwith, they are as if the Priest and Levite in the parable had not only left the wounded man unheeded, but had ridden post-haste to take food and physic to the thieves who had left him half dead.

wasted lands of unconquered Montenegro, that, "the Turks were waging no war of conquest."<sup>1</sup> Midhat himself, when he dined with the Taylors, got cheered when he talked about "my country," and he has since been telling the world something about "mon pays," in a letter to the *Times*.<sup>2</sup> Now it would be hard to say where Midhat's country may be, and it is generally better to abstain from looking too minutely into the beginnings of any of the Highnesses and Excellencies at Constantinople. But it is certain that, if Midhat, or any other of Midhat's kind, applies the words "my country" to any spot of European ground, he uses the words only in the sense in which, when "Taffy came to my house and stole a piece of beef," Taffy would doubtless have found some diplomatic subtlety to justify him in speaking of what he stole as his house and his beef.

It must then be fully understood that the Turk is not fighting for his own home or his own country. He is fighting for the right to play the tyrant—to play the Turk—in the country and the homes of other men. He is fighting to guard his spoils from their lawful owners. He fights in order that he may keep the power of unrestrained murder, robbery, and outrage

<sup>1</sup> This point was well put in the *Northern Echo* of Darlington of July 9th—an admirable paper, which has stuck steadily to the good cause, and which must have done much to keep the stout hearts of the men of the North in the right place.

<sup>2</sup> See the *Times* of July 19th. The modern *Βουλγαροκτόνος* writes in French. His very phrase of "mon pays," I remember to have heard on the lips of the Prince of Montenegro, whose dominions Safvet has had the impudence to call "an integral part of the Ottoman Empire." The "pays" of Midhat may therefore perhaps be meant to take in Montenegro; but it is "mon pays" in a different sense in the mouth of Midhat and in the mouth of its native sovereign.

over as large a part of the earth's surface as he can. To the fine ladies and gentlemen at Stafford House, and to the Duke who talks in their name, this seems a "sacred cause." Those who try to put a check upon the doings of men engaged in this sacred cause are spoken of as "aggressors." The "aggression" of Russia consists in the noble determination of the Russian people that this state of things shall be put an end to, in their determination themselves to spend and be spent in the glorious work. If by Turkey we mean the lands so marked on the map and the people of those lands, the Russians are not fighting against Turkey, but for Turkey. They fight to free the people of Turkey from barbarian bondage. They fight to free the land of Turkey from the exactions of barbarian tax-gatherers. They fight to free the homes of Turkey from the plunder and defilement of barbarian robbers and ravishers. They fight, in short, to free the land from the barbarian intruder, and to give it back to its own people. May such "aggression" as this ever prosper. It is grievous to us as Englishmen that Russia should be left to do alone the work which England should have done at her side. But we can none the less feel our hearts beat for those who are doing the work in which we are kept back from sharing. They have drawn the sword in the cause of righteousness; they have jeopardized their lives unto the death to put down the wrong and to uphold the right. And so God bless Holy Russia.

A high-wrought picture, a sentimental picture, a piece of hysterical raving, will be the comment of some sneerer in whom the habit of sneering has grown so strong that he really

cannot understand the nobler emotions of man's nature. But it is true none the less. Of course we cannot answer for the motives of each particular Russian, least of all for the motives of Russian statesmen and diplomatists. But we can answer for the Russian people ; we can answer for the Russian Emperor. If there be any faith in man at all, Alexander the Liberator may be trusted. If any prince ever strove to avoid war, he has done so. All his professions have been fair, and he has done nothing to belie his professions. He has done all that a prince could do to engage other powers to take a share in the work. He has borne patiently a kind of treatment to which despotic rulers are not well used. He has not only endured the slanders and suspicions of too large a party of Englishmen ; he has endured to hear his own friendly offers answered by the Prime Minister of England in a tone of insolent brag. There is, down to the very last despatch, a marked difference in tone between the petty cavils and suspicions which Lord Derby clothes in the wordiest and silliest form of diplomatic twaddle and the straightforward and intelligible declarations of the Russian Chancellor. I have no more faith in Russian diplomatists than in any other diplomatists ; but the Russian Chancellor is there speaking the voice of the Russian Emperor and of the Russian people and both of them know what they mean, and say what they mean. The Protocol had its ludicrous side. Meaningless as it seemed in itself, it was made more meaningless by the helpless conditional assent of Lord Derby. Still the Protocol, was clearly meant as a last effort to preserve peace, as a last striving to have the work which must be done, done by the

peaceful action of all the powers rather than by the warlike action of a single power. I can see nothing in the course taken by the Russian Emperor which can awaken the slightest suspicion, except in minds which are determined to see matter for suspicion in everything, and above all in every thing Russian. Old Russia had plenty of crimes to answer for, though it would be hard to show that her crimes were greater than the crimes of any other nation in her position. But we are not dealing with old Russia, but with new Russia. We are dealing with an emancipated people, and with the prince who has emancipated them. There is no fair ground for suspecting the honesty of the professions of the Liberator and of his people. It is of course vain to argue with people whose minds are weighed down with a Russian bugbear or an Indian nightmare. They will go on with their bugbears and nightmares in defiance of every argument, in defiance of the evidence of their own senses. So far as a bugbear or nightmare is capable of being refuted, those bugbears and nightmares have been refuted over and over again. There is no need to deal with them again. But there is one argument which one might have thought would be intelligible even to the victims of bugbears and nightmares. Take them on their own ground. If Russia be this dreadfully wicked and dangerous power, a power which is to be suspected and watched and dogged and thwarted, in a way in which we should never think of dealing with any other power, the obvious policy is not to let her have her own way. But to let Russia have her own way is exactly what the do-nothing policy, the *strenua inertia*, of Lord Derby has done. Lord Derby, by rejecting

all the offers of Russia, has played the game of Russia as thoroughly as the subtlest Russian could have wished him to play it. He has done all that one man could do to exalt the influence of Russia, to lessen the influence of England, in the South-Eastern lands. He has done the very thing which Russia could have wished him to do, by letting Russia appear as the one protector, the one deliverer, of the people of those lands. This seeming utter blindness to the first dictates of a rational policy might almost suggest that some subtle scheme lies behind. And it is likely enough that a subtle scheme does lie behind, though assuredly not in the mind of Lord Derby. It would be an Asian mystery indeed, a mystery of iniquity worthy of the subtlest Asiatic brain, purposely to bring matters to such a pass that Russia could not do otherwise than enter upon war single-handed, and then to find some excuse for attacking her while she is engaged in her single-handed warfare.

Russia then, in her present struggle, is entitled to the full sympathy and good wishes of all who profess to seek the deliverance of the South-Eastern lands. Deliverance by Russia alone is not the form of deliverance that we should have wished ; but it is not our fault, it is the fault of Russia, that no other form of deliverance is to be had. If any evil spring from the single-handed action of Russia which might have been avoided by the joint action of Russia and England, the blame of those evils must rest on Lord Derby, on the master who guides Lord Derby, on the party which applauds Lord Derby, and his master. Our consciences are clear. We have done all that private men could do to keep the honor of our country un-

stained, by guiding her course in the path of duty. Lord Derby, his master, and his party have preferred her dishonor. We have done all that we could to keep the South-Eastern lands from falling under an exclusive Russian influence. Whether in blindness or in subtlety, or by force of blindness and subtlety walking arm in arm, they have decreed that Russian influence in those lands shall be exclusive. I repeat again that the Russian is far too wise to seek for the annexation of Constantinople ; but I repeat again that, if the Russian ever should annex Constantinople, it will be Lord Derby more than any one man who has guided his course thither.

Since I last wrote on these matters in these pages, I have spent a considerable time, not indeed at the seat of war, but in parts of Europe which are much nearer to the seat of war than we are at home. In Greece and Dalmatia I had opportunities of studying some particular parts of the subject more thoroughly than I could have studied them in England. But for tracing the general course of events mere geographical nearness is not always an advantage. Greece and Dalmatia lie much nearer to the Danube than England does ; but what is going on by the Danube is known sooner and more regularly in England than it is in Dalmatia or even in Greece. Yet it was perhaps an advantage to be for a while cut off from the ordinary current of English opinion to see only now and then what either friends or enemies were saying at home. When I did see now and then something of it, and now that I have come back to see something more of it, what is most striking



is to find how little general opinion seems to have changed on either side. There is the same wide chasm between the talk of a small and conceited class in London and the general sound sense and right feeling of the nation. How weighty, how all-important, in the history of the crisis was the great national movement of last year, is shown by the continued sneers and revilings of the Mahometan party. That great movement, leading up to the crowning moment when Saint James's Hall answered Aylesbury and the Mansion House, did its work. It stopped the schemes of Lord Beaconsfield and saved us from a war on behalf of the Turk. It taught the little clique of clubs and "society" that the learning and science of England, as well as its practical shrewdness, were ranged against them. How well it did its work we see by the fact that the enemy has neither forgiven nor forgotten it; the votaries of evil are still writhing under their defeat. How little the nation had changed its purpose is plain from the great meetings—faint echoes of which reached me far away—which were held in support of Mr. Gladstone's resolution. And those meetings also proved another thing. They proved how much wiser the nation is than its rulers or its representatives. Those meetings, and the great meeting at Birmingham, showed that, on a vote of the nation, Mr. Gladstone and the righteous cause which he represented would have found a far larger and a far steadier support than they actually did find in the House of Commons. And if the nation has not changed, the enemy has not changed either. It is curious to see, on coming back to a regular reading of the Mahometan press of England, how utterly barren its

powers of invention seem to have been for several months together. There is nothing new, nothing but the old fallacies ten thousand times answered, nothing but the standing epithets of abuse of which one would think that their authors must by this time have grown tired. Take for instance two leading advocates of the cause of evil, who claim specially to represent "society," the "educated classes," and all that kind of thing. There is one specially dull and oracular writer, whose lumbering sentences, as they come out week by week, now and then raise a faint smile on the lips of those who understand either the past or the present. There is indeed a certain kind of amusement in seeing a man who is as incapable of following an argument as of entering into a generous sentiment, piling together, week by week, his crude masses of words, somewhat after the manner of a Cyclopean wall. The longest and most meaningless words that the dictionary can supply are shovelled together in heaps, and when any two heaps are connected by a "but" it is clearly thought to be a brilliant antithesis. When I left England, this writer was, week after week, ringing the changes on the words "philanthropist," "cynical," "sentimental." When I came back, he was ringing them still on "sentimental," "cynical," "philanthropist." This representative of "educated" opinion has indeed within the last week or two hit upon a saying which has for once the merit of novelty. He has found out that there are no Roumans south of the Danube, and he has impressed the doctrine on our minds as an important political fact. Some other week he may perhaps find out that there are no Englishmen south of the Thames, and

we may be treated to the lessons to be drawn from that discovery also. Meanwhile, as the heavy and sententious devil's advocate goes on week by week just as he went on before, so the shrieking and hysterical devil's advocate goes on day by day just as he went on before. "Atrocities and Atrocities" makes as grand a sensational heading as anything that could have been thought of when "atrocities" were a new subject. But in this quarter I am bound to say that, in one point at least, there is somewhat of novelty. The English tongue has been enriched by at least two new words, "philanthropophagist" and "atrocitarian." These are the last specimens of the "educated" English of Pall-Mall; and it may be that in Pall-Mall the new coinage is looked upon as wonderfully clever.

If there is anything the least new in the tactics of the enemy, it simply consists in pointing an old weapon in a slightly new direction. The fallacy used to be, when the doings of the Turk in Bosnia or Bulgaria were spoken of, to cry out at the no less dreadful doings of which the Russians were said to have been guilty in Poland and Turkestan. The gross exaggeration of the facts, the utter want of analogy between the two cases even if the alleged facts had been true, has been pointed out a thousand times. The evil deeds of the Russian, like the evil deeds of the Englishman or the Frenchman, are separable accidents which may be got rid of. The evil deeds of the Turk are inseparable accidents which cannot be got rid of as long as he remains a Turk. But it has lately been found that to shriek out, "See what the Russian is actually doing in Bulgaria," makes a more effective cry than

merely to shriek out, "See what the Russian did some time back in Poland or in Turkestan." It seems yet more delightful to be able to say, truly or falsely, that the native Bulgarians have been doing to the Turks the same things which the Turks were last year doing to the Bulgarians. Reasonable men would wait for fuller and better certified accounts, and every fresh account that comes in from any trustworthy sources helps to show the falsehood of most of the stories. But a worm will turn, and if the long oppressed have here and there taken the opportunity of paying off their oppressors in kind, though we cannot approve, yet we can hardly wonder. But the thing tells. Midhat himself, with his hands red with two acts of Bulgarian massacre, must needs, on the old principle of "*odisse quem læseris*," have his fling against the former victims of his own cruelty and outrage. The man who has "suppressed"—we know the meaning of the phrase—two Bulgarian revolts, has the face to write and say that the devilish deeds which he himself planned and ordered were either not done at all or were done in mere reprisal. And in polite circles Midhat is possibly believed. Most likely he is looked on as a "gentleman," while no Bulgarian ever figured at Hurlingham or at Stafford House. As for the Russians, a greater than Midhat speaks, the voice which once was Midhat but which is Midhat no longer. The Sublime Porte itself has sent out two or three circulars to say that the Russians are doing very dreadful things indeed. So the Sublime Porte sometime back sent out another circular to say that its officers never practised *impalement*, or rather that they could not practise *impalemen*\* because it was forbidden by law.

To be sure the *a priori* argument of the Sublime Porte that its officers could not practise impalement was rather upset by the fact that they did practise impalement. But Consul Holmes, who has to please his superiors, and Mr. Bourke, who has to represent his superiors, were bound to believe the Sublime Porte, facts or no facts, and very vigorously did they believe the Sublime Porte, even in the teeth of Mr. MacColl and Mr. Arthur Evans. And now the Sublime Porte sends round to say how much it is troubled by the "atrocities" of the Russians, and calls on Europe to share its grief and indignation. And some to whom the belief is convenient, though they may not lie under the same official necessity of belief as Mr. Holmes and Mr. Bourke, manage to cultivate a faith so robust as to believe all that the Porte tells them. To be sure "Sublime Porte" has an imposing sound; but it is as well to consider what the words really mean. A Gate, however sublime cannot of itself speak. What does speak, what is meant by the Sublime Porte, is simply the notorious Safvet, one of the Highnesses and Excellencies whose lies were rebuked by Lord Salisbury.<sup>1</sup> Or, more truly, it is not so much Safvet himself, as a well-known Greek traitor in his pay, who stoops to act against his faith and his people, and to lie of Safvet more cleverly than Safvet could lie for himself. Unluckily perhaps he lies rather too cleverly; the innocence and the agony are both piled a little too high; the Sublime Porte figures as a monster really too faultless for this imperfect

<sup>1</sup> In the interval between writing and correcting the proof, Safvet has fallen as well as Midhat, though not quite so utterly. It will be interesting to learn whether there will be any perceptible difference between his style and that of the new Excellency who has succeeded him.

world. The picture at once leads to that kind of suspicion which experienced magistrates feel when a counsel gets specially strong in the way of moral indignation. They know that there is somewhere or other a hole in his argument, and they give their minds to find out where the hole is. Yet there are some who are so anxious to believe anything bad of a Russian that they will believe it even on the witness of the Sublime Porte. There are some who believe that the Turkish doings in Bulgaria were really only reprisals carried a little too far. Perhaps they believe—for the Turk said so the other day—that Suleiman has occupied Cetinje, and that the Prince of Montenegro has sailed from Cattaro in an Austrian steamer. It is only fair to say that Mr. Bourke does not belong to this extreme sect. He does draw the line somewhere. Even after his lame defence of Mr. Holmes he has had to acknowledge in the House of Commons that, not only the somewhat shadowy Sublime Porte, not only the, Highnesses and the Excellencies, but the Imperial Majesty in all its glory, the Grand Turk himself in his own person, had broken his plighted word to his own Bulgarian victims.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Grand Turk himself also comes in bodily in a most amusing telegram in the *Times* of July 16th. A "naval correspondent" telegraphs, "I have just returned from the palace, where I received the most positive assurances from the Sultan himself of the truth of the massacre of the Turkish population by Bulgarians. . . . The Sultan expressly desired me to be informed that five hundred refugees arrived at Stamboul yesterday, many with their hands cut off." The "naval correspondent" seems to have been so overcome by the honor of talking to an Imperial Majesty that he did not stop to think that poor Abd-ul-Hamid—I believe it still is Abd-ul-Hamid—is of all men in the world the least likely to hear the truth about any matter. Since then the "naval correspondent" has telegraphed again. He has been to Hadrianople. The Pasha there has told him some more stories, and with the same easiness of faith he repeats them.

Perhaps the most grotesque shape which this new cry has taken, a shape which, in its simplicity, is worthy of Lord Derby himself, is taken by an utterance of the solemn blunderer who thinks that there are no Roumans south of the Danube. "It would be interesting to learn whether any section of English politicians still blame their Government for not having combined with Russia in making war on Turkey." It may be needful to explain to the readers and writers of every-day English that such a formula as "it would be interesting to learn" is meant to be a very clever sarcasm. It is however easy to satisfy our inquirer's curiosity on the point. He first puts together a long string of things which he thinks tend to the discredit of Russia, among them a number of things which he fancies have happened in Bulgaria, but which, as it turns out, have not happened at all. Then comes the triumphant sarcasm which is to silence us all forever. Yet the answer is a very obvious one. We need not stop to point out the usual confusion between "making war on Turkey" and "making war on the Turks." That is a distinction which a mind of that class could not be expected to understand. But let us grant, for argument's sake, that the Russians have done all that they are said to have done by those whose easy faith believes papers which are sent forth by the Sublime Porte. Now the worse the doings of the Russians can be shown to be, the more reason we have for regretting that Russia was left to do the work alone. We should say that, if the tales were true, Russia, like many of the crusaders, was carrying out a righteous object in an unrighteous way. Our enemies would

say that Russia was cloaking an unrighteous object under the guise of a righteous one. Let us, for argument's sake, accept this worst supposition of all. It only makes it still deeper matter for regret that Russia was left alone. Had the other powers, had England alone, joined with Russia in a firm determination to deal with the Turk in the one way in which reason and experience teach us that the Turk must be dealt with—had the other powers, or had England alone, joined with Russia in issuing the orders of Europe to the Ring at Constantinople, and in making the Highnesses and Excellencies understand that, if they disobeyed those orders, coercion would follow—in such a case, there would most likely have been no need for coercion. In such a case, there would most likely have been no war at all. The barbarian would have knocked under, and would have eaten his humble pie at the feet of his masters, as he always has done whenever he has been dealt with as a barbarian should be dealt with. But suppose the opposite case ; suppose he had ventured to resist. Then coercion would have been the act, not of Russia alone, but of the powers together, or of England and Russia together. In such company Russia would at once have been hindered alike from carrying out any unrighteous objects and from carrying out any righteous objects in an unrighteous way. Russia, waging war in such company, would have been obliged to wage war in such a way as to approve herself to the opinion of her companions. She could not in such company have done all the dreadful things which these writers tell us that she has done. Before the war began, this kind of argument was forestalled. It



was said over and over again—"Work along with Russia. If her objects are good, we shall have the honor of sharing in them ; if her objects are bad, we shall have the means of checking them. By standing aloof we lose alike the honor of sharing in a good work and the power of checking a bad work." The argument is of the simplest, but it seems that there are minds which cannot take it in. And so it is now made a matter of curious interest to know whether any section of English politicians still blame their Government for leaving Russia to work her own will uncontrolled. We who have not let our natural reason be dimmed even either by a sentimental love of Turks or by an hysterical hatred of Russians—we who, among all this uproar and clamor, have kept our heads clear enough to follow a plain line of argument—can see that, the worse Russia is made out to be, the deeper is the guilt and folly of those who have left Russia to do everything by herself. If the Russian army is doing all these dreadful things which there is not a shadow of proof—only the assertion of the Sublime Porte—to show that it is doing<sup>1</sup> the blame rests among Englishmen, not on us who

<sup>1</sup> Quite lately some accounts have come from newspaper correspondents at Shumla which are of more importance than the assurances of the Grand Turk and all his Pashas. It seems that some very ugly deeds have been done by a few Russian irregulars. The same might take place in any army. But it will be interesting to learn whether the criminals will be promoted and decorated, and whether any officers who may have tried to hinder them will be disgraced. That is, after all, the true test.

It is hardly credible, but it stands in black and white, that on July 19th, Lord Derby in the House of Lords was still fumbling away at the mere number of the victims of the Turk in Bulgaria last year. Sir Henry Elliot himself might have taught him that it mattered to no one, except

would have put a check on the action of Russia, but on Lord Derby and his admirers who have left Russia to do as she pleases. I believe that through the length and breadth of England a very considerable section of politicians will be found capable of following this easy argument, and of making the necessary inference from it. How far men capable of such a process are to be found in the circles for whose benefit our present inquirer puts forth the most grotesque forms of ignorance in the most awkward forms of language, how far such plain arguments are likely to be understood in clubs and "society," the sound heart of the people of England will perhaps not even think it "interesting to learn."

On the whole the Mahometan Tory mind does not seem to have been greatly changed by the actual breaking-out of war. It still would have us believe that it has no love for the Turk in himself, that it seeks to uphold him only because he is in some mysterious way profitable to British interests, and because, in Mahometan Tory morality, any wickedness may be upheld by which British interests may be in any way profited. Yet the inherent love of the Turk, that is the inherent love of oppression, the inherent hatred of national rights, shows itself plainly enough in the frantic joy with which the fashionable prints rush at any chance of whitewashing the Turk or of blackening his victims. The debt to the victims themselves, whether their number was ten thousand or twenty thousand. However it is something when, a little later in the same speech, Lord Derby says, "No doubt those accounts which come from Turkish sources are liable to the imputation of not being impartial." When we have got this bit of crooked diplomatic language, it is easy to do it into plain English

claimers against sentimentalism show on such occasions a most sentimental form of delight ; the mockeries at humanity stoop themselves to raise the cry of humanity when they fancy that it may do the Turk a good turn. Two things are still very grievous to the Anglo-Turkish mind. It does not like to be told that the Turks in Europe are simply an invading horde, and it does not like to be told that the policy of the present Government is a Hebrew policy. The facts are so clear, they are so completely the gist of the whole matter, that it is naturally unpleasant to be reminded of them. What is the main reason why morality teaches that no action should be taken on behalf of the Turk, that every action should be taken against him? Because the Turk is simply a robber who has thrust himself into the house of another. It has been shown over and over again that the rule of the Turk is something different in kind from the worst rule of any European power—that it is not government, not even misgovernment, but simply organized brigandage. It has been shown over and over again that the Turk has never done anything to legalize his possession of the lands which he has conquered, that the Ottomans in Europe still remain as they were five hundred years back, an invading horde, an army of occupation. This sober and strictly accurate statement of an undoubted historical fact is so inconvenient to the votaries of the evil cause that they always speak of it as a rhetorical figure. Equally inconvenient is any statement of the real cause why our present Government shows such zeal on behalf of the oppressor, the real cause why we seem constantly to be on the brink of war to maintain him in the

power of oppression. The plain cause is a cause which is purely sentimental, the Hebrew sympathies of Lord Beaconsfield. But we are told that it is unbecoming, that it is ungenerous, to taunt any man with his descent, his religion, or anything of the kind. And so it is when it is a mere taunt. But to point out an important political fact, however unpleasant to this or that man, is neither unbecoming nor ungenerous. No one has a word to say against a Jew, whether by descent or by religion, simply on the ground of his descent or his religion. There are Jews whose descent and whose religion do not hinder them from being very good Englishmen, and against such Jews no one would wish to speak a word. But the charge against Lord Beaconsfield is that he has never become an Englishman, that he has never become an European, that he remains the man of Asian mysteries, with feelings and policy distinctly Asiatic. We can understand, we can almost respect, his position ; but it is a position which cannot be endured in the Minister of England or of any European nation. Lord Beaconsfield's zeal for his own people is the best thing about him, the one thing about which he is really in earnest. But we must be equally in earnest the other way. The whole talk of Lord Beaconsfield, the slandering of Servia, the bragging against Russia, is the talk of an Asiatic. Throughout the East the Jew and the Turk are banded together against the European, and Lord Beaconsfield, as a man of the East, naturally takes the Asiatic side. So throughout Western Europe, wherever the Jew has influence, the cause of the Turk finds supporters. The fact is clear to every one who knows anything of the newspaper

press either of England or of the continent. As there are some Turks who behaved with humanity through all the horrors, and who have been punished by their own rulers for their humanity, so there are some Jews who, to their great honor, have taken another line, and who have stood forth as boldly for the cause of the oppressed as any Christian. But Jewish influence, as a rule, means Turkish influence, just as Turkish influence means the influence, not of good Turks, but of the bad. Only in England Jewish influence is unhappily found in higher places than it is found anywhere else.

This "Semitic instinct"—to use a phrase whose author I know not, but which the Turkish party seem to think it clever to put in inverted commas—is of itself quite enough to account for the policy of a Cabinet led by Lord Beaconsfield. The two things the statement of which so greatly offends the Mahometan mind in England do thus exactly fit into one another; they are in truth related to one another as cause and effect. We are called upon to uphold an invading horde in the possession of the lands and houses of other nations; and the reason why we are called on to uphold them is, because we have at the head of the English Cabinet a man of a nation which has always found its interest in supporting the dominion of that invading horde. The two facts are plain enough; but it is not at all wonderful that those to whom they are inconvenient should wince a little at the statement of them. But it may be that the Semitic instinct is not all; there may be something too in the mere love of startling people, the mere love of surprise and mischief. And there may be something in what has been irreverently called Lord

Beaconsfield's "policy of old clo'." A great part of his political career has been nothing else than stealing the clothes, or, to drop metaphor, adopting the measures, of the Liberal party. And in stealing their clothes, he sometimes shows a certain tendency to steal their rags also. The policy of a Russian war may be looked on as the cast-off rags of the Liberal party. It is an error, a crime, which the Liberal party once committed, but which it is quite certain that they will never commit again. But it is by no means clear that Lord Beaconsfield may not have thought it fine to pick up the forsaken garment, that he may not think that, if only because the Liberals had their Russian war, he must needs have his Russian war too. At all events there is danger, very great danger that way. And the danger will be tenfold greater when Parliament is no longer sitting. The people must speak. The people spoke last year, and their voice saved us. They must speak again as loudly and clearly as they did then, so loudly and clearly that Lord Beaconsfield himself may again think twice before he plunges England into a war which the national feeling of right and wrong declares to be unrighteous.

The Solicitor-General the other day, in a speech somewhere or other, "deprecated discussion" on the policy of the Government, and asked the nation to give the Government its confidence. We can understand why the Solicitor-General may have the best reasons for deprecating discussion. If I have not read his history wrongly this learned gentleman, after several attempts to make his way into the House of Commons in quarters where discussion is commonly rife, has

at last crept in as a representative of a borough which is much less used to discussion. But we should think that those who are at last enabled to have the full benefit of the Solicitor-General's services can hardly thank him for the picture which he unwittingly draws of them. What are we to think of a party, a policy, a Government, which deprecates discussion? It clearly cannot be of the same mind as the honest Roman tribune who wished his house to be so built that every one of his fellow-citizens might see everything that he did. Those who deprecate discussion must have something behind the scenes which they know will not bear discussion. It is easy to believe that a discussion of any Asian mysteries which may be plotting in Downing Street may be a thing to be deprecated by those who are plotting them. But because the Ministry or its officials deprecate discussion, for that very reason the people of England must insist on the fullest discussion of all their doings, of all their possible schemes, in Parliament and out of Parliament.<sup>1</sup> We have men in power whom we cannot trust, men who may at any moment plunge us into any mad act of folly or wickedness. We must watch all their steps and all their words, and we must discuss them with the fullest publicity of discussion to which the free

<sup>1</sup> Since this was written, Lord Derby has said in his speech of July 19th, "If there is one thing connected with the Eastern Question upon which your lordships seem to me unanimous, it is the advantage of avoiding any discussion at the present time." If their lordships are unanimous on this head, which one may be allowed to doubt, the people must show that they are unanimous in thinking that the time which Lord Derby thinks disadvantageous for discussion is thereby proved to be the best of all times for discussion. If by any chance a "negotiation is pending," then we must discuss all the more.

thoughts and free speech of Englishmen are accustomed. Our present rulers must not be allowed a moment's rest ; they must not be allowed a moment when they can fancy that the eye of England is not upon them, watching everything they do and ready to call them to account for any misdeeds. The more they deprecate discussion, the more we must drag them into the full light of discussion. The more they ask for our confidence, the more clearly we must show them that we put no confidence in them. Watchfulness, discussion, the constant expression of public opinion, is all that is left to us, while the forms of our constitution make it possible that we may have to bear the Hebrew yoke for three years longer. With the present House of Commons no good can be done. Till another general election the people must be its own House of Commons. It must speak out its mind, and it must take special care to discuss everything about which the Ministry especially deprecates discussion. In short, the work of last autumn must be done over again. We spoke out then, and we saved our country from a hideous act of folly and wickedness. The same danger has come again, and it must be met by the same means. We must again speak out ; we must again save our country. We must make it clear to all men that, come what may, we will never draw the sword to support the Turk against the Russian.

Let us now mark some special points on which it may be well to insist at the present time. We profess to be neutral. There is a proclamation of neutrality. While those are in power who actually are in power, neutrality is the utmost we



can hope for. We gained thus much by the agitation of last year. The Government has been driven at least to profess neutrality, instead of openly throwing the weight of England on the wrong side. But the Government needs to be very narrowly watched in order to make sure that this professed neutrality shall be a real neutrality. Some things look awkwardly the other way. There was something ominous in the snarl of Lord Derby's answer of May 1st to the Russian Circular. It reads like the writing of one who was afraid to bite, but who could not deny himself the luxury of barking. Or rather it reads like an expression of the sentiments of two people as the joint composition of one who had no mind of himself to bark or to bite or to do anything else, and of the stronger hand which guided the puppet, and which took care that a bark should be thrown in, if only to keep the way open for a bite at some more favorable time. Lord Derby, who had himself broken up the European concert, who had brought things to such a pass that the Russian Emperor could not in honor or duty keep back any longer from the work in which he was pledged, was made to say that it was the Emperor of Russia who had separated himself from the European concert. And after some talk about the Treaty of Paris, the Emperor was further told that he had "departed from the rule to which he himself had solemnly recorded his consent." This talk about the Treaty of Paris, the treaty which was trampled under foot, and righteously trampled under foot, by every public act of 1876, makes one half inclined to look whether the dispatch does not also contain something about guaranteeing the Prussian province of Saxony. The Emperor

is preached to through more than half a column of the *Times*, and he is told in the name of the English Government that "his decision is not one which can have their concurrence or approval." A few days later, May 6th, came another wonderful document, which however was not published in full in the English papers till June 25th. Here the world was favored with the notions of the Ministry about certain points which were supposed to involve British interests. Among these was an amusing sentence about the vast importance of Constantinople, and the consequent necessity of condemning so important a city to barbarian rule, about which I said something a little time back in another shape.<sup>1</sup> The whole tenor of the two documents shows that the policy of the Government is, while proclaiming neutrality, to keep the way open by which it can break through that of neutrality whenever it thinks it safe to do so. On this point the people of England must speak out. They must make it clear that they will not be a party to, that they will in no way endure or allow, any war with Russia on behalf of the Turk, under whatever pretext the attack on a friendly power may be clothed. We must make it plain that we will not strike a blow or spend a penny to keep the Turk in Constantinople, or to keep the Russian out of Constantinople. We have no wish to see the Russian there ; we give him credit for greater wisdom than to wish to fix himself there ; but, if he does fix himself there, it will be Lord Derby's doing and not ours, and we must make it plain that we will do nothing to get Lord Derby out of a scrape of his own making. We must make it plain that we

<sup>1</sup> See the *Daily News*, July 12th.

will not strike a blow or spend a penny to hinder Russia from having that access to the Mediterranean through her natural pathway of the Hellespont which we claim to keep for ourselves by our pathway of the Straits of Gibraltar. And it would be well if we could all of us so far rise above bugbears and nightmares and prejudices of every kind, as to let the sovereign and people of Russia know that, if their act has not the concurrence and approval of the Government of England it has the concurrence and approval of the thinking part of the people of England.

In short, we must leave Lord Beaconsfield no loophole of any kind by which he can entangle us into a war with Russia while Parliament is not sitting. We must keep close watch lest the state of neutrality should be exchanged for a state of warfare, and we must take care that, while neutrality is professed, it shall be a real and not a sham neutrality. We must find out why the fleet was sent the other day to Besika Bay. We know all about its going thither last year. We had various reasons told us why it went there. Lord Beaconsfield gave one reason and Lord Derby another. It matters not what reasons either of them had for sending it; we know what practically came of its going. We know that every Christian looked on it as a menace, that every Turk looked on it as an encouragement. We know that its presence actually did encourage the Turks in their doings of last year, and we know that, long after every one knew this, the fleet was allowed to remain there. For whatever reason it was sent thither, it practically stayed there as an encouragement to evil-doers, and as a terror of those who did well. In the

teeth of this experience, the fleet has been sent there again, and it is for the people to demand that it shall be brought away again. It is for the people further to demand that it shall be not put to any purposes of mischief elsewhere, that it shall be not sent to frighten any part of enslaved Greece from rising against its tyrants, or to hinder free Greece from helping its brethren if they rise. We must make it plain that we will not have the naval strength of England abused to give any encouragement to the oppressor, to give any discouragement to the oppressed. Of another Navarino there can be no hope under our present rulers: but we must keep sharp watch that they do not entangle us in something which would be the exact opposite of Navarino.

The present Government must therefore be narrowly watched by sea; it must also be no less narrowly watched by land. We all read the other day in the papers that this or that barbarian commander had entered Kars "in company with" a British officer. It would have sounded very odd if we had read seven years back that this or that French or German general had entered such and such a city in company with a British officer. We should all of us have felt then that, unless such a fact could be explained in some way very different from its obvious meaning, it must give the other side, whichever it might be, very good reason to suspect our professed neutrality. The people have a right to ask, and to wring out a real answer without any official shirkings, what Sir Arnold Kemball is really doing in company with this or that Turk. The thing looks ugly, and the Russians take it as it is natural they should take it. He can hardly be sent to

learn the art of war from the Turks, as seven years back he might have been sent to learn it from the Germans. Are we quite sure that he never gives the Turks a hint? Supposing he has no commission to do so, no fixed purpose of his own to do so, still the position is a dangerous one. The temptation to give the Turks a hint must come very often, and must sometimes be very strong. To a military man on the spot things must look in a somewhat different light from that in which we look on them here. There is in all men a certain temptation to be influenced by the atmosphere in which they find themselves. We see that the correspondents of newspapers with this or that army commonly pick up the tone of that army, and speak as if its cause were their cause. With a professional soldier the temptation must be still stronger than it can be with a civilian. He can hardly fail to come to look on those in whose constant company he finds himself as in some sort his comrades, and to feel something of a direct interest in their doings. Or, even as a mere spectator of the game, he may often be tempted to give a hint to a player who has missed an advantage or has otherwise failed to carry on the game according to the rules of art. It is easy to understand that an officer placed in such a position may, without the slightest evil purpose at the beginning, gradually slide into the hateful and guilty character of an adviser of the Turk. We have a right to demand that none of our countrymen shall be put in a position so likely to lead to a result so shameful to himself and to his country. And besides this, we know that Sir Arnold Kemball's presence with the Turkish army has, as a matter of fact, done mischief in another way. Last

year he accompanied the Turkish army when it was doing its bloody work of brigandage in Servia. When news of any Turkish doings came to England, the answer of the Turkish party always was that Sir Arnold Kemball knew nothing of these things. Now of course the Turks had sense enough not to torture men to death or to make parents eat the flesh of their roasted children directly under the nose of Sir Arnold Kemball. And thus the presence of a British officer with the Turkish army supplied the friends of the Turk with one of their favorite means of whitewashing their ugly client.

The people must also raise its voice to demand that the terms of the proclamation of neutrality be fully and unflinchingly carried out against those Englishmen who have disgraced themselves by taking the pay of the barbarian, and acting as his agents in his evil deeds. What can Russia think of English neutrality as long as an Englishman commands the Turkish fleet, as long as other Englishmen are engaged in doing engineering and other work on behalf of the Turkish army and navy? In this matter Lord Derby has been humbled, but he has not been humbled enough. It must have been a bitter pill for Lord Derby when he was compelled to allow the rules of the navy to take their course a second time against his accomplice in the overthrow of Cretan freedom. The tale is a short one. Hobart, an English officer, was base enough to enter the service of the Turks. By his own account, published in a Blue Book, he sold his soul for gold, because he was a poor man. He knew that his work would be to keep down Christian nations under an infidel yoke; he knew that the wages of his shame must be wrung from the

blood and groans of suffering Christians. But the lure of barbarian gold was too much for him. Enlisted in the devil's service, he did the devil's work against the men who rose for freedom in Crete. Of this work Lord Derby, his accomplice, naturally approved. In answer to the renegade's <sup>1</sup> cringing letters, he caused the wholesome rule by which Hobart had forfeited his place in the English navy to be relaxed in his favor. By the ordinary rule of the navy, he forfeited his place by entering a foreign service without leave. He remained in the disgrace which he had earned till the Tory Government came into power. Then, by a job as shameless as any that the annals of corruption anywhere record, Lord Derby procured Hobart's restoration to his naval rank, and the apostate Englishman, disgraced with the barbarian title of Pasha, was, as the express reward of his infamy, quartered on the pocket of the British tax-payer. For several years we paid a pound a day to one of the destroyers of Cretan freedom at the bidding of the other. In the present session of Parliament, the job was exposed, and Lord Derby had to give way. Hobart and the rest of the renegade gang are no longer British officers. But the Proclamation of Neutrality denounces fine and imprisonment against all British subjects

<sup>1</sup> A somewhat awkward apologist of Hobart objects to his being likened to traitors and renegades of old, on the singular ground that he is a "Christian." It is not my business to inquire into any man's personal religion; but it is plain that, if Hobart is a "Christian," it makes his guilt deeper. If he were a conscientious convert to Islam—a possible, though not a likely, character—there would be little or nothing to blame him for, according to his own standard. In any case, the name "renegade" seems thoroughly applicable to a man in Hobart's case whether he has formally thrown off Christianity or not.

who take commissions in either belligerent army. Of course Hobart, the late convict Valentine Baker, and the rest of them, cannot be fined and imprisoned while they are beyond the reach of English law. But the English people ought to make it clearly understood that fine and imprisonment will be inflicted on them if ever they do come within the reach of English law. I know full well that the rigid application of such a law might have pressed hard on many noble and heroic men in past times. But this is not the question now. I am not clear that such words should be inserted in a Proclamation of Neutrality in ordinary times. But when Englishmen hire themselves out to the Turk, it is well that those words are there. It is well that the means should be there of compelling the man who refused help to Cretan fugitives to drink the cup of humiliation to the dregs by inflicting the penalties denounced in his own Proclamation against his own accomplices in the work of evil.

Another point on which the nation may well speak out is the doings of a smaller offender than Hobart, but one whose deeds ought not to pass without some mark of national abhorrence. This is Mr. Holmes, the consul in Bosnia whose sayings and doings have been made known to the world through the correspondence in the *Manchester Guardian*. And I may say in passing that it is a great gain to have a first-rate correspondence of this kind, the work of a real traveller and scholar, a man of research, observation, and fearlessness, appear in the columns of a paper published out of London. Such a fact is a real advance. That Manchester should get as good material as London can get is a gain



not only for Manchester but for the whole country. From those letters we have thoroughly learned what kind of man is chosen to represent England in the unhappy land to which a neighboring Christian power might at any moment give peace and will not. We all know by this time what to think of any statement sent by Mr. Holmes ; it might even be interesting to learn how many inconvenient documents he may still keep hidden in his desk. We all know what to think of the man who speaks of the defenders of Bosnian freedom as "brigands." That trick is a very old one ; it has been tried by the abettors of oppression in all times and places. It is only to Mr. Holmes and Lord Derby that it can possibly seem new. But we have less to do with Mr. Holmes's words than with his deeds. Mr. Holmes, who is anxious to please his superiors, seems to think that the best way to please them is to imitate them. As Lord Derby wrote in 1875 to have the insurrection suppressed, so Mr. Holmes wrote to have the insurrection suppressed in 1877. It stands written in the Blue Book, in Mr. Holmes's own words, how he stirred up a Turkish Pasha to make a wasting inroad against the Christians who were holding their country in arms against him. The effect of Mr. Holmes's advice has been told us by Miss Irby and by Mr. Evans. No small part of the wretchedness which good English hearts are now trying to relieve is the direct work of this English consul. The superiors whom he strove so hard to please of course strive to shelter him. Mr. Bourke did his best. But the English people will hardly be satisfied with Mr. Bourke's best. It is for them to say, with a voice which Mr. Holmes's superiors can understand whether

it is their will that a man should receive the pay of England as a representative of England, while his work seems chiefly to consist in stirring up a barbarian oppressor to do even worse than he would have done out of his own heart towards a Christian people who are fighting against him, like Gideon or like Hereward, for their faith, their freedom, and their own land.

Such are some of the main points on which it is most needful that that discussion which the Ministry naturally deprecates should be carried out into every detail. Every trick must be looked into ; every job must be unearthed ; we must watch our present rulers as we would watch men who may at any moment hurry us into a course no less ruinous than wicked. Meanwhile it may be well to give a few words to one or two special incidents which have happened since the war began, and to one or two features of the war itself, as they appeared to one who had the means of watching the ins and outs of some of its less prominent sides. To glance first at home matters, Lord Derby at least is unchanged. He is no nearer to understanding the great events in which the irony of fortune has made him an actor than he was when he thought that he had only to write a letter and the insurrection could be "suppressed." It must have been a sight to see him and Midhat side by side at the Merchant Taylors' feast. There was the cold heart, the blinded understanding, whose one notion of a patriotic uprising was that it was a thing to be "suppressed." There was the subtle brain and the bloody hand which had so well carried out the counsel of his

English adviser. At that feast it was that Midhat had the impudence to talk about "my country." Possibly, in a gathering of English Conservatives, Midhat adopted the dialect of English foxhunters, and by Midhat's "county" we may understand that part of the earth's surface where Midhat, while he had the power, sought and found his human game. But at the same banquet Lord Derby uttered one of those memorable sayings which, in their grotesque simplicity, at least show that he means what he says. Lord Derby at all events altogether disclaims the character of a prophet. When he had to answer the circular announcing the Russian declaration of war, he made himself quite clear on this score. "It is impossible," he tells the Russian Chancellor, "to foresee the consequences of such an act." So at the Merchant Taylors' dinner he complained in pathetic tones that even a wise man could not foresee the future. Here is the genuine honest utterance of a puzzled man placed in the middle of great events which have outrun alike his management and his understanding. It has the same ring as Lord Derby's exclamation of surprise when he found that the insurgents were "fighting, not for administrative reforms, but for independence." The truth of either discovery cannot be doubted. The wisest man cannot foresee the future ; that is, he cannot foresee the future in all its details and all its bearings. In the course of a series of great events, such as those which are now going on, a great deal is sure to happen which the wisest man did not at the beginning expect to happen. Still there is a sense in which a wise man, or even any man of common understanding, can foresee the future. Coming

events do cast their shadows before them, and any man who is not specially blind can learn something by marking the direction of those shadows. Any man who had his eyes open could have seen that there was a great deal more in the revolt of 1875 than Lord Derby saw in it. It needed a special blindness, the blindness of one high-gravel-blind, one *λημῶν χυλοκύνταις*, as the comic poet puts it—the blindness in short of one to whom the great causes, the deep-set feelings, which stir the hearts of nations and make the course of history are altogether a sealed book—it needed such blindness as this to deal with the events of the two last years as Lord Derby has dealt with them. It is one of the odd contradictions in human affairs that, when a man is only moderately dull, moderately blind, his blindness and dulness get found out. When he is preternaturally dull, preternaturally blind, so blind as to think that the great movement of the Slavonic people could be suppressed out of hand, then he gets a reputation for wisdom, and he naturally wonders that the wisdom which he is told that he possesses does not enable him to foresee future events.

Unhappily however those who are too blind to understand the course of history have sometimes, through their very blindness, a hand in guiding its course. It was partly because Lord Derby could not understand the meaning and greatness of the insurrection that the insurrection has grown into all that it has since grown into. The war began. Lord Derby and his colleagues had taken care that England should give no help to the right side ; the people of England had taken care that England should give no help to the wrong

side. So the proclamation of neutrality came. As the Turk could not be helped in any more practical way, he might at least be consoled by a sounding title. Lord Beaconsfield, who has a fancy for imperial creations, was perhaps pleased to see his friend the "Emperor of the Ottomans" put on a level with the Emperor of all the Russias. Yet one thought perhaps might have struck him, the thought that he had justified his former Imperial creation on the ground that the formula of "Empress of India" would have a kind of magic effect, that the talismanic words had only to be uttered in order to check all aggressions on the part of Russia, in order to make every rood of our Indian Empire secure for ever. It is somewhat singular after this that the Cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield should have been driven to use the ordinary forms of diplomatic intercourse, to use conferences, protocols, proclamations, and the rest, when, by Lord Beaconsfield's own account, every object might have been gained, every danger might have been warded off, by the simple process of shouting the world "Empress." However this simpler course of action seems to have been forgotten, and a solemn proclamation was thought needful to guard British rights and British interests. The proclamation was no doubt worded after the manner of other such proclamations, and a grotesque proof was thus given of the way in which all ordinary language simply misleads when it is applied to the present case. To the undoubted fact, that there was war between the Emperor of all the Russias and the personage described as the "Emperor of the Ottomans," there was added the diplomatic fiction that there was also war between their respective coun-

tries and their inhabitants. This, as I have already said, is just what there is not, and that it is not so forms the difference between this war and ordinary wars. The war, I repeat, is one in which the "Emperor of the Ottomans" has for his enemies, not only the subjects of the Emperor of all the Russias, but also those whom he calls his own subjects. Midhat's "country" is filled with rejoicing at the coming of those who, as that country hopes, will hinder any more Midhats from appearing among them. The people of Bulgaria, supposed in the words of the proclamation to be enemies of the Russian Emperor and his subjects, are welcoming him and them with delight as their deliverers from the "Emperor of the Ottomans" and the rest of the gang of foreign invaders. But for Lord Derby, Biela and Trnovo might have welcomed something better than either the old oppressors or the new deliverers. But they naturally welcomed the better of the two alternatives to which Lord Derby has narrowed their choice. Because Lord Derby deemed that separate Bulgarian independence lay beyond the range of practical politics, therefore Russian occupation has been practically proved to come within that range.

With regard to the war itself, I must decline all military criticisms, which it would be rash in me to attempt. I leave those who know such matters scientifically to explain the early successes, the later failures, of the Russian arms in Asia. But the Asiatic campaign, in the stage which it has as yet reached, can awaken little more than a purely military interest. I at least could not watch it with the same feelings with which I have watched the campaign on the Danube.

Warfare before Kars is merely a means to an end—warfare before Trebizond or Antioch might be something more—but the occupation of Trnovo, the passage of the Balkan, is the accomplishment of no small part of the end itself. To chase the Turk from one of the old seats of Bulgarian kingship is a moral as well as a military victory. But there has been one side of the struggle whose moral greatness has soared high over every other. Every one who has either a heart to feel or a brain to understand must have felt that the personal interest, so to speak, of the whole struggle lay, neither in Asia nor on the Danube, but on the Black Mountain. The oracle with whom we have already once or twice made ourselves merry speaks indeed of “the petty war with Montenegro.” Now it is just possible that a man who merely thinks that there are no Roumans south of the Danube may some day get up his geography and ethnology better ; but for a man who calls the Montenegrin struggle a “petty war” there is no hope. He is beyond all cure ; he is in the state which, when I was young at Oxford, we used to speak of as having lost his ἀρχή. That is to say, he has lost all power of judging ; there is no common ground from which men who still keep their reasoning powers in use can argue with him. Such a man, it is plain, can measure objects only according to their physical bigness : for him moral greatness has no meaning. To him a Montenegrin war seems but a petty affair, because the Montenegrins are numerically few and their country is physically small. To him the warfare of Marathön or Morgarten doubtless seems equally petty : the War of Independence in the Netherlands must seem to have been fought on a very petty field ; nay how petty

must England itself look on the map by the side of either Russia or Turkey. Such a man cannot understand that the greatness of Montenegro consists in the fact that the Montenegrins are few and that their territory is small. The moral greatness of Montenegro consists in its physical littleness ; it consists in the heroic resolution by which so small a people have for so many ages held their own against an enemy whose physical force was a hundred times greater than theirs. The struggle in Montenegro may not be, in a military sense, the most important part of the war ; it is undoubtedly that part round which the highest human interest gathers. The Russian army, engaged as it is in the noblest of causes, is still in its constitution an ordinary professional army. In Montenegro we have the higher spectacle of an armed nation, of a people among whom, age after age, every man has been ready to draw his yataghan against the implacable enemies of his faith and his national being. The sneerer at a "petty war" would find it hard to understand the breathless anxiety with which those who were parted only by a mountain-wall from the scene of the great struggle watched its course daily and hourly. It is a wonderful feeling to stand in perfect peace and safety, with the ordinary work of life going on around one, almost within cannon-shot of the strife which is to decide whether a people of heroes are to keep the freedom which their fathers have handed down to them, or are, after the fight of ages, to fall under the yoke of the savage enemy whom they have so long withstood. Day by day, almost hour by hour, the electric wire was bringing news. The lying tale of the Turk—which still it was hard to read without the fear that it might be true—often came



first. It was presently followed by the truer vision which brought comfort to every generous heart. Of the general result of the struggle there is now little doubt. No one could fear that in any fair fight the men of the Black Mountain would fail to do as they have ever done ; no one could doubt that, hand to hand, they would beat back the hosts of Sodom at any odds. But, on the other hand, it was clear that the barbarians, beaten to utter shame last year and this, were more eager than ever to achieve at last the overthrow of the unconquered land. And a barbarian leader, reckless of the lives of his men, might bring up successive armies to the slaughter till the small numbers of the defenders might be worn out by the mere work of slaughtering. Montenegro, in short, might be overcome as Leönidas was overcome at Thermopylai. Both predictions have to some extent come true. The Turks have entered the land ; they have played the Turk in the land ; and they have been driven out of the land. The dreams of setting up a Pasha at Cettinje have passed away ; the invading host, balked of its prey and fearfully lessened in its numbers, has found it convenient to march away to other fields. The great army which was to have subdued the whole land is gone, and the mountaineers, naturally enough rejecting some armistice of Lord Derby's devising, are carrying on local warfare with their usual success. Now the fact that the Turks were driven out of the land shows that Montenegrin valor stands as high as ever ; but the fact that they ever got into the land shows that Montenegrin generalship must have gone down a little since the days of Saint Peter and his two successors, spiritual and lay. And we must

remember that, among such a people as that of Montenegro, every man that falls is a personal loss to his prince and country. "One salmon's head is worth a thousand frogs," and the death of one hero is hardly counterbalanced by the slaughter of a thousand savages. Still the brave little state which has weathered so many storms has weathered this storm also. The unconquered land is still unconquered ; the dreams of the invaders have been but dreams ; the Sublime Porte has nothing to do but to growl and to lie over the utter overthrow of its vaunting hopes.

It is ominous that some of the troops which have marched away from the slaughter in Montenegro are said to have marched to the frontiers of free Greece. I have lately had some opportunities of studying the politics of the Greek kingdom. I am doubtless biassed in favour of a people in whom I have taken a deep interest all my days, and who have lately shown me what their feelings are towards one whom they are good enough to look on as having done them some service. But I think that I can judge their case pretty impartially. One thing is plain that, in the unutterable folly of our Eastern policy, we have been doing everything in our power to alienate a people whom it is really a hard task to alienate. Even later wrongs have not made the Greeks forget older benefits. People who do not get beyond conventional chatter may find it hard to believe that two of the most prominent feelings of the Greek mind are deep distrust—often rising into hatred—of Russia, and deep affection for England. But the incomprehensible theory of "British interests" leads us to neglect and snub a vigorous and rising race, a race eager for our

friendship, while we uphold the power of a worn-out gang of barbarians. The case of free Greece, her peculiar difficulties and dangers, has of late been more than once stated by her friend, <sup>1</sup> and every day that passes strengthens the case as it has been stated. Greek distrust of Russia is perfectly natural ; but, when it degenerates into a blind feeling of dislike to the Slaves in general, we come again to those old disunions and jealousies which, five hundred years back, enabled the Turk to make his way into Europe. The Greeks fear that the Russians, if successful, will draw a frontier unfavorable to them and favourable to the Bulgarians. Of all puzzles in the world the greatest is to know where the frontier is to be drawn, and I have often said that no one who wishes to keep the good will both of Greeks and of Slaves will undertake to draw it. But the Greeks are doubtless right in thinking that Russia, if left to herself, will give them less than their fair share. Now in such a case the obvious policy would seem to be to establish, by vigorous action in the common cause, such a claim on Russia as Russia cannot neglect. The annexation to the Greek kingdom of enslaved Greece, of the strictly Greek lands, Epeiros, Thessaly, Chalkidike Crete and the other islands which are still left in bondage, is an act of such manifest justice and policy that no one is likely to speak against it except these babblers about the "integrity of the Ottoman Empire" who would speak against any act of justice or policy. The question is as to the boundary in those lands which, like Macedonia and Thrace, are partly Greek and partly Slave. But surely every moment that Greece lets

<sup>1</sup> See the *Times*, May 22nd.

slip makes it more likely that the boundary to be drawn in those parts will be unfavourable to the Greeks. Nay, free Greece can hardly expect that even Epeiros and Thessaly will drop into her mouth without some action on her part. On the other hand, action is more dangerous for the Greeks than for any other people in those lands. Roumania can act in the rear of the Russian army ; the Turks are not likely to march to Bucharest just now. The original insurgents, the men of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had nothing to lose. But Greece has flourishing sea-part towns, and she has but small means of defending them, if the enslaver of Crete should go forth on a mission of destruction against Peiræus, Syra, Patras, Corfu, or Zante. Those towns lie open for the Asiatic barbarian and the European traitor to do their worst against them. The risk is fearful ; but without running the risk it is hard to see how Greece can rise above her present position ; and, if she does not rise above her present position, she will certainly fall below it. From the point of view of land warfare only, it might have been well to have chosen the moment when so large a barbarian force was employed against Montenegro. But the coast towns would have gained no safety by such a diversion. The popular feeling, when I was there, was strong for war, war to be waged by free Greece for the deliverance of enslaved Greece. From all that one hears the popular feeling is now even stronger than it was then. But it is easy to understand that a Government may shrink from such a risk. Still, without risking something, nothing can be gained ; and, if free Greece simply folds her arms and looks on, instead of gaining Ochrida or Philippopolis, she will have small

chance of gaining Larissa and Joannina. But mark how all this shows the folly of those who, five-and-forty years back, refused Greece a rational frontier. When Mahmoud was on his knees, it would have been as easy to draw the line at one point as at another. But silly diplomatists decreed that Greece should be "petty," and now silly scribblers sneer at her for being "petty."

But, whatever be the duty of Greece in a case of such perplexity, the duty of Englishmen is clear. It is not much that we can do while the foreign yoke is about our necks; but there is a good deal that we can hinder. The most reckless of Ministers can hardly dare to go to war in the teeth of the national will. He must be taught what the national will is. Things have come to this, that the Government of our own country must be watched as we should watch a foreign army. Their every action must be watched; any act which can tend to help the evil cause, any suspicious motions of fleets or armies, any more bragging speeches or insolent despatches, will be a new cause for the people to speak out and to say that it will have none of these things. The more those who have reason to fear the light try to shroud themselves in darkness, the more they must be dragged before the light; the more they "deprecate discussion," the more their every deed and word must be discussed. The enemy taunts us with having changed our minds since last autumn. We must show that we are of the same mind still. We must make him feel where the real sense, the real thought, of England lies. The work of last autumn, and especially the Saint James's Hall meeting, showed how thoroughly the two forms of intel-

lectual life were working together in that great movement. A man cannot attain eminence in any branch of learning or science without thought. He cannot rise to eminence in any department of practical life without thought. But he may lounge away all his life in a fashionable club, and may fancy himself wonderfully clever in so doing, without making use of any form of thought at all. In the list of conveners of the Saint James's Hall conference there was a remarkable union of practical men of business, men of weight in their local dwelling-places, side by side with men of mark in every branch of learned and scientific pursuit. There is hardly a form of intellectual eminence that was not represented on the list ; and, along with them and working in hearty fellowship with them, were the hard-headed men of central and northern England, men who have to use their brains in one way, as the learned and scientific class have to use their brains in another. That union must still go on. Each division of the band that was then united needs the help of the other, and each has every reason to work along with the other against the enemies with whom we have to strive, the representatives of mere fashion and chatter, of London "society" and London clubs. The English people, under its natural leaders of either class, must tell the enemy at home and abroad in words that no man can mistake that, tied and shackled as we are, if we cannot do what is good, we will at least hinder what is evil. We must tell them that not a drop of English blood shall be shed, that not a penny of English money shall be spent, in order to prop up the foulest fabric of wrong that the world ever saw, or in order to throw hindrance in the way of those who are engaged in the holy work of its destruction.











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